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ABSTRACT 
Two Essays on CEO Compensation and Investment Behavior 
Jonathan T. Fluharty-Jaidee 
This dissertation is composed of two essays which examine the risk-taking incentives severance 
provides to CEOs. The first essay of the dissertation examines how severance can allow CEOs to invest in ways 
that increase the cost of termination. This investment maneuver plays upon the initial cost of severance as an 
assurance from the board to the CEO that she will not be terminated without reason. As a result, the CEO can 
invest in ways which reduce her likelihood of termination by reducing the pool of potential challenging CEOs 
who might be successful in replacing her. This ‘barrier’ to internal governance then allows CEOs to shirk their 
responsibilities and lead the quiet life.  
The first essay tests the effects severance compensation on cash levels, capital expenditures, dividend 
yields, managerial specific investments, financial leverage, premiums paid for acquisitions, and lastly investment 
in R&D. Since Change-In-Control agreements occur in 73% of firms with severance agreements, this essay is 
the first to disentangle the incentives of either contract. Results suggest that when a CEO has a severance 
agreement they are likely to reduce cash levels to make it more difficult to pay out a severance package. They 
use the cash by increasing capital expenditures, managerial specific investments, or by overpaying for 
acquisitions. This essay reports confirming evidence that CEOs with severance invest less in R&D, suggesting 
that CEOs do shirk their responsibilities after reducing their likelihood of termination. Change-In-Control 
agreements, conversely, provide the incentive to increase investment in R&D, and reduce overpayment on 
acquisitions and managerial specific investments: suggesting that Change-In-Control agreements produce the 
incentive benefits that severance is intended to do.  
The second essay examines compensation contracts in an ex-post framework using real-options. To date, 
severance has not been included in the calculation of incentive measures as there has never been a method of 
valuing severance agreements. This essay provides a present value model of compensation agreements which 
includes severance contracts. The valuation of severance relies upon expectations of remaining tenure, which 
are innovatively estimated using CEO cohort ‘death tables’. The model shows that vega, a common measure of 
risk-taking incentives, is related to firm size which may drive results found in the literature linking vega to risky 
investment behavior. The model lends itself to the creation of a direct measure of risk-taking incentives, 
compensation gamma—the convexity of compensation portfolios.  
Results from the second essay suggest a positive and significant relationship between firm size and 
vega. Vega’s relationship to risk-taking incentives becomes less significant when gamma is included in the 
empirical tests. Gamma appears to be a significant determinant of risk-taking incentives and firm focus. Lastly, 
results show that vega, when severance is included in its construction, does not show a large change in risk-
taking incentives or firm focus. When severance is included in the construction of gamma, the relationship 
between gamma, risk-taking incentives and firm focus reverses, providing empirical evidence that severance 
may reduce risk-taking incentives and increase diversification by risk-averse CEOs.  
Together these essays present a conclusion that severance contracts may not produce the incentive to 
invest in risky projects as they are intended. Instead severance may provide incentives to invest in ways that 
make it costly to terminate the CEO for underperformance, reduce investment in risky-projects, and increase 
CEO risk-aversion. Additionally, vega’s relationship to risky investment may be driven by cofounding 
relationship between firm size and risky investment. Gamma is a direct measure of compensation incentives and 
by using this measure severance is seen to reduce risk-taking incentives. These results question the use of 
severance in compensation agreements, especially when change-in-control agreements appear to produce the 
investment incentives that severance is supposed to provide. 
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Essay One: Force-Fields, Risk-Taking, And Termination Pay: Severance’s 
Barrier to Internal Governance 
 
JEFF SMISEK’S TROUBLED TENURE AS CEO of United-Continental Holdings came to an 
end in September 2015, following the revelation of corrupt dealings with a US official. Smisek 
proved to be a problematic CEO1. He persistently neglected to update depreciating airliners and 
United-Continental hemorrhaged cash by the billions each year until declining gas prices in early 
2015 allowed operating cash flows to overtake an aggressive share repurchase program—propping 
up share prices while underlying performance waned2. During his tenure, United-Continental 
plummeted to the lowest ranked airline among consumer groups in the United States, and Smisek’s 
plan to strengthen and unify the workforce remained incomplete. Despite these performance 
issues, Smisek was only asked to step down after the corruption scandal was revealed, yet he still 
retained his severance package3. 
 How can a CEO, who makes poor investment decisions or shirks responsibilities, resist 
being replaced by a better fitting rival? Provided markets are efficient monitors, a moderately 
better opponent should replace an incumbent CEO if she is not producing adequate returns or is 
damaging the firm (Lehn and Zhao 2006). However, since severance is costly and initially 
dissuades the board from terminating an incumbent CEO, she can invest in ways which would 
                                                           
1 Smisek was listed as a nominee for the Worst CEO of 2013 by a CNBC poll. 
2 Instead, Smisek preferred to invest in gilded linings, including renovating United Airline lounges and luxury expenditures such 
as ‘marble cocktail tables’ for first class passengers. 
3 His severance package included a $5 million lump-sum payout plus additional costs of accrued compensation; unlimited life-time 
flights; his corporate car; and restricted stock compensation: in all, roughly 37 million dollars. 
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increase the cost of termination—causing the board to need stronger justifications for termination 
since her departure is costlier than originally planned.  
My contribution is to show how CEOs invest to alter the relative cost of severance after 
compensation contracts are negotiated. When a CEO foresees their own potential replacement 
because of a rival’s appearance, she pre-emptively invests in ways that reduces the likelihood of 
success for that challenger. The incumbent CEO can achieve this goal by forcibly reducing the fit 
of the firm with respect to the rival CEO; by reducing the pool of potential candidates; or by simply 
making it more difficult to pay out the severance contract. So long as a challenging CEO’s 
probability of producing cashflow gains appears lower than the incumbent’s, the incumbent CEO 
will not be replaced. This provides a means by which, barring external events (e.g. a scandal, fraud, 
etc.), CEOs remain in power even while they underperform or under-invest.  In the long-run, the 
incumbent can implement board-level entrenchment by seating her own directors and establishing 
loyalty programs.  
These investment choices, which raise the costs of termination, introduce barriers to 
internal governance and allow for the CEO to act upon the perverse incentives that severance 
creates (e.g. shirking); subsequently, severance is the lynchpin which allows CEOs to initially 
remain in power while underperforming before they can entrench themselves.  
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows: I discuss the relevant literature and 
develop the hypotheses in Section I. In Section II, I present the collection and summary; in Section 
III I discuss the empirical methodology. In Section IV, I provide an analysis of the data and 
discussion of the results. Section V concludes with a discussion on the implications of the findings.  
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I. Hypothesis Development 
I.1 Literature Review  
 
Severance is considered an important component of compensation portfolios as it is 
intended to spur investment and assure the CEO that they will not be fired without reason (Almazan 
and Suarez 2003; Inderst and Mueller 2008; Gillan, Hartzel and Parrino 2009; Manso 2011; Ju, 
Leland and Senbet 2014). However, there is some evidence that severance does the opposite and 
allows CEOs to shirk their responsibilities, make poor investment decisions, or live the ‘quiet life’ 
(Hicks 1935; Bertrand and Mullianathan 2003; Atanassov 2013; Muscarella and Zhao 2017). The 
question remains as to how CEOs can continue to underperform and not be terminated for such 
behavior. Since shirking, poor investment, and underperformance are observed in recently hired 
CEOs who have a severance contract, entrenchment cannot be the immediate answer (Muscarella 
and Zhao 2017).  
Almazan and Suarez (2003) (A&S) model severance in an optimal compensation contract 
through a 4-stage negotiation process. In their model, an incumbent CEO faces the potential arrival 
of a challenging CEO whose quality is observable to the incumbent after the incumbent’s 
compensation contract is designed but before she selects her investment scheme. A&S’s solution 
results in a contract that includes performance pay, control rents, and some positive level of 
severance which is efficient in getting the CEO to invest in a way that produces a high probability 
of returns for shareholders4.  
In A&S’s model, if the board observes a rival who is moderately better than the incumbent 
CEO, the board finds it optimal to replace the incumbent if, and only if, the expected cashflow 
                                                           
4 The amount of severance is set relative to the performance pay and control rents to balance the incentives.  
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gains under the rival CEO are greater than the sum of the incumbent’s expected performance pay 
and severance contract5. So long as the incumbent CEO’s severance compensation is low enough 
relative to the expected cash-flow gains under the rival CEO, the incumbent CEO will be replaced. 
If severance is too low, the incumbent CEO will be replaced whenever any slightly better 
challenger arrives. Consequently, a CEO without a severance agreement may not have time to 
invest before she is replaced: resulting in an ever-changing management team and value 
destruction for the firm6. To solve this dilemma, A&S conclude that there must be some amount 
of severance to form a commitment to the CEO that she will not be terminated before she can 
invest7.  
Yet, A&S show that severance contracts are large enough only to induce investment but 
not so large that the CEO may shirk their responsibilities. However, I argue that CEOs can alter, 
or side-step, this constraint after negotiating their compensation agreement. By making specific 
investment choices, CEOs can reduce the set of potential rival candidates who could produce 





                                                           
5 Conditional on the probability of success of the challenger CEO. 
6 Referred to in Almazan and Suarez (2003) as the Time Inconsistency Dilemma. 
7 Because of these constraints, the optimal severance package is equal to the possible profits under a low-quality rival and the cost 
of compensating the incumbent CEO. In this case, severance compensation is set high enough to provide a credible signal to the 
CEO that the board will not terminate her when a slightly better CEO appear—so long as the incumbent CEO is willing to invest. 




I.2 Hypotheses  
 
Methods for reducing a rival CEO’s expected probability of success or increasing the cost 
of termination are not necessarily poor investment schemes and may have high probabilities of 
success—none-the-less they reduce the board’s likelihood to terminate the incumbent.  
Such investment schemes include: (1) altering the cash structure of the firm—i.e. reducing 
surplus cash, increasing capital expenditures or dividend payouts (Harford et al. 2008); (2) 
managerial specific investments, which become less-valuable (or worthless) as a result of the 
CEO’s departure (Shleifer and Vishny 1989)8; or, (3) by reducing financial flexibility and 
overpaying for acquisitions (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited 2011; Lehn and Zhao 2006). 
Lastly, after erecting the barrier CEOs may have the incentive to shirk resulting in under-
investment in R&D (Muscarella and Zhao 2017).  I consider each of these investment schemes 
individually as testable hypotheses below.  
I.2.1 Cash and Dividends, and Capital Expenditures 
 
To increase the relative costs of termination, the incumbent CEO may attempt to reduce 
available cash that could be used to pay for the severance compensation package. Harford et al. 
(2008) argue that CEOs who face weak-boards may reduce cash by spending it internally, 
purchasing perquisites, and increasing capital expenditures—each of which increases the control-
rents the CEO obtains and decreases the likelihood of termination by reducing cash available to 
pay severance.  
CEOs may also increase dividends. Since dividends are sticky, increasing the dividend 
results in a long-term commitment to shareholders, and a challenging CEO would find it difficult 
                                                           
8 See also Kale, Kedia, and Williams (2015) for applications and estimations of RSI with respect to severance.  
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to reduce dividends owing to their stickiness9.  This not only reduces the viable sources of cash to 
the firm but directly reduces the probability of success for the potential challenging CEO. 
Furthermore, incumbent CEOs may appear to out-perform rivals as shareholders experience short-
run increases in share performance, either through false signals of future performance or 
differences between short- and long-term discounts of expected dividends, despite long-run 
depletion of value (Miller and Modigliani 1961; Watts 1973; Baker and Wurgler 2016).  
Therefore, when a CEO has a severance agreement, I expect to observe that their firms 
exhibit lower cash levels (Hypothesis 1), increased levels of dividends (Hypothesis 2), and 
increased capital expenditures (Hypothesis 3).  
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between severance pay and cash levels of firms.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between severance and dividend yield. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between severance and capital expenditure 
intensity. 
 
I.2.2 Management Specific Investments and Relationship Specific Investments 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) discuss management specific investments (MSIs) and show 
that management makes investments that are tied to their personalities, knowledge sets, or 
relationship networks as a means of making themselves ‘irreplaceable’ to the firm. For example,  
MSI occurs when a CEO specifically makes an acquisition in a field she has a specific expertise 
but were that expertise is not widely found in rival management, (e.g. Elon Musk investing Tesla 
                                                           
9 See, for example, Linter (1956); Bhattacharya (1979); DeAngelo et al. (1992); Fama and French (2001); Jagannathan, Stephens, 
and Weisbach (2001); Grullon and Michaely (2002); Baker and Wurgler (2005) or a review of dividend payout policy.  
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Motors, Inc., an auto. manufacture, into SolarCity Corp., a solar panel manufacturer—few rival 
CEOs may have expertise in both auto manufacturing and solar panel manufacturing).  
Because MSIs are non-recoverable expenditures, a large cost would be incurred by the firm 
if the incumbent were to be replaced. In the context of A&S’s model, there is a foreseeable 
contingent loss that arises in the event of the incumbent CEO’s replacement that is viewed ex-ante 
by the board; thereby, the board will only terminate the CEO when the expected profit from a rival 
CEO is so great as to compensate for the contingent loss of the MSI plus the incumbent’s severance 
and other compensation.  
While Shleifer and Vishny proposed management specific investment in 1989, there is a 
lack of empirical research surrounding MSI due to the cost and difficulty in obtaining sample data. 
To extract MSI one would need to match CEO knowledge sets to investment programs—which 
would produce a noisy measure. Due to this difficulty in establishing a direct firm-CEO specific 
measure of MSI, I propose using a proxy of relationship specific investment which are related to 
the management’s personality or knowledge set.  
 Following Kale, Kedia and Williams (2015), relationship specific investments (RSIs) 
among vendor-customer pairs can serve as a proxy for MSI as it proxies for the relationship 
between management of the two firms. Such investments may be exceptionally specific to the 
CEO and the relationship upon which the investment predicates may find itself strained should the 
CEO be replaced—which is similar to the concept of MSI. This is realized as a reduction in the 
pool of high quality challengers as well as making it more expensive to terminate the incumbent 
CEO. I expect to observe increased MSI for CEOs compensated with severance agreements 
(Hypothesis 4); however, since a measure of MSIs is difficult to obtain, I use RSI as a proxy. 
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Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between severance pay and the amount of 
relationship specific investment.  
 
I.2.3 Increased Debt and Premiums on Acquisitions  
 
To make it less likely that a rival will succeed a CEO may attempt invest in a way that is 
difficult to unwind or takes a long-time to payoff.  A CEO may reduce her firm’s financial 
flexibility to make it difficult for a replacement to maneuver. Secondarily, the CEO could lever up 
the firm and appropriate the funds in MSI, capital expenditures, or acquisitions.  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Whited (2011) consider the effects of unused debt capacity as a 
key component of flexibility and show that increased financing constraints can limit flexibility and 
the ability to fund future investment. Gamba and Triantis (2008) construct a model to explain 
financial flexibility and the reversibility of capital borrowing and how these factors affect future 
investment10. Furthermore, Fazzari et al. (1988) show that firms with higher financial constraints 
have higher sensitivity to investment cash-flows: forwarding the prior argument that lean-cash 
flows may cause a range of just sufficient cash under which only current management can operate. 
I expect to observe higher levels of leverage for CEOs who have a severance agreement 
(Hypothesis 5).   
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between severance pay and financial leverage. 
Incumbent CEOs may also overpay for firms. Lehn and Zhao (2006) perform an analysis 
of the likelihood that a CEO is terminated after making a ‘bad’ bid for the firm. They find that the 
                                                           
10 Capital structure and financing capacity’s effects on firm growth and value have long since been studied in a vibrant literature: 
Myers (1977); Myers and Majluf (1984); Fazzari et al. (1988); Whited (1992); Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001); Moyen 
(2004): as a varied list covering different hypothesis on the broad topic.  
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probability of CEO turnover after the event of a ‘bad’ bid and acquisition—defined as an over-
priced bid/offer—depends upon how over-priced that bid was and to the performance of the 
acquiring firm’s shares thereafter.  Lehn and Zhao (2006) provide evidence that internal conditions 
may work in terminating value-destructive CEOs; however, in their model a CEO who is 
compensated with severance is able to make more self-serving or worse bids than CEOs who do 
not have the protection of severance. Thereby I expect to see CEOs, who are compensated with a 
severance agreement, to increase premiums paid on acquisitions relative to their non-severance 
compensated counter-parts (Hypothesis 6).  
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between severance pay and premiums on 
acquisitions. 
 
I.2.4 Shirking Hypothesis 
 
If a CEO invest in any of the previous schemes and is able to effectively reduce the 
likelihood the board will terminate her, she may be able to shirk their responsibilities. A&S allow 
for such an event so long as severance compensation is more expensive than the control-rents and  
pay-performance the CEO obtains due to low-success or no investment. This result only holds if 
the CEO is not terminated due to non-investment, which can only occur if they are protected by a 
barrier11.  
 If a CEO can make it more expensive for the board to terminate her when it is optimal for 
the board to do so, she can thereafter shirk responsibilities until the board deems it favorable to 
                                                           
11 Alamzan and Suarez (2003) detail the investment compatibility constraint as a reason the CEO will invest or be terminated for 
not investing, the CEO can only violate the ICC when the value of severance exceeds that of control rents and pay performance—
the board will observe this violation when the CEO makes severance reasonably expensive to implement, allowing them to shirk 
in the sequential game. The force-field is the mechanism that allows the CEO to rationally violate of the ICC.  
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pay her severance as well as any costs associated with her replacement. Such events do not save 
the firm value as they end up renegotiating with the CEO who extracts a higher severance pay to 
agree to the replacement (Almazan and Suarez 2003). As a result, a CEO could shirk her 
responsibilities and under-invest. Muscarella and Zhao (2017) find empirical evidence that CEOs 
who have a severance agreement are likely to exhibit shirking behavior.  If shirking does occur, it 
is because severance allows the CEO to protect themselves from the board’s termination 
capabilities in some way. Like Muscarella and Zhao (2017), I should observe decreased investment 
in R&D intensity or a negative and significant relationship between severance pay and R&D 
intensity if there is evidence of shirking behavior which confirms a barrier to internal governance.  
 
II. Variable Description and Data Collection  
 
II.1 Variable Description and Construction 
 
This study uses data from Compustat and ExecuComp on the period ranging from 2008 to 
2015 to control for potential errors in the compensation database12. I obtain ExecuComp’s 
TERM_PYMT and CHG_CTRL_PYMT values—each which represent termination payments and 
change-in-control payments total value, respectively—reported in millions of dollars. Termination 
Payments, a.k.a. severance, are cash payments made to CEOs if they are terminated ‘without 
                                                           
12 Although Cadman, et al. (2016) document the errors in the ExecuComp database, a hand collected sample of 100 firms for 2007 
through 2014 revealed that in more recent years the accuracy of the data has significantly improved. This may have occurred for 
several reasons, (1) as shown in Cadman et al. (2016) firms now report tables as required by SEC regulation rather than negligently 
reporting data in the form of a paragraph. Due to this increase in accuracy of use of tables over paragraphs, the ExecuComp data 
collectors appear have better access to data points where they previously would have cast the data to ‘0’ or ‘missing’ assuming no 
severance or change-in-control payment existed where a table did not. As Cadman et al. (2016) makes use of 2006 and 2007, the 
years in which the SEC regulation switch-over occurred, it is perhaps not surprising that reporting has improved in later years; (2) 
Compustat IQ may have responded to the issues described in Cadman et al. (2016) and adjusted their data collection techniques. 
11 
 
cause’13. Change-in-Control payments, a.k.a. golden parachutes, result from either a single or 
double-trigger event following a merger or acquisition14. The amounts listed in the ExecuComp 
database represent the contractually obligated amounts negotiated in the prior year between the 
CEO and their compensation committee.  
Using the values reported for TERM_PYMT as a measure for severance I scale it by Total 
Assets to construct the measure % Termination Payment. I additionally construct % Change-In-
Control Payment in the same fashion using CHG_CTRL_PYMT. To control for cash 
compensation, I collect each CEO’s Salary, Bonus¸ Value of Stock Awards, Value of Option 
Awards, Non-Equity Incentive Compensation, and Other Compensation. Each of these values are 
directly obtained from ExecuComp15. I also collect the data relating to tenure, reported as CEO 
Continuous Tenure, which measures the amount of time a CEO has continuously remained in 
office, and the CEO Age which is the current age they are in any given year within the panel.  
Since severance is affects risk-taking behavior it is important to examine the effects of 
severance in the same model as measures of incentives to take risk, delta and vega. Delta or the 
Portfolio and Vega of the Portfolio respectively are constructed using the same methodology found 
in Kale and Meneghetti (2011)16. The values are presented in thousands of dollars ($000) change 
in portfolio value per a 1-dollar change in the underlying share price for Delta of the Portfolio, and 
                                                           
13 ‘Cause’ typically refers to an issue of moral turpitude and does not generally refer to a lack of performance. A CEO who is fired 
for poor performance would be fired ‘without cause’, a CEO who is fired due to a scandal may be terminated ‘with cause’ and not 
receive their severance pay; although there are exceptions to these cases. 
14 A single trigger change-in-control agreement would pay an executive simply if the firm was acquired or merged (i.e. the executive 
need not be terminated). A double trigger change-in-control agreement pays an executive should a firm be acquired or merged (the 
first trigger) and that executive was then let go (the second trigger). Single trigger agreements are rare in comparison to ubiquitous 
double-trigger agreements.  
15 Reported in thousands of dollars in ExecuComp, rescaled to millions.  
16 I am permanently indebted to Costanza Meneghetti (WVU Department of Finance) for providing me with the code to make these 
estimations from extracted ExecuComp data sets which follows the code provided by Lalitha Naveen on her website from Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2014). These calculations are based on the Black and Scholes option valuation and make corrections using the 
FAS 123R changes in ExecuComp.  
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thousands of dollars ($000) change in portfolio value per 1% change in volatility of the underlying 
share price for Vega of the Portfolio.  
For firm level controls, I construct each firm’s R&D Intensity, following Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006), where R&D expenditure is scaled by total assets. Likewise, I obtain firms’ capital 
expenditures which are then scaled by Net Property, Plant and Equipment (NPP&E) to form 
Capital Expenditure Intensity. I also collect or construct other firm level variables including each 
firm’s Market-to-Book ratio, Log Sales, Book Financial Leverage, Market Financial Leverage, 
Sales Growth, Taxes, and Cash-To-Assets. I use a rolling 60-month variance of firm’s returns to 
compute Volatility. Lastly, I collect each firm’s EBITDA, Operating Cash Flows, and Financial 
Cash Flows. I compute each firm’s average Dividend Yield over the past three years as a measure 
of their average dividend payout relative to their share price. 
As in Kale, Kedia and Williams (2015), to compute the variable for customer segment sales 
I form a weighted average of customer R&D using the percentage of customer sales to total sales 
for a supplier firm as weights taken from the customer-segments database within Compustat. I 
delineate customer R&D for each supplier firm in the matched ExecuComp database as Customer 
R&D Intensity.  
For acquisition related data, I obtain variables for the Date of the Announcement of an 
acquisition, the Acquirer, the Target, as well as firm level controls for the Target from SDC 
Platinum for all reported acquisitions from 2008 to 2015 which are over 5 million dollars in value 
where the acquirer is a U.S. based firm. Additionally, I collect information about each specific 
deal, including the amount of ownership before and after the transaction—which allows me to 
construct a ToeHold categorical variable which is one (1) when the firm purchases less than 5% of 
the target firm after the deal completes and zero otherwise (Schwert 1996; Officer 2003; 
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Meneghetti and Williams 2017). SDC reports a deal’s ‘hostility’ through their “Attitude” variable, 
allowing me to construct an indicator variable, Hostile, which is set equal to one (1) when the deal 
is deemed hostile or unsolicited and zero otherwise17. Similarly, I use indicator variables provided 
by SDC Platinum to control for Tender Offers (Tender), Asset Swaps (Asset Swap), and White 
Knights (White) if the acquisition fell into those categories.  
II.2 Description of Data: Univariate Analysis  
 
The sample contains all CEO-firm pairs with non-missing observations in the Compustat 
database, between 2008 and 2015. Across the full sample there are 1,424 individual firms 
comprising a total of 6,631 firm-year pairs and among these firm-years there are a total of 1,630 
distinct CEO-firm pairs. When matching to the segment data for reported customer sales the 
sample size reduces to a supplier-customer-year triplet of 2,755.  
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, and quartile groups for variables 
implemented in the estimations throughout the paper. Change-In-Control Payments, is nearly two 
times the amount of Termination Payments at $13 million versus $6.44 million, respectively18. Of 
the 6,631 firm-years, 5,724 of those are firms which have positive Change-In-Control Payments 
and 4,800 have positive Termination Payments. This indicates that over the total sample 86.3% of 
the firm-year pairs have change-in-control agreements and 72.4% have severance agreements. Of 
                                                           
17 SDC Platinum additionally reports an “Unsolicited” variable as well as a “Change In Attitude” variable. Unsolicited is more 
generic variable that provides less information than that of the “Attitudes” variable as many unsolicited bids are also considered to 
be friendly in nature. However, it is important in some instances if one were to consider bids on a case by case basis to control for 
a change in attitude as provided by SDC. Otherwise a bid set may start as Hostile and switch to Friendly—particularly if a White 
Squire or a White Knight bid comes into play that dominates any Black Knight or Hostile bids. Since I am testing completed 
deals—I do not directly address this feature here and only use the ending result of the deals as to whether they are considered 
Hostile or not.  
18 The changes in SEC regulation requires that firms not only report cash payments of severance but any payments which occur after the CEO is 
released of duties. This includes life insurance, health benefits, restricted stock grants, unvested options, etc. But most importantly it also includes 
adjusted payments to Pensions which are often specified in the contracts “to be released in a lump-sum upon termination.” Curiously the valuation 
for this amount of payment is a complicated equation designated often to be related to the CEO’s 60 th birthday and a certain level of compensation 
related to how long the CEO has been with the firm and how long they remain with the firm after they turn 60 and said to be an actuarial equation 
relating the present value of same. As such, estimating such payment would be nearly impossible for an outsider to the firm, since each firm may 
use whatever actuarial measurements they deem appropriate.  
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the distinct firms in the sample, 1,112 of the firms list a positive Change-In-Control Payments for 
all years in the sample; 142 never list a change-in-control agreement, and 170 firms have a change-
in-control agreement in some years but not all. For Termination Payments: 296 never report a 
termination agreement, and the remaining 1,141 report a termination agreement at all points in the 
sample. Together these numbers suggest somewhat higher levels of reported severance and 
change-in-control payments than previously reported in the literature19.  
The average CEO in the sample is 56 years of age. CEOs must have been CEO for at least 
1 year to enter in the sample and the average CEO is in office a continuous 6.42 years. It appears 
that the average CEO in the sample does quite well in any given year and receives an annual total 
(present value) compensation of $5 million ($2.5 million in the median) not including any change-
in-control payments or termination payments20.  
Since the occurrence of severance and change-in-control agreements are highly correlated 
(e.g. correlation of 73%)21, I use the continuous variables even though there is a marginal potential 
for collection error as reported in Cadman et al. (2016). Estimation using indicator variables may 
not accurately reflect the reality in this situation (i.e. dummy variable trap) and continuous 
variables are necessary to discern the different effects between severance and change-in-control 




                                                           
19 Extant literature tends to focus on the S&P 500 Index as a convenient sample for this analysis. Although I make use of a larger 
sample, a necessity with the use of simultaneous equation modeling, I also performed estimation on the convenience sample of the 
S&P 500 and found the same reporting of Severance and Change-In-Control agreements at roughly 41.3% of the sample. This 
matches results in the prior literature.  
20 Including Salary, Bonus, Stock Awards, Option Awards, Non-Equity Incentive Pay, and Other Compensation 
21 Correlation Matrices can be found in the Appendix II.  
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Vega, delta, severance and change-in-control agreements are all determined 
simultaneously by the compensation committee during the negotiation process. Thus, it is 
necessary to estimate a system of simultaneous equations (SSE) under 3SLS as in Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen (2006).  
 I employ a system of five equations each with the endogenous-dependent variables being 
Variable of Interest (i.e. Cash-to-Assets, Dividend Yield, Capital Expenditure Intensity, Financial 
Leverage, Premium On Acquisition, and R&D Intensity), Delta of the Portfolio, Vega of the 
Portfolio, Termination Payment, and Change-in-Control Payment. The remainder of the 
construction closely follows that of Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006). B, G and Z represent control 
variable arrays and are described in Appendix II. The model for the system is given below:
  
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡  =      𝛾1,1𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +




=      𝛾1,3𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +
=                                          
=      𝛾1,5𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +
𝛾2,1𝐶ℎ𝑔. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3,1𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4,1𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 +1𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟏+1𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟏+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟏+ 𝑎1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
𝛾2,2𝐶ℎ𝑔. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +                   𝛾4,2𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  +2𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟐+2𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟐+2𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟐+ 𝑎2 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
𝛾2,3𝐶ℎ𝑔. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +




                                         +3𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟑+3𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟑+3𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟑 + 𝑎3 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝛾4,4𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  +4𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟒+4𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟒+4𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟒 + 𝑎4 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝛾4,5𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  +5𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟓+5𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟓+5𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟓 + 𝑎5 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 
            (eq. 1) 
Variables are changed depending on the estimation performed and the variable of interest. 
Specific construction of the equations can be implied from their table; where a variable’s parameter 
estimate is missing in the specification, it is excluded from the system. All estimations use year 
and industry fixed effects but are not reported for brevity. 
To control for effects of cash-flows on cash levels I include controls for operating, and 
financing cash flows. At the CEO level in include variables relating to components of the 
compensation portfolios and CEO characteristics which might affect incentives; such as, Salary, 
Bonus, Stock Awards, Options Awards, Non-Equity Incentive, Other Compensation, CEO 
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Continuous Tenure, CEO Age. I implement several firm-level controls: Market-To-Book Ratio, 
Log Sales, Financial Leverage, Sales Growth, Dividend Yield, Tax Rate, Volatility, EBITDA, 
following the prior literature to control for firm value, size, growth, profitability, and riskiness. 
Through-out the 3SLS SSE estimates I implement much of the same controls for each estimation 
with some variations depending on the dependent variable of interest. This allows me to maintain 
consistency across estimations and cross examine results.  
IV. Results 
 
IV.1 Corporate Cash Holdings and the Force-Fields 
 
If the hypothesis that severance pay agreements allow the CEO to create a barrier to 
termination are correct and CEOs increase spending on capital expenditures (Hypothesis 3), 
dividends (Hypothesis 2) or acquisitions (Hypothesis 6), then I expect cash-to-asset ratios to have 
a negative relationship with severance (Hypothesis 1); and capital expenditures, dividend yields, 
and premiums paid on acquisitions to have a positive relationship with severance. I test Hypothesis 
1 in the simultaneous system in Table 2, where Cash-To-Assets is the dependent variable. 
In Table 2, the coefficients on Termination Payment are negative and significant indicating 
a negative relationship between cash levels and expectations of severance pay. To estimate the 
economic significance, I compute a sensitivity (elasticity) estimate of severance on cash-to-assets 
using the parameter estimates and sample means to form a point-estimate22. Coefficients from 
Table 2 imply that a 1% increase in severance pay can lead to a 0.1125% drop in cash-to-assets. 
                                                           
22 Sensitivity is computed as the values produced from SSE do not directly map to economic values and their effects are marginal 
with respect to the entire system. 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟.𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝𝑦𝑚𝑡(
𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑃𝑦𝑚𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝐴𝑣𝑔.𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
), i.e. 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚,𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =
𝛽𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑝𝑚𝑡(





To put things in perspective a change in severance from the 50th percentile (median) to the 75th 
percentile ($1.8 million in the median to $6.34 million) predicts an effective 28.375% reduction in 
cash-to-assets ratios: were a 1% change in severance pay is approximately $60,000 at the mean.  
The results from Table 2 support the idea that severance agreements may hinder 
governance capabilities of the board by reducing the cash available as theorized in Jensen 1986. 
To determine where the cash goes I re-estimate the SSE using both Capital Expenditure Intensity 
(Hypothesis 3) and Dividend Yield (Hypothesis 2) as the dependent variables. Results are in Tables 
3 and 4, respectively.  
Results in Table 3 indicate that the relationship between Termination Pay and Capital 
Expenditure Intensity is positive and significant. This implies that severance agreements increase 
investment in low-risk assets and indicates decreased risk-taking on behalf of the CEO (Coles et 
al 2006). In the case of Change-In-Control Payments it appears that CEO’s reduce investment in 
low-risk projects. Additionally, I document that Change-in-Control Payments have a positive 
relationship with vega  consistent with Lambert and Larcker (1985) and  Hartzel, Ofek, and 
Yermack (2004).  
Next, I investigate whether a CEO attempts to reduce cash levels by increasing dividends 
as in Baker and Wurgler (2016) (Hypothesis 2). The results of the estimation with Dividend Yield 
as the dependent variable are presented in Table 4. There does not appear to be a significant effect 
of severance compensation on dividend yields; however, there does appear to be an effect of 
dividend yields on the valuation of Termination Payments and Change-In-Control Payments. The 
results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 support the intuition that CEOs reduce cash levels by increasing capital 




IV.2 Management Specific Investments 
 
 Next, I test the hypothesis that incumbent CEOs make MSIs to make themselves 
irreplaceable to the firm and increase the effective cost of termination. To test this hypothesis since 
it is difficult to construct a direct measures of MSI, I follow Kale, Kedia, and Williams (2015) and 
use relationship specific investment (RSI). I relate the effects via severance on MSI as proxied by 
RSI for the abstraction of ‘managerial specific’ investment. As in Kale, Kedia and Williams (2015) 
and Kale and Shahrur (2007), I test for the increase in RSI using customer R&D Intensity—a 
weighted average of the customer sales for the supplier firm. The supplier firm is matched to the 
firm of a given CEO of interest, and I include the customer-level vega and delta.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, Table 5 indicates a positive and significant relationship 
between severance pay and the level of customer R&D Intensity, suggesting that CEOs do increase 
RSI/MSI investment when compensated with severance agreements a result that is consistent with 
the theory of Shleifer and Vishny (1989). This effect is economically significant, as coefficients 
in Table 5 imply that a 1% increase in termination pay results in a 2.08% increase in customer 
R&D intensity. This suggests that increases in severance may lead to large increases in managerial 
specific investment as proxied through RSI. 
IV.3 Financial Flexibility and Acquisition Over-Payment  
 
 Do CEOs increase firm leverage to reduce financing capacity and increase external market 
frictions to future borrowing? (Hypothesis 5) (Fazzari, et al. 1988; Gamba and Triantis 2008). I 
estimate the SSE using Financial Leverage, the firm’s market debt ratio, as the endogenous 
dependent variable in the system—results are reported in Table 6.  
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The results show there is a positive and significant relationship between severance pay and 
Financial Leverage and a negative and significant relationship between change-in-control pay and 
Financial Leverage. These effects appear to be solely direct effects as neither the Delta or Vega of 
the Portfolio of the CEO appear to be significantly related with Financial Leverage. A 1% increase 
in severance pay predicts an increase of 0.4867% in financial leverage measures (debt to assets), 
or a 125.46% increase in financial leverage when moving from the 50th to 75th percentile. Given 
the mean of financial leverage in the sample is 24% this constitutes an increase of financial 
leverage to 54.11% (debt to assets), a significant change.  
Next, I investigate the effects of severance on premiums paid for acquisitions. Do CEOs 
compensated with severance over-pay for acquisitions (Hypothesis 6) (Lehn and Zhao 2006)?  As 
there is an error in the reported deal value from SDC with respect to fees and shares acquired in 
the transaction as SDC relies on reported values, I construct a Tobin’s Q-style measure of the 
premium (i.e. the relative value of the total deal value to the total net assets paid for the firm at the 
time of the acquisition) 23. The second reason for this specific use rather than a percentage premium 
of the prior share price is that it allows me to retain more than twice the number of reported mergers 
which otherwise would fall out of the sample due to non-reporting. Using this alternative 
calculation, I can employ a total of 172 unique individual bids per date-acquirer-target group 
compared to only 70 using the construction of premiums via share price24. I performed individual 
                                                           
23 The reason for this is twofold: firstly, in using the standard construction of the deal reported in price-per-share I found that this 
price includes the total value of the transaction—inclusive of flotation costs and fees paid to advisors of both firms. Such an error 
could alter the result, furthermore to redact the fees paid by using the SDC Platinum reported variable for Target and Acquirer 
Financial Advisor Fees, I need to be able to accurately gross up the value by the number of shares acquired in the transaction. 
Unfortunately, it appears that the SDC database sometimes incorrectly reports the number of shares acquired in the transaction. 
Secondarily, while SDC also reports the percentage of shares acquired of the total outstanding, this number is not always reported. 
While it is possible to traverse back and forth between the total listed deal value, using SDC’s Value of Transaction Mil variable, 
and the listed deal share price, in many cases a large error is introduced.  
24 The unfortunately low amount of observations for this set is due to the multiple merging and need for likewise cross-reporting 
between multiple databases including Compustat, ExecuComp, CRSP, and SDC Platinum. The resulting full merge produces a 
combined sample of 762 observations, only 172 of which are usable due to non-reported data. It might be possible to iteratively 
collect by hand the remaining 590 observations to fill-the-gap, however, as the scope of this essay is not to address M&A activity 
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regressions (not reported) which indicate that they do produce similar results in the signs of the 
parameter estimates. This is sufficient to ascertain directional causation—and so I include the 
analysis of the 172 acquisition bids here.    
This Tobin’s Q-style premium measure captures the full premium on the transaction as the 
relative value of the assets acquired tells us the under- or over-valuation of the firm relatively 
speaking. Just as Tobin’s Q measures the valuation of market-capital relative to assets this measure 
of premium should capture the relative over- or under- valuation on acquisition25. Using this 
premium as the endogenous dependent variable in the regression as well as using an indicator 
variable for whether the acquisition was a ToeHold, a White-Knight (or White Squire) acquisition, 
an Asset Swap, or a Tender offer I perform the 3SLS estimation to discern the effects of severance 
and change-in-control payments on premiums26.  
Using this estimation, I measure the relationship between how efficiently CEOs negotiate 
acquisitions and severance agreements. If severance payments allow CEOs to habitually overpay 
for firms they acquire, then there will be a positive and significant relationship between premiums 
paid for acquisition and severance pay (Hypothesis 6).  
Results in Table 7 indicate strong evidence of a positive and significant relationship 
between premiums paid on acquisitions and severance pay. However, there is a significant and 
negative relationship in the level of premiums paid and change-in-control agreements. The average 
Tobin’s Q-style measure is a positive 28.6% and change-in-control payments may reduce this 
                                                           
itself, but rather investigate evidence of increased premium due to severance using the data at hand—I do not perform this data 
acquisition due to the difficulty and time involved.  
25 In the construction, I use the percentage of shares acquired as a scaling factor for assets where needed and reported in order to 
correct for percentage purchased when it is not 100%. 
26 White-Knight and Asset Swap indicator variables were dropped from the regression and not reported in the table as they 
introduced direct multi-collinearity into the model.  
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significantly. These results suggest that severance could be a value destructive contract for firms 
to implement which is in contrast to Almazan and Suarez (2003), but similar to Lehn and Zhao 
(2006) and Gormley and Matsa (2016) who suggest that only external governance will result in 
termination. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between severance pay and financial 
leverage. With respect to economic significance, it appears that a 1% increase in severance pay 
results in a 0.8506% increase in the Tobin’s Q measure. Since the mean of the premium measure 
is 127.81 a jump from 50th to 75th percentile in severance predicts premium increase by 60.97. 
Given that the Tobin premium measure has a standard deviation of 45.77, this is not unreasonable 
but does suggest a jump of one standard deviation in the amount of premium paid.  
IV.4 CEO Risk-Taking, The Quiet Life and Shirking Hypothesis 
 
 If the CEO is protected by a barrier she may exhibit reduced risk-taking as there is less 
incentive or concern for him to take risks. This is known as the ‘Quiet Life’ or ‘Shirking 
Hypothesis’ proposed by Muscarella and Zhao (2017) and supported in the model provided by 
A&S. To exhibit the quiet life a CEO must be insured that she will not be fired for under-investing 
and limited returns. Thereby severance is what allows CEOs to get away with leading the quiet 
life.  
Results in Table 8 show that severance is negatively and significantly related to R&D 
Intensity suggesting that CEOs which are compensated with a severance agreement receive lower 
overall incentive to invest in risky investment projects, consistent with Muscarella and Zhao 
(2017) in a SSE framework. However, Change-In-Control Payments has a positive and significant 
relationship with R&D Intensity, implying that firms in which the CEO is compensated with a 
change-in-control agreement will see increased investment in risky projects. When taken together, 
the change-in-control agreements’ incentives dominates severance agreements’ negative effects. 
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This suggests an overall positive relationship should be observed between the simultaneous 
existence of change-in-control with severance agreements and risk-taking incentives (e.g. R&D 
Intensity) and could explain the positive results seen when dummy variables are used as in the 
extant literature.  
A positive relationship between the CEO’s portfolio vega and R&D intensity implies that 
vega is set to increase risk taking of the CEO. Looking to the simultaneous effects of severance 
and change-in-control payments on vega, the results show that change-in-control payments are 
highly influential upon the Vega Of The Portfolio of the CEO. This indicates that not only do 
change-in-control payments exhibit a direct effect on the incentive for CEOs to invest in risky 
projects but that they have an indirect effect by simultaneously increasing the Vega Of The 
Portfolio. The dual positive result of the vega on R&D Intensity and Change-In-Control Payments 
on Vega Of The Portfolio as well as the direct positive result of Change-In-Control Payments on 
R&D Intensity suggests that change-in-control agreements are responsible for incentivizing CEOs 
to increase investment in risky projects. This estimation model allows me to separate the 
incremental effects and the indirect effects imparted through the CEO’s own sensitivity to changes 
in her portfolio value subject to the volatility of the underlying shares.  
Interestingly, there still exists a discrete negative effect on risk-taking imparted by the 
existence of severance agreements. To my knowledge Muscarella and Zhao (2017) is the only 
other paper showing a negative relationship between severance and risk-taking behavior. This 
raises the question of the use of severance agreements to induce CEOs to make risky investments, 
yet the evidence suggests they may not. However, it is worth noting that provided a CEO is 
compensated with a change-in-control agreement at the same time (or alone), the effect may be a 
net positive owing to the dominating effects of change-in-control payments relative to severance. 
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Overall, this provides confirmatory evidence of Muscarella and Zhao’s (2017) ‘Shirking’ or ‘Quiet 
Life’ hypotheses were severance alone is concerned. However, the incumbent CEO can only 
exhibit this shirking or ‘quiet’ life owing to their barrier to internal governance. The results are 
economically significant as well—a 1% increase in severance results in a 1.7465% decrease in 
R&D intensity.  
 
IV.5 Contractual Changes in Severance Agreements 
 
  To further the analysis of severance’s effects I re-run the above estimations on a sub-
sample of CEOs who have had a contractual change in their compensation agreement. I classify a 
CEO who has a contractual change as one that has been given a new a severance contract (e.g. 
where one did not previously exist) or has lost a severance contract (e.g. where one existed before), 
or has had multiple changes in their agreement to provide or remove a severance agreement. Only 
489 CEO-firm pairs have a contractual change, constituting roughly 30% of the sample of all 
unique CEO-firm pairs, a far larger proportion than was, a priori, expected. The directional 
movement—i.e. from no severance to severance or vice versa, etc.—is not particularly important 
for the estimation as the movement should be in the same direction as the change in the variable 
of interest. Following Hypothesis 1, if a CEO is newly provided with severance I should observe 
a significant negative effect on cash-to-assets. Conversely, when a CEO loses severance as part of 
the compensation agreement the estimation predicts an increase in cash-to-assets. The abridged 
SSE model used to test the structural break is provided here27: 
                                                           
27 Prior to (or after) a structural change: severance is 0; therefore, forming an interaction variable of structural change ind.* 
termination payment is not necessary, all information is captured by the constant indicator and the continuous variable for slope. 
The adjustment made here is akin to a piecewise estimation on the inclusion (exclusion) of severance from the compensation 
agreement at a specific point in time.  
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𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑑. (𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡)𝑖,𝑡 = {
   0, 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 0
 1, 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 > 0
(2) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑑.𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡(𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡)
+𝒁𝑖,𝑡(𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕) + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (3)
 
The contractual chg ind. is applied to the other equations in the system so that the effect is captured 
in these estimations as well, however the sub-equations in the system are not provided in equation 
(3) for brevity28. The coefficient for contractual chg ind. provides the shift in constant as a CEO 
has a severance agreement added-to or removed-from their compensation agreement. The estimate 
for Termination Payment in this construction provides the slope effect of severance pay when the 
CEO has been granted a severance pay agreement.  
 In addressing the previous hypotheses, I run this estimation in the 3SLS SSE and examine 
the shift in the constant on dependent variables cash-to-assets, financial leverage, dividend yield, 
capital expenditure intensity, and R&D Intensity. I was not able to run the estimation for the 
premium paid on acquisitions and RSI as the sample proved to be too small. Results of the SSE 
with the contractual chg. ind. on the sub-sample of firms are presented in Table 9.  
 Results are largely consistent with the findings in the prior estimations. There are 
significant drops in cash-to-assets when a CEO is provided with severance lending evidence to 
support Hypothesis 1. The slope for severance is also negative and significant suggesting that, as 
severance increases, cash-to-assets declines. Since scaled values of severance (termination pay to 
assets) are used the effect is 1:1 in economic significance, indicating that cash to assets falls 
roughly 7.2% upon the initiation of a severance agreement.  
                                                           
28 The specifications for the sub-equations can be found in equation 1, with a full specification of the system in Appendix I.  
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 The results on financial leverage and dividend yield are not significant although the slope 
effects are, indicating that it is the amount of severance that causes a relational effect rather than 
the initiation of a severance agreement. However, the results follow Hypotheses 2 and 5, and this 
is the first evidence of an effect on dividends. 
 Capital Expenditure Intensity and R&D Intensity provide similar results to the prior SSE 
estimations, confirming Hypotheses 3 and the Shirking or ‘Quiet Life’ Hypothesis (Muscarella and 
Zhao 2017). Noting that the effect is partially economically significant in this analysis: capital 
expenditure intensity appears to show a structural increase of 1.55% (in terms of Net PP&E) where 
the mean is 24%, a 6.46% growth over the mean; whereas R&D intensity shows a sharp decline 
of 2.632% where the sample mean itself is 3%. Following Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), this 
spread suggests a decline in risky investment and an increase in relatively less-risky investment 
and is also consistent with the findings of Harford et al. (2008) with an increase in capital 
expenditures as a means of using excess cash.  
IV.6 Dodd-Frank §951 Exogenous Shock to Severance Pay and Performance Monitoring  
 
 The adoption of Section 951 provides an ‘exogenous’ shock to the level of monitoring and 
shareholder power regarding CEO compensation and with specific indignation towards severance 
agreements following the public’s perception of golden-parachutes and severance packages paid 
to wall-street bankers during the collapse of 2008.  
 In the extant literature, surveyed by Yermack (2010), shareholder voting power on firms 
has engendered an entire sub-field of research. Say-on-pay voting has its initiation in a 1992 SEC 
ruling allowing shareholders to sponsor resolutions that inhibit certain types of management 
compensation (Subramaniam and Wang 2009). Subsequently several researchers have examined 
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the effect of shareholder voting on managerial compensation and found that voting does have 
effects on both managerial compensation and firm performance (Gillan 2001; Morgan and Poulsen 
2001; Cai and Walking 2011; Fischer et al. 2009; Carter and Zamora 2009; Conyon and Sadler 
2010; Ferri and Maber 2009; Conyon 2015).  
 Implicit in this literature is the idea that shareholders may execute voting rights to effect 
change on management when it serves them best to do so. For example, according to the studies 
on the British adoption of say-for-pay voting, shareholders predominantly only vote against 
compensation when it reaches levels that are higher than expectations would suggest is reasonable 
(Yermack 2010). Therefore, a level of monitoring exists when the voting power rests in the hands 
of shareholders by allowing an external market correction to CEO compensation: removing the 
agency between that of the board and the shareholders.  
 On July 21st, 2010, then President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter Dodd-Frank). Section 951 of Dodd-Frank lays 
out provisions for say-on-pay requirements as well as amending section 14A in the securities law 
requiring formal and full disclosure of compensation agreements and voting on same in the form 
of proxy statements (commonly known as DEF 14As). While disclosure of compensation 
agreements in increasing detail has been required since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 
say-on-pay voting was allowed only in the proposals previously described. On Jan 25th, 2011, the 
SEC adopted and implemented Section 951 of Dodd-Frank and required that public firms initiate 
and set a schedule for say-on-pay votes within the next immediate board meeting of 201129.  




 Following the implementation of Section 951, monitoring of CEO compensation should 
increase and CEOs should take actions to reduce their barriers following the adoption (i.e. they 
will increase cash-levels, and reduce capital expenditures, reduce financial leverage and premiums 
paid on acquisitions and increase R&D investments). Thereby, using an indicator variable for the 
period before and after implementation of Dodd-Frank §951, I sub-sample the prior analyses to 
see if CEOs do reduce their barriers. This reversal follows in the same vein as the predictions from 
A&S model in which strong governance leads to a reduction of CEO extraction in control rents 
and power to remain CEO. Equations 4, 5, and 6 and used in the estimations for Table 10: 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 §951 𝐼𝑛𝑑.𝑖,𝑡  (< 2011) = {
0,        𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ≥ 2011
 1, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 < 2011
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 §951 𝐼𝑛𝑑.𝑖,𝑡  (≥ 2011) = {
0,        𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 < 2011
 1, 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ≥ 2011
 ,   𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑖 (4) 
𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 §951 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (< 2011) = {
𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ,       𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 < 2011
0 ,                    𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ≥ 2011
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 §951 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (≥ 2011) = {
0,                                𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 < 2011
 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ≥ 2011
(5) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡
1 (𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 §951 𝐼𝑛𝑑.𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑡
2 (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 §951 𝐼𝑛𝑑.𝑖,𝑡 )
                 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡
1 (𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 §951 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡)  + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡
1 (𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 §951 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑦𝑚𝑡𝑖,𝑡 )
+𝒁𝑖,𝑡(𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊,𝒕) + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (6)
 
Results for the estimations performed again on cash to assets, financial leverage, dividend yield, 
capital expenditure intensity and R&D intensity as dependent variables are shown in Table 10.  
 Since the construction follows that of a piecewise regression differences in the indicator 
constants and slope estimates are presented in Panel B (Indicator and Term Pymt respectively). 
Results in Panel B show that, consistent with the reversal hypothesis, in the face of monitoring or 
strong governance, CEOs do appear to increase cash directly after the implementation of §951. 
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They also appear to reduce leverage. Interestingly, although I held no priors on the change in 
dividend yield given that I did not find consistent results in the prior estimates to support 
Hypothesis 2, results show a large and significant increase in dividends. I also show an increase in 
capital expenditure intensity that is significant, although the slope of the effect of severance 
following Dodd-Frank is negative and significant as well. There appears no significant effect on 
R&D intensity.  
 The results are mixed but seem to indicate that where monitoring exists CEOs may reverse 
previously erected barriers, but where the connection is abstract (i.e. R&D intensity is a proxy for 
risk-taking or risky investment) monitoring may have little effect on the outcome. Together these 
results lend support to the idea that stronger governance can mitigate the control rents and 
protection a CEO can raise with severance agreements—couching the empirical results in the 
model of A&S and providing evidence of the barriers as well.  
IV.7 Barriers to Internal Governance and Take-Over Intensity 
 
If a CEO faces an exogenous market condition which increases the likelihood of 
termination or change in control—the original hypotheses examined should show stronger results 
as CEOs attempt to protect themselves from termination even more. I examine a split sample on 
industry take-over intensity, defined as the number of firms which are targeted for acquisition in 
each year (t) for a given industry (I) divided by the total number of firms in the industry for that 
year, 𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼,𝑡 =
#𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠𝐼,𝑡
#𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠𝐼,𝑡 
. Each firm is matched to its industry take-over intensity 
on a per year basis. I re-run the SSE on the sub-samples of low intensity (below the median (0.2)) 
and high intensity (above the median) and examine the change in their coefficient estimates in 
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Table 11, presented in the column labeled ‘diff.’ Due to a direct relationship with takeover intensity 
and premiums paid on acquisitions, I do not investigate this hypothesis.  
 The results show a consistency in general with the prior results for Capital Expenditure 
Intensity, and Dividend Yield is insignificant. For Cash-To-Assets it appears that CEOs under 
external market pressure decrease their levels of cash dependent upon the level of termination 
payment they expect to receive supporting Hypothesis 1.  
 The results on Capital Expenditure Intensity are less straight-forward and do not conform 
to Hypothesis 3, however, it could be the case that capital expenditure intensity is related to the 
level of take-over intensity: producing an unobserved endogenous effect. Relationship Specific 
Investment (Hypothesis 4) appears to increase as there is more take-over pressure in the industry, 
conforming to the hypothesis.  
Financial leverage is also found to be increasing as takeover intensity increases (Hypothesis 
5), which suggests that CEOs increase the level of financial leverage, an effect here which is 
uniquely not counter-balanced by change-in-control payments as in the other cases, results which 
are consistent with Frazzari et al. (1988). Lastly, I find evidence that R&D intensity declines as 
takeover intensity increases for CEOs compensated with severance—although this effect is almost 
entirely mitigated by change-in-control payments, a small effect remains. This result points to a 
rational expectation of the board—that CEOs are expected to reduce risk-taking when they are 
insulated from termination with a severance agreement and external pressure proves them the extra 
incentive of not taking risk. In this instance of takeover intensity, it appears boards mitigate these 
effects by increasing change-in-control payments relative to the takeover intensity to reduce these 
incentives. Regardless, it appears severance could lead to a reduction is risk-taking in 
environments where termination or takeover pressure is high.  
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 To provide further robustness I run a SURE estimation, for comparison to the SSE, and a 
Mixed-Model estimation reporting effects of risk-taking (R&D Intensity), capital expenditure, and 
cash-levels (reported Appendix II)—the results remain similar.  
V. Conclusion 
 
 This essay addresses how it is that CEOs can resist termination and shirk responsibilities 
by erecting a barrier to the board’s ability to terminate, which rests upon the CEO not being 
terminated for their lack of effort or value destructive activities. I show that if a CEO invests in a 
way that decreases the likelihood of success of a rival CEO or makes it costly for the board to 
terminate her, she can protect herself from the internal mechanisms for CEO replacement. This is 
only made possible because severance initially dissuades the board from terminating the CEO 
when she begins to make these investment choices.  
 As evidence of the barriers to internal governance, I document reductions in cash-levels 
(Hypothesis 1) and increased capital expenditure (Hypothesis 3) due to severance. However, I do 
not find overall evidence to support the idea that incumbent CEO’s increase dividends (Hypothesis 
2) as a method of reducing cash—and thereby it appears that most of the cash flows towards capital 
expenditures or acquisitions as there is also evidence of over-payment above the natural valuation 
of firm assets (Hypothesis 6). Additionally, I document an increase in financial leverage 
(Hypothesis 5), which might make it increasingly difficult to operate or make future investments 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited 2011). Furthermore, I show that these effects, except for 
capital expenditure intensity, are increasing with external takeover pressure.  
This study differs from A&S by showing that given specific types of investments and 
financial adjustments CEOs can violate A&S’s constraints while remaining consistent with the 
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framework—causing a loop-hole in the model. This results in boards choosing the ex-ante 
‘optimal’ level of severance compensation only to find ex-post that their CEO does not make the 
expected investments and uses (abuses) the binding mechanism of severance as a means to throw 
up a ‘force-field’ between herself and the board. As a result, CEOs have a means by which to shirk 
their duties or lead a ‘quiet life’—even upon initially taking office.  
 These results are important not only for boards of firms and compensation committees, 
who are investigating the use of severance contracts, but also for policy makers who may be 
reasonably skeptical of the positive effects these separation agreements are intended to provide. 
Overall, my evidence suggests that severance contracts not only reduce managerial risk-taking but 
also may destroy shareholder value as CEOs have an incentive to protect themselves from 
termination and thereafter act selfishly: increasing agency costs. Coincidentally, Muscarella and 
Zhao (2017) explicitly document long-term shareholder value destruction as a result of severance 
agreements. 
Consequently, it is concerning that boards—who should bear in mind their fiduciary 
responsibilities to shareholders—would use severance packages when it appears that change-in-
control agreements provide the incentives of increased investment in worth-while risky projects 
and are, evidently, value creating.  
 At the very least, this evidence should spur research on the topic of managerial risk-taking 
and value creation of severance and change-in-control agreements and warrants new investigations 
using modern data that reflects recent regulatory changes and reporting environments. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
  
Variables Obs. Mean Min. 25% Median 75% Max.
Termination Payments Scaled (%) 6631 0.08% 0.54                -             -                0.10              0.12              0.17              
Change-In-Control Scaled (%) 6631 0.11% 0.46                -             0.10              0.12              0.13              0.18              
Termination Payments (mil $) 6631 6.44          15.10              -             -                1.80              6.34              298.86          
Change-In-Control Payments (mil $) 6631 13.02        20.60              -             1.97              6.79              16.67            431.85          
Delta of the Portfolio ($000) 6631 511.18      1,003.04         -             48.93            179.99          533.81          7,277.54       
Vega of the Portfolio ($000) 6631 119.74      201.37            -             9.26              43.58            136.39          1,242.79       
Salary ($000) 6631 740.17      386.38            -             489.38          690.00          950.00          4,800.00       
Bonus ($000) 6631 136.36      638.80            -             -                -                -                23,128.79     
Stock Awards ($000) 6631 1,844.60   5,458.55         -             33.99            821.00          2,383.55       380,000.00   
Option Awards ($000) 6631 1,040.61   2,568.10         -             -                292.51          1,228.69       68,349.00     
Non-Equity Incentives ($000) 6631 1,116.03   1,662.66         -             49.78            648.00          1,472.25       31,575.00     
Other Compensation ($000) 6631 178.32      867.98            -             15.74            49.99            158.51          46,347.77     
Market to Book Ratio 6631 0.35          0.94                -             0.01              0.05              0.22              6.50              
Log Sales 6603 7.35          1.64                3.35            6.27              7.29              8.40              11.48            
Sale (mil $) 6622 7,037.63   24,622.58       -             522.37          1,465.67       4,451.80       470,000.00   
Cash To Assets Ratio 6631 0.17          0.17                -             0.05              0.12              0.25              0.75              
Financial Leverage 6631 24% 176% 0% 2% 18% 31% 12094%
Dividend Yield 6631 1.08% 4.13% -             -                -                0.39% 30.23%
R&D Intensity 6631 3.29% 5.39% -             -                0.47% 4.62% 27.45%
Capital Expenditure Intensity 6631 24.45% 15.89% 2.0% 13% 20% 31.52% 80.25%
Tax Rate 6631 23% 42% -226% 17% 31% 37% 158%
CEO Continuous Tenure (years) 6631 6               4                     1                 3                   5                   9                   23                 
Sales Growth 6631 330% 9576% -100% -5% 6% 19% 646110%
CEO Age (years) 6614 56             7                     28               51                 56                 61                 76                 
Volatility 6631 0.41          0.04                0.33            0.38              0.44              0.45              0.45              
EBITDA  (mil $) 6621 1,110.80   3,960.12         (2,336.03)   61.85            199.19          668.30          78,669.00     
Operating Cash Flow (mil $) 6621 869.72      3,264.76         (3,150.00)   43.28            146.53          491.00          59,725.00     
Tobin's Q 6631 552.52      10,987.90       -             -                1.34              21.04            570,000.00   
Return on Assets (ROA) 6631 4% 33% -1476% 2% 5% 9% 314%
Profit Margin 6631 -9% 507% -30118% 2% 6% 10% 408%
Total Asset Turnover 6631 1.12          0.77                -             0.63              0.92              1.42              13.18            
Operating Expense Margin 6631 106% 509% -3148% 86% 92% 97% 30217%
Total Assets (mil $) 6631 8,033.96   33,437.32       0.09            530.06          1,545            4,780            800,000        
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Deviation
TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics. Presented above are the descriptive statistics for the firm-year pairs, the sample runs 2009 to 2015 in total there are roughly 6,631
observations with the few exceptional cases where the values are reported missing. Computed and shown are the cross sectional year-firm means and standard
deivations as well as their quintile distributions. The quintile distributions can give a sense of scope to the distributions of the data set. As can easily be seen in R&D
Intensity there is a large problem with natural zeros--I attempt to correct for this using a mixed model found in section 6.3 Mixed Model Analysis: Simultaneous
TOBITs to Treat Natural Zeros. Where appropriate the values are reported in percentages. Termination Payment, Change-In-Control Payments, EBITDA, Operating
Cash Flow, Sales and Total Assets are all reported in millions were indicated. All other CEO level compensations are reported in thousands. 
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Table 2: Cash Levels and Severance   
Termination Payments (mill $) -0.00297 *** 8.64431 *** -4.81290 *** 1.20995 ***
Change In Control Payments (mil $) -0.00075 * -6.19375 *** 4.68451 *** 0.76638 ***
Delta of The Portfolio ($000) 0.00003 *** 0.15766 *** 0.00294 *** -0.00329 ***
Vega of The Portfolio ($000) 0.00043 *** 4.41714 *** -0.01452 *** 0.02313 ***
Salary 0.00001 * -0.01873 *** -0.00392 *** 0.00582 ***
Bonus -0.00001 * 0.01110 *** 0.00090 *** -0.00112 ***
Stock Awards 0.00000 *** -0.00137 *** -0.00012 *** 0.00019 ***
Option Awards -0.00001 *** -0.00074 *** 0.00090 ***
Non-Equity Incentive 0.00001 *** -0.00045 0.00012 -0.00003
Other Compensation -0.00000 0.00794 *** 0.00124 *** -0.00156 ***
Market to Book Ratio -0.00548 *** -21.80134 * 6.50077 *** -0.10747
Log Sales -0.06293 *** -89.23306 *** 30.46164 *** -0.24471 **
Financial Levearge -3.55866 0.41723 0.01401 -0.00961
Sales Growth -0.00001 -0.03202 0.01130
Dividend Yield 0.00352 *** -0.00898 0.02040
Tax Rate -0.02111 ***
CEO Continuous Tenure -0.00221 *** 19.31547 *** 0.03875 -0.10635 **
CEO Age -0.00090 *** 0.01772 -0.02333
R&D Intensity -555.40829 *** 242.84991 *** -3.52219 *** 0.27605
Capital Expenditure Intensity 501.72274 *** -19.02534 0.22177 -1.75957
Volatility -1001.73508 *** 276.90902 *** 10.11679 *** -14.49288 ***
EBITDA 0.00001 -0.00002
Financial Cash Flows
Operating Cash Flows 0.00009 -0.00016
Constant 0.64445 *** 907.43766 *** -341.64790 *** -5.03598 *** 9.37801 ***
Observations 
TABLE 2: Cash Levels and Severance
TABLE 2:Cash Levels and Severance. This table reports the results for the 3SLS regressions relating to the estimation of Cash-To-Assets as
explained by dollar value Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio and Delta of the Portfolio as well as CEO
and firm level controls. Although not reported each system has industry and year fixed effects specified as strictly exogenous to the system. The
system estimates Capital Expenditure Intensity, Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio, and Delta of the
Portfolio as endogenous factors specified by the remainder of the system. The estimations indicate that there is a negative relationship between the
amount of severance paid to a CEO and the reduction in cash levels overall. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates signifiance
at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
PANEL A: Cash-To-Assets
 Cash-to-Assets 
Delta of the 
Portfolio







6576 6576 6576 6576 6576
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Table 3: Dollar Value Severance and Capital Expenditure Intensity  
Termination Payments (mil $) 0.00175 *** 7.32818 *** -5.18498 *** 1.21663 ***
Change of Control Payments (mil $) -0.00134 *** -5.90277 *** 4.93635 *** 0.76827 ***
Delta of The Portfolio ($000) 0.00005 *** 0.15870 *** 0.00250 *** -0.00311 ***
Vega of The Portfolio ($000) -0.00007 *** 4.53463 *** -0.01425 *** 0.02218 ***
Salary -0.00001 * -0.01712 *** -0.00322 *** 0.00513 ***
Bonus -0.00000 0.01068 *** 0.00084 *** -0.00106 ***
Stock Awards 0.00000 *** -0.00137 *** -0.00015 *** 0.00020 ***
Option Awards -0.00000 -0.00072 *** 0.00089 ***
Non-Equity Incentive -0.00000 0.00024 0.00016 * -0.00010
Other Compensation -0.00000 * 0.00856 *** 0.00127 *** -0.00159 ***
Market to Book Ratio -0.00299 -20.59958 * 6.29622 *** -0.08436
Log Sales -0.01657 *** -75.50736 *** 25.84642 *** -0.03845
Financial Levearge -0.00352 *** 1.18925 0.30453 0.04916 -0.03625
Sales Growth -0.00002 -0.00338 0.00902
Dividend Yield -0.00187 *** 0.00403 0.01373
Tax Rate 0.00566
CEO Continuous Tenure -0.00332 *** 20.73021 *** 0.06167 * -0.11860 ***
CEO Age -0.00191 *** 0.04327 ** -0.03632
R&D Intensity -794.70164 *** 164.52065 *** -2.72779 *** 2.16616 *
Capital Expenditure Intensity 1478.56533 *** -65.12693 *** 9.75671 *** -8.14301 ***
Volatility -1103.60874 *** 273.90386 *** 10.50461 *** -14.60660 ***
EBITDA -0.00015 0.00013
Operating Cash Flows 0.00032 -0.00038
Constant 0.45262 *** 623.69782 *** -289.61611 *** -9.56580 *** 10.59598 ***
Observations 
TABLE 3: Dollar Value Severance and Capital Expenditure Intensity 
TABLE 3: Dollar Value Severance and Capital Expenditure Intensity--Panel A. Panel A indicates the results for the 3SLS
regressions relating to the estimation of Capital Expenditure Intensity as explained by dollar value Termination Payments,
Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio and Delta of the Portfolio as well as CEO and firm level controls. Although
not reported each system has industry and year fixed effects specified as strictly exogenous to the system. The system estimates
Capital Expenditure Intensity, Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio, and Delta of the
Portfolio as endogenous factors specified by the remainder of the system. * indicates significance at the 10% level, **
indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
PANEL A: Capital Expenditure Intensity
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Table 4: Dividend Yield and Severance
Termination Payments(mil $) -0.40663 179.44679 *** -20.34437 0.55742 ***
Change of Control Payments(mil $) -1.13454 *** -514.49875 *** 102.22616 *** 0.87048 ***
Delta of The Portfolio ($000) -0.00036 0.20609 *** 0.00011 *** -0.00022 ***
Vega of The Portfolio ($000) -0.00194 ** 4.60502 *** -0.00030 *** 0.00072 ***
Salary 0.00042 * -0.00161 0.00004 0.00014 ***
Bonus -0.00028 ** 0.00113 0.00003 -0.00004 ***
Stock Awards -0.00001 -0.00011 0.00000 0.00000
Option Awards 0.00008 ** -0.00001 *** 0.00002 ***
Non-Equity Incentive 0.00003 0.00104 0.00001 0.00000
Other Compensation -0.00001 -0.00132 0.00001 -0.00001
Market to Book Ratio -0.31074 *** -35.57373 ** 7.66928 ** -0.01851 ***
Log Sales 0.23823 *** -154.79035 *** 35.30235 *** -0.04601 ***
Financial Levearge -0.01588 -8.17718 1.68724 0.00328 -0.00844 ***
Sales Growth 0.00226 *** -0.09590 0.02511
Dividend Yield -0.02039 *** -0.01952 ***
Tax Rate 0.15815
CEO Continuous Tenure 0.00613 6.81000 *** -0.01257 *** 0.00838 ***
CEO Age 0.00391 -0.00131 -0.00168 *
R&D Intensity -244.91099 *** 59.55280 *** -0.04596 0.05230
Capital Expenditure 415.87327 *** -83.07433 *** 0.03529 0.05463
Volatility -1501.81719 *** 335.58083 *** -0.13889 -0.07319
EBITDA 0.00001 -0.00001
Financial Cash Flows
Operating Cash Flows -0.00000 -0.00000
Constant 0.10904 2018.54931 *** -467.55586 *** 0.06856 0.93317 ***
Observations 
PANEL A: Dividend Yield
TABLE 4: Dividend Yield and Severance
TABLE 4: Dividend Yield and Severance. This table reports the results for the 3SLS regressions relating to the estimation of Dividend
Yields as explained by scaled Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio and Delta of the Portfolio as
well as CEO and firm level controls. Although not reported each system has industry and year fixed effects specified as strictly exogenous
to the system. The system estimates Capital Expenditure Intensity, Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the
Portfolio, and Delta of the Portfolio as endogenous factors specified by the remainder of the system. * indicates significance at the 10%
level, ** indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
 Dividend 
Yield 
Delta of the 
Portfolio
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 Table 5: Relationship Specific Investment and Severance 
 
Termination Payment 0.00551 ** 0.00325 *
Change-in-Control Payment -0.01353 * -0.00618 *
DELTA 0.00917 0.00359
VEGA -0.00233 *** -0.00114 ***
Salary -0.00015 0.00004
Bonus -0.00062 -0.00031
Stock Awards 0.00315 ** 0.00355 **
Non-Equity Incentive -0.00017 -0.00055
Other Compensation -0.00033 -0.00033
Market-to-Book Ratio -0.00055 -0.00061
Log Sales -0.00115 * -0.00621 **
Sales Growth 1.25333 *** 1.11332 **
Financial Leverage (market) -0.00316 -0.06223 **
ROA (firm) -0.00915 *** -0.01051 ***
Supplier R&D Intensity 0.09812 *** 0.10951 ***
CEO Continuous Tenure 0.00000 0.00000
CEO Age 0.00052 0.00012
Customer VEGA 0.02353 *** 0.02661 ***
Customer DELTA -0.00614 ** -0.00563 *
Customer Financial Leverage 0.00966 0.00955
Customer Sales Growth 2.56001 *** 1.56331 ***
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES
Observations 2723 2723
R Squared 0.32 0.36
TABLE 5: Relationship Specific Investment and Sevearnce. This table reports the results for the OLS regressions relating to
the estimation of RSI as explained by scaled Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio
and Delta of the Portfolio as well as CEO, firm level, and customer controls. The construction of the estimates follow the
work of Kale, Kedia, and Williams (2015). Differentially the items of interest here are the factor-loadings on Termination
Payment. Model 1 does not have industry fixed effects, Model 2 does have industry fixed effects. * indicates significance at
the 10% level, ** indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
Model 1 Model 2 
Customer R&D (WA) 
TABLE 5: Relationship Specific Investment And Severance
PANEL A: Relationship Specific Investment
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 Table 6: Financial Leverage and Severance 
 
Termination Payments (mill $)0.01814 *** 8.10740 *** -5.13166 *** 1.21778 ***
Change In Control Payments (mil $)-0.01439 *** -6.42538 *** 4.82894 *** 0.76824 ***
Delta of The Portfolio ($000)- .00006 0.16205 *** 0.00286 *** -0.00326 ***
Vega of The Portfolio ($000)0.00038 4.60652 *** -0.01577 *** 0.02314 ***
Salary 0.00008 -0.01973 *** -0.00361 *** 0.00548 ***
Bonus -0.00002 0.01069 *** 0.00090 *** -0.00112 ***
Stock Awards 0.00000 -0.00104 *** -0.00013 *** 0.00019 ***
Option Awards 0.00001 -0.00070 *** 0.00086 ***
Non-Equity Incentive 0.00001 0.00040 0.00015 -0.00008
Other Compensation -0.00002 0.00800 *** 0.00125 *** -0.00157 ***
Market to Book Ratio -0.01059 -23.38838 ** 6.23377 *** -0.09053
Log Sales -0.04564 ** -100.89421 *** 26.06175 *** -0.08059
Financial Levearge 10.83703 -1.38394 0.95510 *** -0.96318 ***
Sales Growth 0.00000 -0.03708 0.00980
Dividend Yield 0.00452 -0.00794 0.01914
Tax Rate -0.04029
CEO Continuous Tenure 0.01500 ** 17.53750 *** 0.03105 -0.09273 **
CEO Age -0.00239 0.02924 -0.03368
R&D Intensity -707.39779 *** 164.06653 *** -1.35665 0.94964
Capital Expenditure Intensity 465.81617 *** -58.92394 *** 1.42668 -1.79621
Volatility -1056.19855 *** 266.38093 *** 10.69286 *** -14.45348 ***
EBITDA -0.00019 0.00016
Financial Cash Flows
Operating Cash Flows 0.00036 -0.00041
Constant 0.65479 *** 1034.41803 *** -288.51974 *** -6.78062 *** 9.09821 ***
Observations 
TABLE 6: Financial Leverage and Severance
TABLE 6: Financial Leverage and Severance. This table indicates the results for the 3SLS regressions relating to
the estimation of Financial Leverage as explained by dollar value Termination Payments, Change-In-Control
Payments, Vega of the Portfolio and Delta of the Portfolio as well as CEO and firm level controls. Although not
reported each system has industry and year fixed effects specified as strictly exogenous to the system. The system
estimates Financial Leverage, Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio, and Delta of 
the Portfolio as endogenous factors specified by the remainder of the system. The results show that CEOs
compensated with a severance package can be reasonably expected to increase financial leverage levels significantly as
a function of the amount they are paid--indicating potential increased overall firm risk. *indicates significance at the
10% level, ** indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
PANEL A: Financial Leverage
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Table 7: Severance’s Effect on Premium Paid above Asset Value  
 
Termination Payments (mil $) 3.67292 *** -148.100290 ** 47.85174 *** -0.00771
Change of Control Payments (mil $) -16.55802 *** -387.669330 *** 281.61732 *** 0.11703
Delta of The Portfolio ($000) -0.00408 *** 0.16918 *** -0.00078 *** 0.00002
Vega of The Portfolio ($000) -0.01126 *** 4.159970 *** 0.00607 *** 0.00097 ***
Salary -0.00537 *** -0.15733 *** -0.00064 *** 0.00016 ***
Bonus 0.00594 *** -0.18208 *** 0.00098 0.00029 ***
Stock Awards -0.00143 *** -0.00352 -0.00016 *** 0.00001 **
Option Awards -0.00085 *** 0.00001 -0.00005 ***
Non-Equity Incentive -0.00070 *** 0.03712 *** 0.00021 *** -0.00005 ***
Other Compensation 0.04172 *** 0.90268 *** -0.00224 ** -0.00072 ***
Market to Book Ratio 30.42049 *** -1593.571620 *** 105.53091 *** 0.04021
Log Sales 1.05541 *** -105.923960 *** 31.01829 *** -0.06406 ***
Financial Levearge 25.07283 *** 753.358120 *** -79.46124 ** 0.32109 -0.10009 ***
Sales Growth 1.75116 *** 133.459230 *** -45.66565 ***
Dividend Yield 1.70787 *** 0.12801 *** -0.03173 ***
Tax Rate -4.53242 ***
CEO Continuous Tenure 2.91200 *** -77.169670 *** -0.05228 *** 0.01070 **
CEO Age -0.85180 *** -0.05643 *** -0.01905 ***
R&D Logged Intensity
Capital Expenditure 716.879940 *** 370.16589 *** 2.57563 *** 0.20503 ***
Volatility 3585.469100 *** 18.60159 1.85143 0.46509 ***
EBITDA 0.00000 -0.00003 ***
Financial Cash Flows




Constant 28.42941 *** 683.914650 -654.17765 *** 2.98231 *** 2.35120 ***
Observations 
TABLE 7: Severance's Effect on Premium Paid Above Asset Value 
TABLE 7: Severance's Effect on Premium Paid above Asset Value. In order to estimate the effect of severance on mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) over-payment I attempted to use several types of estimations, however, the observations inherently involved are almost
always very small. While this clearly introduces small sample bias this is the net effect of incremental merging across datasets without
replacement or casting of missing variables. Other proxies for M&A activity or over-payment produce similar results in the signs, that is
severance increases over-payment and change-in-control decreases it, but, I report this proxy here owing to the errors intrinsic in using the
other proxies. This proxy allows me to elude the errors in the other proxies and confidently estimate the effect. * indicates significance at the
10% level, ** indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
PANEL A: Tobin Style Premium Measure (Deal Value/Replacable Asset Value)
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Table 8: Severance’s Effect on Risk-Taking  
 
Termination Payments (mil $) -0.00894 *** 2.54861 -1.87291 *** 1.24710 ***
Change of Control Payments (mil $) 0.00520 *** -1.21792 2.78493 *** 0.75360 ***
Delta of The Portfolio ($000) -0.00003 *** 0.14853 *** 0.00240 *** -0.00265 ***
Vega of The Portfolio ($000) 0.00069 *** 4.39128 *** -0.00622 *** 0.00699 ***
Salary -0.00003 *** -0.01963 *** -0.00505 *** 0.00710 ***
Bonus -0.00001 *** 0.01036 *** 0.00070 *** -0.00078 ***
Stock Awards 0.00000 *** -0.00167 *** -0.00011 *** 0.00016 ***
Option Awards -0.00001 *** -0.00082 *** 0.00117 ***
Non-Equity Incentive 0.00000 ** -0.00266 ** 0.00003 0.00005
Other Compensation 0.00000 ** 0.00561 *** 0.00116 *** -0.00145 ***
Market to Book Ratio -0.00552 *** -20.58030 * 6.53013 *** -0.03751
Log Sales -0.04496 *** -121.96693 *** 44.01592 *** 0.23969 **
Financial Levearge 0.00169 * -2.33313 -0.30195 0.04857 -0.04774
Sales Growth -0.00001 -0.03868 0.01355
Dividend Yield -0.00071 ** -0.01105 0.02385
Tax Rate -0.01494 ***
CEO Continuous Tenure -0.00168 *** 20.15085 *** 0.04264 -0.08788 **
CEO Age -0.00028 0.00004 0.00271
R&D Intensity -1503.22194 *** 604.98174 *** -18.02735 *** 21.36946 ***
Capital Expenditure 493.28600 *** -56.50963 *** 2.03633 ** -2.44845 **
Volatility -842.62976 *** 180.96797 *** 12.17381 *** -15.02836 ***
EBITDA -0.00011 0.00010
Operating Cash Flows 0.00018 -0.00026
Constant 0.40516 *** 1166.91230 *** -420.27409 *** -3.12796 * 2.11542
Observations 
TABLE 8: Severance's Effect on Risk-Taking 
TABLE 8: Severance's Effect on Risk-Taking--Panel A. Panel A indicates the results for the 3SLS regressions relating to the
estimation of R&D Intensity as explained by dollar value Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Vega of the Portfolio
and Delta of the Portfolio as well as CEO and firm level controls. Although not reported each system has industry and year fixed effects
specified as strictly exogenous to the system. The system estimates R&D Intensity, Termination Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, 
Vega of the Portfolio, and Delta of the Portfolio as endogenous factors specified by the remainder of the system. The estimations are not
significantly different in terms of sign than those found in Table 3. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates signifiance
at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
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Table 9: Identification Break: No Severance to Severance (vice versa)
Dependent Variable 
-0.07178 *** 0.14584 -0.21944 0.01555 *** -0.02632 ***
(0.0000) (0.4396) (0.3491) (0.0000) (0.0033)
-0.05972 *** 0.01492 *** 0.16822 *** 0.00652 *** -0.00378 ***
(0.0811) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
0.00370 *** -0.00703 *** -0.16833 *** 0.00159 * -0.00041
(0.8557) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0999) (0.2372)
-0.00003 *** 0.00007 -0.00049 *** 0.00003 *** -0.00002 ***
(0.0000) (0.5604) (0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0000)
0.00014 *** -0.00074 0.00275 *** -0.00014 *** 0.00023 ***
(0.0000) (0.2498) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.00003 *** 0.00006 0.00003 -0.00004 *** 0.00000
(0.0070) (0.7904) (0.9059) (0.0003) (0.2307)
0.00000 0.00006 -0.00011 0.00001 * -0.00001 ***
(0.7944) (0.4125) (0.2601) (0.0610) (0.0000)
0.00000 ** 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 *** 0.00000
(0.0261) (0.6091) (0.7609) (0.0001) (0.1033)
0.00000 * 0.00001 -0.00008 0.00000 * 0.00000 *
(0.0590) (0.8514) (0.1458) (0.0861) (0.0811)
0.00001 *** 0.00007 0.00006 0.00000 0.00000 **
(0.0002) (0.1850) (0.3020) (0.1942) (0.0211)
0.00000 *** 0.00001 -0.00004 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 ***
(0.6302) (0.8427) (0.5448) (0.5595) (0.4783)
0.00434 0.01443 -0.25269 *** 0.00019 -0.00110
(0.1875) (0.8329) (0.0029) (0.9538) (0.3553)
-0.02810 *** -0.15178 ** -0.13543 * 0.00183 -0.01445 ***
(0.0000) (0.0214) (0.0987) (0.5603) (0.0000)
-0.01107 0.06594 0.21731 0.01306 * -0.00921 ***
(0.1283) (0.6641) (0.2464) (0.0651) (0.0000)
0.00177 ** 0.03275 ** -0.01959 -0.00243 *** 0.00074 ***
(0.0179) (0.0334) (0.3064) (0.0009) (0.0014)
-0.00126 *** -0.00713 -0.00534 -0.00286 *** -0.00041 ***













TABLE 9: Identification Break: No Severance to Severance (vice versa )
Salary





Change in Control Payments Scaled
Delta of The Portfolio ($000)
Vega of The Portfolio ($000)
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-1.03248 ** 3.37168 *** 0.08755 *** 0.08575 ***
(0.0169) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.00280 *** -0.00177 -0.00315 *** 0.00162 ***
(0.0053) (0.9450) (0.0014) (0.0000)
0.00481 *** 0.00394 -0.00227 *** -0.00034
(0.0000) (0.8135) (0.0044) (0.1777)
0.13020 *** -1.47531 *** -0.75024 0.06608 ***
(0.0000) (0.0009) (0.1740) (0.0000)
1.01815 *** 6.70000 *** -4.95179 *** 0.43064 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0000)
0.42086 *** 1.77211 ** 2.77949 *** 0.37067 *** 0.12900 ***







TABLE 9: Identification Break: No Severance to Severance (Vice Versa) Creating a sub-sample for CEOs whose compensation package changed during
their time in office regarding severance. CEOs in the sub-sample either did not initially receive severance and then later had it added to their compensation
agreements; recieved severance initially and then had it removed from their compensation agreements; or varyingly had severance added or removed from
compensation multiple times during their tenure as CEO. The directional movement (no severance then severance, or severance then no severance, or
multiple breaks) is not relevant to the analysis as the hypothesis predicts a change in the dependent variable when severance exists (vs. does not exist).
Constructing an indicator variable for when a CEO has severance versus when they do not in any given year for a CEO-firm pair and inserting it into the SSE
3SLS provides the same consistent type of estimators achieved in the prior analysis but also allows for the identification of the effect of severance directly in
its origination. Being that CEOs take these actions upon severance's initiation into their compensation portfolio this test helps to identify whether the hypothesis 
presented are causally linked to severance. The effective construction follows that of an 'event analysis' where the parameter loadings on the Contractural 
Chg. Ind. estimate the 'shock' to the dependent variable produced by newly providing ( or removing) severance to a given CEOs compensation portfolio.
Roughly 30% of all CEO-firm pairs experience a break in compensation where severance is added or removed from the CEO's compenastion portfolio during
their tenure, what was expected to be a rarity is fairly common. Estimation is performed in the SSE because it is assumed that the inclusion of severance (or
removal) into the compensation portfolio is simultaneously determined with parameters of compensation. The remainder of the estimations follow the same
constructs as those found in tables 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, however they are not reported here for brevity. Values in parenthesis are p-values. * indicates 
















Table 10: Dodd-Frank Act §951 Implementation Piecewise Estimation
Before §951 Indicator ( < 2011) 0.5739 *** 0.0010 0.3048 0.5547 *** 0.1579 ***
(0.0000) (0.9903) (0.4625) (0.0000) (0.0000)
After §951 Indicator (>=2011) 0.5804 *** -0.0471 0.8767 ** 0.5763 *** 0.1584 ***
(0.0000) (0.5656) (0.0384) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Before §951 Term Pymt ( < 2011) 0.0010 *** 0.0016 0.0168 * 0.0010 *** -0.0003 **
(0.0059) (0.3889) (0.0825) (0.0081) (0.0142)
After §951 Term Pymt (>=2011) 0.0005 0.0007 0.0325 *** 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.1578) (0.6764) (0.0001) (0.6068) (0.4005)
Change In Control Payments Scaled 0.8573 *** -9.1544 *** -20.0052 *** 1.1838 *** 0.2945 ***
(0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0026) (0.0000) (0.0004)
Delta of Portfolio ( $000) 0.0000 *** -0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.8266) (0.0000) (0.5588)
Vega of Portfolio ($000) 0.0001 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0005 * 0.0000 0.0001 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0740) (0.3217) (0.0000)
Salary 0.0000 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0011)
Bonus 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 ***
(0.3692) (0.1288) (0.9621) (0.0502) (0.0030)
Stock Awards 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0024) (0.2250) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Options Awards 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.5974) (0.2910) (0.1571) (0.0000)
Non-Equity Incentive 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(0.0000) (0.0015) (0.1233) (0.0441) (0.0218)
Other Compensation 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 *
(0.0637) (0.1119) (0.3395) (0.4412) (0.0976)
Market to Book Ratio 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
(0.6430) (0.9777) (0.6225) (0.8330) (0.4188)
Log Sales -0.0471 *** 0.0339 *** -0.0165 -0.0220 *** -0.0140 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.6591) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CEO Continuous Tenure 0.0007 * 0.0017 -0.0354 *** -0.0022 *** 0.0006 ***
(0.0970) (0.4422) (0.0016) (0.0000) (0.0001)
CEO Age -0.0015 *** 0.0014 0.0069 -0.0026 *** -0.0006 ***





















(+) 0.0077 ** (-) -0.0599 *** (+/-) 0.5419 *** (-) 0.0234 *** (+) 0.0007
(0.0440) (0.0020) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5520)
(-) -0.0007 (+/-) 0.0008 (+/-) 0.0179 (+) -0.0010 ** (-) 0.0002
(0.1070) (0.7040) (0.1010) (0.0150) (0.2180)
TABLE 10: Dodd-Frank Act §951 Implementation Piecewise Estimation As a result of Dodd-Frank §951 adoption by the SEC on Jan 25th, 2011,
firms were required to provide 'say-on-pay' votes to shareholders beginning immediately with the next shareholder meeting. This change to the voting power
of shareholders with respect to internal firm decisions deminimizes an agency gap between shareholders and the board in decisions on executive pay
agreements. Inherently the initiation of the §951 adoption by the SEC would institute an increase in governance power and monitoring via external markets as 
CEOs now face higher scrutiny and reprimand for decisions from institutional investors, block-holders, and activist investors who can carry a proxy on 'say-
on-pay' to fruition. Such a shift in monitoring and shareholder external governance should result in the CEO reversing the perverse effects of severance much
in the way that Almazan and Suarez (2003) predict that CEOs with strong boards ( and thereby strong governance) will be unable to extract control rents or
renegotiate compensation upon the arrival of a rival CEO conditional on quality of said rival. As such I expect to see a reversal in the predicted signs in a
piecewise estimation from the estimations preformed previously--that is a reversal of the hypotheses. In using a piece-wise regression I can observe the
instantaneous shift after the event and a change in slope following the event for the variable of interest (Termination Payment). While I predict that there will
be an immediate reversal as the CEO solves the game inductively, as in Almazan and Suarez (2003) and initiates new investment decisions upon the adoption 
of §951 by the SEC, it is not expected that any increase in Termination Pay after the event would alter the previous hypothesis and that the effect should
remain consistent. The results are mixed, but consistent with the idea that an increase in monitoring or shareholder power led to a reversal of the predicted
hypothesis for Cash levels and firm leverage with significance. R&D Intensity exhibits a reversal but it is insignificant, and interstingly dividend yield shows a
significant jump following the adoption although given the lack of findings in prior analysis I held no priors in this prediction. Capital Expenditure Intensity
provides no reversal from the prior analysis except in the case of slope which was not expected to change but does. Results are displayed in the table above
with emphasis predominantly in Panel B (the differences). Values in parenthesis are p-values, * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
TABLE 10: Dodd-Frank Act §951 Implementation Piecewise Estimation (cont.)
PANEL B: Differences in Constant and Slope 
After §951 Indicator  - Before 
§951 Indicator 





Table 11: TakeOver Intensity and Force-Fields
p-value Std. Err. p-value Std. Err Diff. Z-Score
Cash-To-Assets
         Term Payment -14.590 *** 0.000 0.460 -19.811 *** 0.000 0.635 -5.221 *** -6.659
         Chg. Control Payment 11.567 *** 0.000 0.370 16.139 *** 0.000 0.439 4.572 *** 7.956
         Delta 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** -21.60
         Vega 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.740
CAPEX Intensity
         Term Payment 7.613 *** 0.000 0.543 -6.757 *** 0.000 0.539 -14.37 *** -18.79
         Chg. Control Payment -0.546 0.157 0.386 5.789 *** 0.000 0.423 6.335 *** 11.05
         Delta 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 41.56
         Vega 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 3.895
Div. Yield 
         Term Payment 0.114 *** 0.000 0.180 0.363 *** 0.000 0.142 0.248 1.082
         Chg. Control Payment -0.049 *** 0.000 0.130 -0.250 *** 0.000 0.114 -0.201 -1.165
         Delta 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.014 0.000 0.000 *** 4.601
         Vega 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 8.635
Relationship Specific Investment
         Term Payment -2.814 0.102 1.720 11.636 *** 0.000 1.402 14.45 *** 6.511
         Chg. Control Payment 9.219 *** 0.000 1.220 -1.884 0.101 1.121 -11.10 *** -6.703
         Delta 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 20.21
         Vega 0.002 *** 0.000 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.200
Financial Leverage
         Term Payment -0.016 *** 0.000 0.000 0.103 *** 0.000 0.008 0.119 *** 15.62
         Chg. Control Payment 0.012 *** 0.000 0.005 -0.012 0.845 0.006 -0.024 *** -3.183
         Delta 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** -52.83
         Vega 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 0.003 *** 124.3
R&D Intensity
         Term Payment -0.006 *** 0.003 0.002 -0.021 *** 0.000 0.001 -0.015 *** -6.250
         Chg. Control Payment -0.004 *** 0.011 0.002 0.009 *** 0.000 0.001 0.013 *** 7.176
         Delta 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** -124.0
         Vega 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 0.000 *** 102.5
TABLE 11: TakeOver Intensity and Force-Fields
TABLE 11: TakeOver Intensity and Force-Field. This table depicts only the 4 estimates of the SSE for Term Payment, Change in Control Payment, Delta and Vega, it
does not show their interactive effects through each equations estimation, because primarily this table examines whether the hypothesis hold when intensity for take-over
increases--and the CEO faces more risk of termination or change in control. I find that for the hypothesis examined here are consistent when examined with take-over
itnensity with the exception of CAPEX Intensity. When takeover intensity is high, a CEO faces more pressure and should exhibit increasing barriers. This table shows that
the difference of the parameter estimates when takeover intensity is high v. low is either negative ( decreasing) or positive (increasing) for a given hypothesis. For cash-to-
assets, the result indicates a decreasing cash-to-asset value with increasing levels of severance as takeover intensity increases, suggesting that CEOs facing more pressure
do reduce cash-levels. This table also shows that change in control payment helps to miitigate this effect as investigated over take-overs which change in control payments
are meant to protect the CEO against. However, it appears that netted with the diff. in change in control payments--the effect is not eliminated. For CAPEX Intensity, the
effect observed is different from that reported in table 3, however, it may be the case that CAPEX intensity is endogenously related to take-over intensity, i.e. firms may
spend less on capital expenditures when take-over intensity in an industry is high as capital expenditures may make it difficult to fend off take-over attempts and may also
make it more likely a firm will be acquired. For Dividend Yield, I continue to show no true effect, the differences are insginficant. For Relationship specific investment the
effect observed here is using the SSE, which is different than the OLS employed by Kale, Kedia and Williams (2015) and also presented in table 5, however, it remains
consistent. As CEOs face high takeover pressure they appear to increase relationship specific investment significantly, suggesting that they are decrasing the liklihood of a
rival CEO's success in a takeover. Financial Leverage increases when takeover intensity is high--which may be an artifact of a relationship with take-overs: a high level of
leverage often makes firms less desireable for acquisition so long as they are solvent, never-the-less the result is consistent with the hypothesis. R&D intensity is also seen
to be decreasing, but the effect apperas to be mitigated by change in control payments almost entirely, suggesting that when CEOs face take over pressure they have less




TakeOver Intensity Low 
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Essay Two: A General Model of Managerial Incentives and Risk-Taking 
 
 
Managers whose compensation is a concave function of firm value have incentives 
to reduce firm cash flow variability. Hence, such managers might reject variance-
increasing positive net present value (NPV) projects.  
–Clifford Smith and René Stulz (1985) 
TRADITIONAL MEASURES OF MANAGERIAL RISK-TAKING incentives include delta (i.e.  
performance-pay sensitivity, or PPS) and vega (i.e. volatility sensitivity). While these measures 
have been used extensively in the literature, they do not incorporate the effect of severance 
compensation (Bizjak et al. 1993; Core and Guay 1999; Guay 1999; Cohen et al. 2000; Coles et 
al. 2006; Anderson and Core 2013)30. Additionally, these measures are an indirect proxy of 
compensation incentives as they do not measure convexity of the compensation contract with 
respect to firm value (Smith and Stulz 1985; Guay 1999; Coles et al. 2006).  
To address these concerns, I develop a real-option model of CEO compensation that can 
be applied to all types of compensation and allows for the computation of incentive measures that 
include the effect of severance. Using this model, I derive compensation gamma, a direct measure 
                                                           
30 There is an ongoing debate as to whether severance increases risk-taking or reduces it and this is confounded in regard to how 
severance interacts with other types of compensation. Holmström (1979) and Holmström and Milgrom (1987) indicated that firm 
specific risks should reduce pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO owing to the ‘equilibrium’ concept of CEO compensation—
that is higher firm risk necessitates higher compensation to assuage the risks. This result was supported by Aggarwal and Samwick 
(1999) but has yielded conflicting results in Prendergast (2002). Daniel, Coles, and Naveen (2006) show that there is a ‘vega’ effect 
which strongly relates to traditional measure of CEO risk-taking such as R&D intensity or CAPEX intensity. Conyon, Core and 
Guay (2009) shows that risk-adjusted CEO compensation is not significantly different than that of CEOs in Britain—yet American 
CEOs take on dramatically higher equity risk. Furthermore, there is conflict over what exactly causes the risk-taking incentive—is 
it stock or stock options? Guay (1999) and Parrino and Weisbach (1999) both show that stocks produce very little risk-taking 
incentive for the CEO; whereas Booth (2009) argues that stock options are the best method for incentivizing the CEO to take risks. 
Worse still is the conflict over what exactly the effect of severance compensation packages has on CEO risk-taking. Ju, Leland and 
Senbet (2002) argue that put options are ‘analogous’ to severance packages—which implies that severance packages function as a 
type of insurance—which for rational individuals generally increases ex-post insured risk-taking behavior (Holmström (1979)). 
This argument is certainly supported by Daniels et al. (2006), but a working-paper by Muscarella and Zhao (2017) show that this 
may no longer be the case with striking evidence to suggest that CEOs no-longer face incentives to produce risk but are actually 
incentivized not to take it.  
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of compensation convexity which helps to correct for vega’s relationship to firm size, share price 
and firm riskiness. Such relationships may ultimately bias empirical results and cause inconsistent 
estimates through firm size when vega is used as a measure of incentives.  
I then empirically test the validity of gamma and vega from the model using CEO actuarial 
‘death tables’ as a novel means of predicting remaining tenure for a CEO31. I examine the effect 
of gamma and vega, with and without severance, on CEO risk-taking and find that gamma is 
generally positively related to risky investment. Vega’s effect, on the other hand, is unclear. I also 
show that severance may reduce risk-taking incentives and firm focus. This suggests that gamma 
and vega do not have the same implications as incentives measures, and severance may not provide 
as much benefit to firms as previously thought.  
The remainder of this essay is constructed as follows: Section I, contains the derivation of 
the model. In Section II, I discuss the differences between gamma and vega with the assistance of 
graphics of compensation portfolios. In Section III, I describe the construction of actuarial ‘death 
tables’ for CEO tenure. Section IV uses empirical estimates of gamma and vega in univariate, 
OLS, and 3SLS Simultaneous equation regressions to test the differences between gamma and 
vega and the effects severance has on measures of risk-taking incentives and firm focus. Lastly in 




                                                           
31 A rather small contingency of the literature examines CEO tenure, Career horizons, decision horizons, or hazard ratios of 
employment. This area of the literature serves as a fertile ground for increased research, given the inherently important effects of 
expected tenure on CEO behavior and risk-taking. See Antia, Pantzalis, Park (2010), Brookman and Thistle (2009).  
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I. The Model  
 
Almazan and Suarez (2003), Ju, Leland and Senbet (2004), and Inderst and Mueller (2008) 
each expound upon the intended benefits of severance in increasing investments in variance 
increasing projects, as severance acts as an assurance that the CEO will not be terminated should 
the project ultimately reduce the value of the firm. Thereby it is intuitive that severance agreements 
should affect a CEO’s sensitivity to firm value and sensitivity to volatility (i.e. delta and vega, 
respectively)—yet these measures do not account for the effects of severance32. 
Furthermore, severance and option compensation have long been modeled separately as 
individual parts of an ex-ante principal-agent framework between a CEO and her shareholders 
(Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; Hart 1995; Bebchuck and Fried 2003; Frydman 
and Jenter 2008; Edmans and Gabaix 2009). However, this ex-ante treatment does not consider 
how CEOs behave after their contracts are negotiated and what incentives they truly experience 
(Williamson 2002). This essay’s contribution is to 1) use an ex-post model of compensation 
contracts to examine their incentives; 2) include the effect of severance in measures of those 
incentives; and 3) improve the accuracy of those measures. 
I.1 CEO Compensation Structure 
 
CEOs are compensated with some combination of executive stock options, share grants, 
cash compensation (i.e. salary, bonus, or some other long-term incentive plan33), and perhaps some 
                                                           
32 Until recently, the amount of severance to be paid out in a contract was not disclosed.  Owing to changes in accounting regulation 
(Sarbanes Oaxley (2002) and Dodd-Frank Act (2009)) have resulted in a requirement that shareholders vote on CEO (and other 
CEO level officer and director) compensation and that these agreements are  disclosed in detail. Before 2006, the existence of a 
severance agreement had to be disclosed, following 2006 the amount was needed. Cadman et al. (2008) and Muscarella and Zhao 
(2017) discuss the collection of these severance agreements. Fluharty-Jaidee (2017) finds that following 2008 the reporting in the 
ExecuComp data-base is consistent and dramatically improved allowing me to the amount of severance.  
33 See Balsam (2002), Bebchuck and Freid (2004), Canyon (2006), and Booth (2009), for example, which all provide detailed 
explanations on the history and use of CEO compensation and the nature of the compensation parts and their individual incentive 
components. Yermack (2006) addresses change-in-control payments. 
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amount of severance. For this model, I restrict the compensation to four types: 1) cash and other 
compensation, which includes any compensation which does not relate to firm value or severance; 
2) stock compensation, which includes granted or restricted stocks; 3) executive stock options 
(ESOs), which includes all exercisable and unexercisable options (vested and unvested)34; and 4) 
severance, which provides a lump-sum payment should the CEO be terminated without cause35. 
Therefore, a hypothetical CEO has a compensation portfolio given in present value terms as: 𝜋 =
𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠. I discuss the valuation of each individually.  
Severance can be modeled as an insurance contract via a digital-barrier option36. A digital-
barrier option is a type of option in which the payout is one (1) if the barrier is crossed and zero 
otherwise37. Digital-barrier options are a useful method of modeling severance as they provide an 
immediate fixed payment after a certain limit has been reached—i.e. the CEO has reached a point 
where the board deems it necessary to terminate them and they receive a fixed payout equal to 
their severance agreement. In my model, the barrier is determined uniquely by share price, 
although it is worthwhile to mention that the barrier does not need to relate to the share price at 
all; however, share price provides a convenient and intuitive way to proxy the performance of the 
CEO (Warner et al. 1988)38.  
                                                           
34 For simplicity I do not investigate the effects of vested, unvested, or exercisable and unexercisable options, although they can be 
modeled for using the model by allowing them to come into effect only after a specific amount of time. 
35 For an investigation on the incentives of change-in-control payments see Yermack (2006). Change-in-Control Payments are 
included in severance as a style and is not intended to imply they are the same or unimportant.  
36 In an older version of their paper Ju, Leland and Senbet (2003) had a footnote which indicated it would be appropriate to value 
severance using a digital barrier option. They have since removed that footnote—but not to be remiss and to provide credit I would 
like to indicate that I had obtained the initial idea for modeling severance in this way from these authors.  
37 For example, should share’s price drop below a set barrier of $30, a barrier option immediately executes and acquires a value 
of $1; should it expire above $30 (i.e. never crosses below the barrier) it is worthless. Digital refers to 1/0, and barrier to the 
execution condition of the option.  
38 A dynamic digital barrier option is an added layer of complexity, not detailed here, in which the termination time of the option 
is unknown as well as the barrier itself is temporally unrestricted in value—that is to say, the barrier is allowed to move over-time 
and there is no known expiration time at any given point in time. This would be perhaps the most general rendition of the model 
and most accurately reflects reality, however, I leave this for future research. I provide a brief review of the valuation of digital 
barrier options in Appendix II which follows closely the construction by Rubinstein and Reiner (1991) 
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 A down, knock-in digital-barrier option, which pays out a fixed amount if a barrier is 
crossed from above, is used for the valuation of Severance. The fixed payout amount is represented 
as Q in Rubenstein and Reiner (1991) and the same notation is used in this model: 𝑉𝑄𝑡 =
𝑄𝑡𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝜏Φ(−𝑑2𝑡
𝑄 ), where 𝑄𝑡  is the contracted level of severance at time 𝑡; 𝑟𝑡 is the risk-free rate a 
time 𝑡; and Φ(−𝑑2𝑡
𝑄
) is the value of the risk adjusted probability from  Black and Scholes (1973) 
for a specific 𝑑2 defined for severance
39. Φ(. ) represents the cumulative standard normal 
distribution40.  
Cash, conversely, is represented with a down, knock-out digital-barrier option, which 
ceases to pay out once the barrier is crossed from above. The down-and-out option is important as 
CEOs do not receive their cash or bonus compensation upon termination. In the extant literature 
one would assume cash payment regardless of termination—I make the distinction so that the 
hypothetical CEO does not obtain both a severance payment and cash compensation at the same 
time.  
 Stock compensation is represented by the number of shares granted or held (𝑔) times the 
difference between the granting, or purchase, price (𝐵𝑡0) and the current share price (𝑆𝑡). When 
the shares are granted to the CEO, 𝑆𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡0= 0 (i.e. 𝑆𝑜 = 𝐵𝑡0), as the CEO has no basis in the 
position. This captures the incremental value of the shares: 𝑉𝑠 = 𝑔(𝑆𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡0). These shares exist 
as property of the CEO until they are sold by the CEO; an assumption of the model which may 
                                                           
39 The notation of the super-script 𝑄 is used here since options and severance valuation may have different risk-adjusted 













differ from reality—however it does not have large effects on the conclusion41. ESOs are valued 
using Black-Scholes (1973) for European options42.  
 The last part of the compensation portfolio is the catch-all category of other compensation 
which includes all other compensation that a CEO may obtain in the course of employment but 
which they expect to lose upon termination; including, pension funds, health-care, perquisites, 
long-term contingent bonuses, et al. This form of compensation is the vaguest, but reasonably so: 
it is also vaguely described in the DEF-14 and DEF-14As. For this form of compensation, I assume 
some components may continue after termination43, and it is common for CEOs to have such 
perquisites which follow even after their tenure of office. However, in the DEF-14As this 
compensation may not be included in the severance package value and are included in other 
compensation. Other compensation which ceases to exist upon termination would be of importance 
to a CEO facing the prospect of termination and would play heavily into their investment choices44. 
To incorporate this loss of compensation into the model I include a term in the same valuation as 
cash which also ceases to be provided to the CEO upon termination.  
                                                           
41 The final result of the model is a second order derivative, in which case 𝑔𝑆𝑡 falls out of the model. Whether the shares are 
restricted or unrestricted upon the termination of the CEO can be considered an unnecessary complication as one could simply 
formulate the valuation of the shares along with a down, knock-out type digital barrier provision attached to it for those shares 
considered unrestricted, as with the cash compensation. Thereby, one would be repeating the ‘other compensation’ part of the 
compensation portfolio with those unrestricted shares and adding mere complication and little more verisimilitude to the model; 
for these purposes I willfully ignore whether the shares are restricted or unrestricted for parsimony.  
42 Since the options can be exercised opportunistically by the CEO, valuation as an American style option has merits. However, I 
restrict the present derivations to the simpler European-style option valuation owing to their ease of differentiability and the relative 
verifiability (Chen, Lee & Shih (2010)). Within the scope of examining delta, vega and gamma I do not expect this to have large 
effects on the analysis—though using American options could reveal many interesting artifacts of compensation and risk-taking 
incentives. 
43 Such as the case for Karl Otto Lagerfeld, whose DEF-14A for Fendi, owned by LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE, and 
Chanel S.A. fashion houses dictates that he be allowed to use his office, a secretary, a limo and the use of the [a] corporate air-
craft, when not already in use, for personal transportation for a year after being terminated from his position. As Creative Director 
of Fendi, Chanel and Lagerfeld Fashion houses Karl O. Lagerfeld has executive status and sometimes wields implicit executive 
authority on par with that of the President or CEO. [LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton SE (2015), Form DEF-14A 
(2015).  Retrieved from SEC EDGAR website http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml] 
44 Continuous payment of other compensation in the model simply shifts upward in the vertical intercept of the compensation 
profile and falls out in differentiation since such compensation occurs regardless of performance of the CEO and would not affect 
risk-taking (it’s an employment independent endowment); ergo, continuous compensation lends little benefit to the model.   
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I.2 Delta, Vega and Gamma 
 
Delta (or PPS) serves as a first-order measure of how a CEO’s compensation portfolio’s 
total value changes in relation to a change in the value of the of the firm (i.e. 𝜕𝑉/𝜕𝑆), while vega 
is a first-order measure of the change in the value of the compensation portfolio to change in the 
volatility of the firm’s share price (i.e. 𝜕𝑉/𝜕𝜎). Gamma is the second-order derivative of the 
compensation portfolio with respect to firm value (i.e. 𝜕2𝑉/𝜕𝑆2). The gamma of the portfolio 
determines the curvature of the portfolio.  
CEOs with convex compensation portfolios have explicit benefits to invest in variance 
increasing projects with positive NPVs (Smith and Stulz 1985). Contrary to its use in the literature, 
vega does not measure the incentive to invest in risky projects because it does not measure 
convexity—it measures only the sensitivity of the portfolio to risk.  
Making a risk-averse CEO highly sensitive to changes in risk (i.e. increasing vega) does 
not necessarily indicate that they will be incentivized to increase investment in risky projects—
indeed they may be incentivized to reduce investment in high volatility projects to reduce the 
firm’s risk to match their own preferred level of risk as they know their compensation is highly 
sensitive to volatility (e.g. hedge the risk). Yet, this is the very argument that is made when vega 
is used as a barometer of risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation portfolios (Holmström 1979; 
Holmström and Milgrom 1987; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999). Therefore, it is not clear what type 
of incentives vega provides, since vega only shows how sensitive a CEO’s compensation portfolio 
is to a firm’s underlying risk.  
Since gamma is a singular measure of local convexity, the incentives are clear. When 
gamma is negative the compensation portfolio is concave with respect to firm value indicating a 
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dis-incentive to invest in variance increasing projects. When gamma is positive the compensation 
portfolio is convex with respect to firm value indicating an incentive to invest in variance 
increasing projects. 
I.3 The General Model 
 
 Using the prior simplified construction of the compensation profile, I add the digital-barrier 
valuation to severance and cash (with other compensation) and use Black-Scholes for the ESOs to 
obtain the expanded present value payout function 𝜋𝑠𝑡(. ): 
πst(Qt, rt, τ, St, KQt, KOt , σt, qt, Ct, gt, Bt0 , d2
Q, d1
O, d2
O, Oth.t ) =
= Qte
−rτΦ(−d2
Q) + (C + Oth. )te
−rτΦ(d2







𝑄𝑡  is the amount of severance in the compensation portfolio for a specific period in time (usually 
set annually), 𝑟𝑡 is the risk-free rate at time t used as the rate of discount. 𝑆𝑡 is the firm’s share 
price at any point in time and 𝐾𝑄𝑡, 𝐾𝑂𝑡  are the strike prices for both the severance package (𝑄𝑡) and 
the ESO package (𝑂𝑡). The strikes are different because termination is expected to occur only after 
a specific lower barrier is crossed, and ESOs usually have a strike above the current price to 
encourage long-run performance. 𝜎𝑡 is the measure of the underlying firm’s volatility for a given 
time t; 𝑞𝑡 is the dividend yield of the firm in the given time t, and 𝑔𝑡  is the number of shares granted 
or otherwise provided to the CEO (cumulative, net of exercise) for a given time t. 𝐶𝑡 and 𝑂𝑡ℎ.𝑡 are 
the cash and other compensation portions of the compensation contract and represents all the 
compensation for the CEO not included in other groups and which is assumed to stop after the 
CEOs are terminated. Contractually this compensation is often known well in advance, so cash 






𝑂 are computed as in the Black-Scholes framework, with the exception that 𝑑2
𝑄
 
relates to the parameters associated with the severance package (particularly  𝐾𝑄𝑡), and 𝑑1
𝑂 , 𝑑2
𝑂 are 
associated with the ESOs (𝐾𝑂𝑡). Derivations for the following equations can be found in Appendix 
IV. 
The delta for a compensation portfolio is given by equation (2): 
ΔP = ΔQ + (ΔC + ΔOth.) + ΔS + ΔO (2) 
The derivative of delta is gamma, and portfolio gamma is the summation of individual gammas of 
the components, so the gamma of a compensation portfolio is given in equation (3): 
ΓP = ΓQ + (ΓC + ΓOth.) + ΓS + ΓO (3) 
Expanding equation (2) using valuation models from Rubenstein and Reiner (1991) and Black and 
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Allowing NetSev to be defined as severance less cash and other compensation, 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑣 = 𝑄𝑡 −














































) = στS2ΓP(𝑆𝑡 , 𝜎𝑡 , 𝜏, d2
Q, d1
Q, d1
O, 𝑟𝑡 , KQt, KOt  𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑣) (9) 
Equation (8) shows that vega is increasing in share price. Since vega increases in share price 
through 𝑑1
𝑂 and 𝑆𝑡, there may be relationships between vega and other firm characteristics. 
Additionally, when volatility increases (𝜎) firms with high share prices have CEOs with 
increasingly large vega and this is particularly true for CEOs who have a high remaining tenure 
(𝜏) as it increases this effect even more. Equation (9) implies that, ceteris paribus, CEOs of firms 
with a high share price have higher vega.  
I.4 Gamma, Vega and Risk-Taking Behavior 
 
Vega and Gamma have different implications as measures of risk-taking incentives. As 
equations (6) and (9) show, gamma is decreasing in volatility, which is consistent with rational 
expectations of risk-taking (Guay 1999; Belghitar and Clark 2016). Vega, on the other hand, is 
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increasing in volatility (through 𝑑1
𝑂)45. Thereby, equation (8) suggests that while volatility is 
increasing a CEO faces increased incentives to take risk so long as vega is a positive measure of 
risk-taking incentives.  CEOs experiencing conditions of increased volatility should exhibit a 
declining appetite for risk due to an increase in risk-premia used in discounting projects’ expected 
cashflows—decreasing investment opportunity set with less projects exhibiting positive NPVs 
(Guay 1999). Gamma follows the behavioral prediction that increasing volatility results in a 
declining, or negative, incentive.  
Equation (9) shows that vega increases exponentially in share price (i.e. 𝑙𝑖𝑚(𝑆 →
∞+) 𝑜𝑓 vP = ∞
+ ). Vega also increases as ESOs become more at- or in-the money, an issue which 
is compounded as time to expiration (or termination) increases. This suggests that CEOs have 
unbridled incentives to take risk—which is inconsistent with diminishing marginal utility and 
benefits.  
Gamma initially increases as share prices approach strike prices and ESOs are out-of-the 
money, increasing the incentive to take risk to move the ESOs in-the-money. When ESOs become 
in-the-money, Gamma begins to converge to zero—consistent with declining marginal utility. 
Equation (6) shows a negative relationship between gamma and share price, but it is convergent 
(i.e. 𝑙𝑖𝑚 (𝑆 → ∞) 𝑜𝑓 Γ𝑝 = 0) and not exponential
46. 














normally the case, and increasing in volatility when the ESOs are in the money so long as log-returns relative to the strike remain 
below the expected return process (i.e. ln (
𝑆𝑡
𝐾




46 A negative relationship between firm size and gamma would bias down relationship matching incentives to risk-taking behavior. 
Where vega is positively associated with firm size and firm size may drive investment in risky projects, a high vega may be 
associated with high investment in risky projects spuriously. High firm size is associated with slightly lower gamma, but if gamma 
is positively associated with risky investment the conclusion remains the same. The downward bias in gamma moves against the 
endogenous relationship vega suffers from.  
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A positive relationship between share price, or firm size, and vega could explain vega’s 
supposed relationship to risk-taking incentives. Firm size and associational accounting metrics that 
also vary with firm size—i.e. increased R&D intensity, lower CAPEX intensity, increased 
financial leverage, lower growth rates, higher cash flows, higher dividends and lower firm 
riskiness—may be the reason behind the positive relation between vega and risk-taking measures 
(Guay 1999; Core and Guay 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hayes et al. 2012; Anderson and Core 2013).  
Additionally, as the model suggests that gamma is negatively related to firm size, so it is important 
to test the relationship between gamma and firm-size to see if the negative association holds 
empirically.  
I.5 Gamma, Vega and Time to Termination and Pressure to Perform 
 
It has been theorized that individuals behave irrationally, take on increased risk, or ‘go-for-
broke’ when the expectation of failure is approaching or apparent (Golbe 1988; Eberhart and 
Senbet 1993). Time to maturity (or termination) (𝜏) affects gamma and vega differently. Vega, 
however, decreases as 𝜏 approaches 0. Interestingly, increased levels of severance may mitigate 
the ‘go-for-broke’ effect, although, this is not observed through vega which exhibits no change 
with respect to time due to the termination condition. Vega also decreases as ESOs approach their 
expiration and are near at-the-money.  
Gamma increases as 𝜏  approaches zero; therefore, as a measure of risk-taking incentives 
it behaves as predicted by the behavioral literature. Gamma also provides for increased risk-taking 
if options are near at-the-money and ESOs are expiring is soon; although if ESOs are in-the-money, 
a CEO has less incentive to increase risk-taking further as they face decreasing marginal incentives 
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the further in-the-money the ESOs become—an artifact of gamma that is in line with the gain and 
risk-aversion effects under prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).   
Vega is increasing in time to termination and time to expiration for ESOs. This implies that 
CEOs who either do not expect to be fired soon or have a long-time until their ESOs expire have 
an increased incentive to take risk: which is inherently counter intuitive given an implicit reduction 
in pressure to perform. Gamma, on the other hand, were long-time to maturities exist, dictates a 
near zero (or negative) incentive to take risk—a rational result if the CEO feels little pressure to 
perform (Weisbach 1988; Borokhovich, Parino, and Trapani 1996; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Hsu, 
Hsiao and Li 2009; Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash 2011)47.  
 Thus, while vega and gamma share similarities, gamma is a direct measure of convexity of 
compensation portfolios and therefore a better measure of risk-taking incentives.   
 
II. Compensation Portfolios and Convexity 
 
In the previous discussion I have asserted that it is the convexity (i.e. shape) of the 
compensation agreement that drives the incentive to take risk. To visually examine the shape of 
compensation agreements I depict the present value of contracts across share prices—recalling that 
share price also acts as the proxy for when the CEO will be terminated. In the following figures, I 
show CEO compensation portfolios along with gamma and vega for various levels of severance, 
                                                           
47 𝜏’s effect on gamma is non-linear. 
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which generally takes on values equivalent to two or four times cash and bonus compensation, 
typically ranging from 2 to 8 million dollars48.  
In Figure 1, I have used a volatility value of 0% for visual representation of compensation 
payouts49. The magenta line represents a CEO who has no severance compensation agreement. 
The red line represents the termination barrier, crossing below this line represents the termination 
event. The black dashed lines, varied by the amount of severance, show how severance directly 
increases the total payout after the termination event is crossed. 
 The green line depicts the strike price of the ESOs—represented in the formula as 𝐾𝑜—
and is placed arbitrarily at 55. The vertical blue line represents the grant price for shares and is 
arbitrarily 50 dollars a share. The termination barrier is set at 40 dollars a share—which is 
represented in the formula as 𝐾𝑄. Increasing or decreasing the termination barrier, or strike and 
grant prices, will not largely affect the geometry of the compensation portfolio50.  
 When volatility increases to 10% in Figure 2 it causes a smoothing of the payout function. 
Increasing volatility further to 20%, 30%, etc., smooths the payout even more. This shows 
evidence of vega’s relationship to smoothness, not convexity, of the compensation portfolio. 
In Figure 3, I show for a range of share prices the value of gamma on the compensation 
structure with the same parameters in Figure 2. As the gamma for compensation packages with 
                                                           
48 In order to remain congruent with reality in which many CEOs face compensation severance that are structured with these sort 
of provisions, severances may actually change in value over the tenure of the CEO owing to these constructions in the contracts, 
this is why severance is used here with a subscript for time.  
49 A volatility of 0% results in a completely rigid payout structure, clearly delineating the individual components. 
50 The only impossibility imposed by reality is that the initial termination barrier cannot be above the strike prices for the options 
or the grant price for the stock—this would imply that the CEO is granted shares for which they may not be able to increase the 
value of the shares or options and would be nearly immediately terminated. A scenario such as this would be equivalent to 
functionally saying to the CEO that they will be paid if they raise share price by some improbable amount—say 200%—but fired 
and lose the value of all of their compensation, except severance pay if applicable, if they do not immediately reach that goal the 
day they start.  
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severance is often above the magenta line (no severance), the model predicts that severance should 
provide increased risk-taking incentives while the CEO is employed under certain values for firm 
riskiness, time to maturity (termination) and discount rates. 
In Figure 4, I have depicted vega, using the same parameters in Figures 2 and 3. Vega and 
gamma share a similar structure, but vega is large, and always positive, and would become larger 
as share prices increase. In Figure 3, gamma declines after the ESOs are in-the-money and gamma 
converges to zero as share prices increase, which is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
and Tvede (1999). These figures help to understand and think about compensation portfolios as 
the equations can prove to be unwieldy and difficult to interpret; next I test the intuition of the 
model and its predictions for associations between vega, risk-taking incentives and firm size 
empirically.  
III. Vega and Gamma and Risk-Taking Analysis 
 
 The model predicts a positive relationship between vega and share prices or firm size, but 
how strong the relationship is, and whether the relationship affects vega’s relationship to risky 
investment, remains an empirical question. In this section I first construct measures of remaining 
tenure from CEO ‘death tables’ which is used as 𝜏 in the computation of vega and gamma 
following equations (6) and (8). I then use these vega and gamma estimates in univariate and 
multivariate tests to determine if there is a link between vega and firm size that might explain 
vega’s relationship to measurements of risky investment such as R&D and CAPEX. Based on the 
model’s predictions, I expect to find a positive relationship between vega and firm size and a 
negative relationship between gamma and firm size.  
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 Since firm size and investment in R&D Intensity are positively related, and firm size and 
investment in CAPEX Intensity are negatively related—firm size may drive the positive link 
between vega and R&D Intensity and the negatively association to CAPEX Intensity (Guay 1999; 
Core and Guay 2002; Coles et al. 2006). The model predicts that gamma is negatively related to 
firm size, which biases against the likelihood of finding a positive and significant relationship to 
investment in R&D for gamma. The model also allows me to examine whether including severance 
in the computation of vega or gamma alters the relationship with firm size and ultimately the 
relationship to CEO risk-taking. 
 Lastly, I use simultaneous equation models to test if vega remains a determinant of risk-
taking incentives and firm riskiness through diversification (i.e. firm focus) when gamma is 
included in the model. Lastly, I use the simultaneous regressions to test how severance effects the 
incentives measured by vega and gamma. Based on the model, severance should increase risk-
taking incentives using either vega or gamma as a measure—although this depends on a given set 
of parameters, and empirical tests are necessary to determine the overall effects.  
III.1 Data Collection and Univariate Statistics  
 
I collect firm-level variables as measures of firm size from Compustat and merge CEO-
level variables from ExecuComp for all non-missing CEO-firm pairs over the period of 2008 to 
2015—resulting in 1,453 unique firms with 1,441 unique CEOs for 6,295 observable firm-year 
pairs. All variables are winsorized where appropriate at the 1% level. Univariate statistics for 
variables are reported in Table 1 and described below.  
Share Price is the last price of the firm on the last trading day of the year in any given year 
(PRCC_F) listed in Compustat and has a mean (median) of 37.94 (28.07). Ln(Assets) is the natural 
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log of total assets for a firm in a given year and has a mean (median) of 7.39 (7.29). Ln(Market 
Value of Equity) is the log of the market capitalization on the last day of the year in any given year 
with a mean (median) of 3.24 (3.33); Ln(Book Value of Equity) is the log value of reported 
shareholders equity with a mean (median) of 2.35 (2.43). Market-to-Book is a measure of firm 
value as a ratio of market equity to book equity with a mean (median) of 3.11 (2.33). Book 
Leverage is a measure of book value of debt to total assets with a mean (median) of 21% (18%) 
and is used to control for the leverage of the firm.  
Tobin’s Q is a measure of firm value relative to net replaceable assets and has a mean 
(median) of 84.64 (0.29). Volatility is the rolling 60-month variance for a firm’s share returns and 
has a mean (median) of 41% (44%) reported as standard deviation.; Volatility may be a determinant 
of vega and gamma and may also have a relationship to firm size. Sales Growth, computed as the 
log-difference of sales year-over-year, has a mean (median) of 0% (7%). Surplus Cash, the cash 
from assets-in-place divided by total assets (see Coles et al. 2006), has a mean (median) of 6% 
(6%). Stock Return is the total holding period return of a firm’s shares for a given year and has a 
mean (median) of 0% (8%). Lastly, Return on Assets (ROA) computed as net income over total 
assets has a mean (median) of 5% (9%) and is used as a measure of firm profitability.  
 CEO-level variables include Percentage of Cash-to-Total Compensation and has a mean 
(median) of 29% (20%). Percentage of Stock- and Option-to-Total Compensation has a mean and 
median of 47% (55%), and while not used in the estimations as it would sum to 100%, the 
percentage of compensation that is severance is 24% (20%). These percentages are used to control 
for the composition of compensation portfolios while being indiscriminate with respect to firm 
size. CEO compensation Delta (or PPS) is a known determinant of vega and has a mean (median) 
of 542.86 (193.31). It represents a $1000 dollar change in compensation for the CEO given a $1 
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dollar change in the underlying share price. CEO Age has a mean (median) of 55.23 years (55 
years), and current continuous Tenure has a mean (median) of 5.95 years (5 years). Lastly, using 
the previous death table analysis, Expected Remaining Tenure may be a determinant of vega and 
gamma as well.  
 Using ‘death table’ estimates and estimation method discussed in the next sub-sections 
III.2 and III.3, vega and gamma are constructed with and without the effect of severance. Vega 
without severance has a mean (median) of 127.21 (142.03); Vega with severance has a mean 
(median) of 118.76 (135.35). Gamma without severance has a mean (median) of 0.48 (0.25), and 
Gamma with severance has a mean (median) of 0.27 (0.22). This is initial empirical evidence that 
severance may not increase risk-taking incentives overall, as theory might suggest, but reduce 
them.  
III.2 Time to Termination and Death Tables 
 
 To estimate delta, vega or gamma and include the effects of severance one needs an 
estimate of when the termination event will occur51. The termination of a CEO depends on several 
factors including firm performance, scandals, age of the CEO, relative tenure to industry medians, 
general market performance, acquisition performance, entrenchment, CEO matching, and shares  
ownership (Jovanoic 1979a & 1979b; Hambrick & Mason 1984; Coughlin and Schmidt 1985; 
Warner et al. 1988; Weisbach 1988; Denis et al. 1997; Denis and Kruse 2000; Allgood and Farrell 
2002; Parino et al. 2004;  Henderson, Miller and Hambrick 2006; Walters, Kroll and White 2007; 
Brookman and Thistle 2009; Antia et al. 2010). 
                                                           
51 I price the termination event at-the-money for simplicity, although a dynamic barrier—were the K is dependent on some function 
K(.) would prove more realistic—yet infinitely more difficult to handle. There are several papers in the risk literature which deal 
with Weibull distributions and expectations via AFT or Hazard models that can be employed to estimate a barrier given a host of 
covariate factors.  
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 In the extant literature there is a select, albeit small, group of papers focused on the decision 
horizon (e.g. career horizon) and termination risk of a CEO and how these measures relate to firm 
performance. This essay differs in respect to this literature by being the first to construct and 
examine CEO cohort ‘death tables’—the actuarially defined time a CEO will continue to remain 
in office based on the cohort-year they became CEO52. This section is not concerned with the effect 
of tenure on firm-performance or risk-taking incentives but the prediction of remaining tenure.  
The standard method of estimating remaining tenure, as noted in Brookman and Thistle 
(2009) (BT), is to use a logit model and predict odds of termination. BT extend this literature by 
using survival analysis to predict the hazard ratio of CEO termination. They find that 82% of CEOs 
have a tenure lasting less than 13 years, after which the risk of termination tends to fall.  
 Antia, Pantzalis and Park (2010) (APP) provide a compound method of determining CEO 
decision horizon based on the CEO’s relative tenure and age to the median industry tenure and 
CEO age. APP show that CEO tenures have on averaged decreased from approximately eight years 
to four years on a sample running 1996 to 2003. While both methodologies by BT and APP are 
comprehensive measures and provide a great deal of pertinent information, the hazard ratio 
measures the instantaneous risk of failure and cannot be used to compute remaining expected time 
to failure. Additionally, while APP is measured in full years, due to the industry adjusted effects 
the decision horizon (DH) variable can be negative or positive: making it impossible to construct 
a measurement of remaining time53. 
                                                           
52 Also called ‘life tables’ or ‘mortality tables’.  
53 Negative where the CEO is older than the median CEO in the industry, or they have remained a CEO longer than the median 
tenure in the industry. 
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 A solution to this problem is to compute expected remaining tenure as an actuary would 
compute expected remaining life in pricing a life-insurance contract. Using standard methods of 
constructing ‘death tables’, equations for which are given in Tables 2 and Appendix III, I capture 
each CEO’s start year from ExecuComp and examine how many CEOs within that start year 
remain CEO at their firm each year thereafter. I examine this for CEOs in the period of 1997 to 
2015 and construct cohort expectations of remaining tenure, a selection of which is presented in 
Table 254. Using these tables, I assign remaining tenure on a per year basis for each CEO cohort. 
To determine the total tenure a CEO can expect to have, I add the expected remaining tenure to 
their current tenure in a given year.  
 Averaging across the sample I find that CEOs have an expected total tenure term of roughly 
16 years, slightly higher than the results found by BT and significantly longer than the 8 to 4 years 
given by APP. However, while the total tenure term is on average expected to be 16 years, more 
recently hired CEOs have shorter expected remaining tenure. For the full sample, the rate of decay 
for expected remaining tenure increases after CEO experiences approximately 8.3 years—the rate 
of decay increases after only 5.7 years for CEOs who came into office with the past decade (2005 
to 2010). After 14 years, CEOs experience a rapid decay of remaining tenure expectancy, as seen 
in Table 2: Panel C. Additionally average expected remaining tenure is 2.98 years, which is 
directly in line with the 4 years in APP’s DH estimation as the CEO can only rationally expect to 
remain CEO for that much longer55. 
                                                           
54 The sample window runs 1997 to 2015, however the sample pulls back to 1965 to determine CEO survivorship and deletes any 
who became a CEO before 1965. In the estimates, a only sub-sample of CEOs who have ‘died’ (were terminated, changed control, 
or actually died) were used to avoid survivorship bias these estimates were then used to provide predictors to all CEOs (in the next 
section)—even those who are ‘living’ (still CEO of the same firm).  
55 All life estimates use a half-year population and death expectation—this is purely for simplicity and is standard in use of 
actuarial ‘crude’ measures.  
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 Consistent with BT I find evidence that CEOs who pass the 13-year mark of tenure have 
decreased likelihood of termination—with the standardized average tenure expectancy increasing, 
which indicates of a survivorship effect. Much like the life expectation of infants increase 
significantly once they are over the age of five, so does the tenure expectancy of CEOs—although 
it warrants stating that very few CEOs ever make it past ‘the toddler years’. Those who do make 
it past 13 years of tenure likely have high levels of entrenchment, percentages of ownership or low 
governance boards and may remain CEO for quite a long time. For example, within the sample the 
longest tenure term observed was 53 years. I use the expected remaining tenure estimates produced 
by these ‘death tables’ in the construction of estimates for vega and gamma.  
III.3 Univariate Analysis of Firm Size and Risk-Taking Incentives 
 
To test whether vega or gamma have a relationship with share price or firm size and the 
effects severance has on investment and risk-taking behavior, I construct estimates for gamma and 
vega which include severance. To do so I first need empirical estimates of remaining tenure and 
use those values in computing vega and gamma. I then compare gamma and vega across different 
quartiles based on firm size and measures of risky investment to determine if there is a relationship 
as the model suggests.   
 To obtain CEO-firm-year specific estimates of remaining tenure, I run a first stage 
estimation using the cohort expected remaining tenure from the death tables as an explanatory 
variable for a CEO’s tenure in any given year, along with covariates to control for firm 
characteristics, CEO compensation, market cycle characteristics, CEO age, and industry medians 
for age and tenure which may affect a CEO’s likelihood to be terminated in any given year. The 
first stage estimation of the model is presented in Table 3: Panel A. I use results of the fitted model 
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to provide an estimate for 𝜏 used to compute gamma and vega for a given CEO in a given year, 
sample averages are reported with other univariate statistics in Table 1.  
 I break firms into quartiles based on Share Price, Ln(Assets), R&D Intensity, and CAPEX 
Intensity. I compute the average gamma and vega, each with and without severance, for each 
quartile as well as the correlation between gamma and vega and the determinants and report the 
results in Panel B.  
 Table 3, Panel B, reports a positive and significant relationship between vega, share price, 
and firm size which is consistent with Core and Guay (2002), and my model, but inconsistent with 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2002). Baker and Hall (2002) suggest that firm size plays a role in CEO 
incentives so long as the activity of the CEO is considered; however, they note that with respect 
to firm size CEO incentives are constant or declining ‘slightly’—which is not consistent with Table 
3’s results for vega but is consistent with the result for gamma. Only gamma computed on ESOs 
alone (Gamma No Term.) indicates a negative correlation with firm size—which is to be expected 
following equation (9).  
 Panel B also shows there is a positive and significant relationship between R&D intensity 
and both gamma and vega. There is a negative and significant relationship between vega and 
CAPEX intensity and no relationship between gamma and CAPEX intensity.  
These results are similar to Coles et al. (2006)’s findings; however, in Coles et al. (2006) 
R&D intensity and CAPEX intensity are seen as substituted risky investment—were an increase 
in R&D intensity and decline in CAPEX intensity represented risky project substitution under 
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assumed capital rationing56. Since R&D intensity is positively correlated with firm size and 
CAPEX intensity is negatively correlated to firm-size, the fact that vega is also positively related 
to firm size may indicate that the relationship between vega and R&D intensity or CAPEX 
intensity is not clear. Since results in Table 3 and equation (6) suggest gamma is negatively related 
to firm size and there is a positive and significant relationship to R&D intensity, the relationship 
between gamma and risky investment at the very least is not being driven by firm size.  
 Overall, Table 3 reports initial evidence of a significant and positive relationship between 
vega, firm size and share price. There is a negative relationship between vega and capital 
investment, but a positive relationship with vega and R&D. There is a negative relationship 
between gamma and share price, but only when severance is not included—a result that is 
consistent with the pricing of ESOs and the effects of moneyness. A positive relationship between 
gamma and investment in R&D—and a negative relationship to firm size—suggests that the risky 
investment incentives measured by gamma are not driven by firm size, while vega’s may be which 
is consistent with Core and Guay (2001) that firm size may drive the relationship between delta, 
volatility and risk-taking in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). Next I examine these relationships 
with multivariate analysis to control for other determinants which may affect risk-taking behavior 
and incentives. 
III.4 Multivariate Analysis 
 
                                                           
56 Coles et al. (2006)’s argument that investment substitution between R&D and CAPEX suggests increased risky investment—as 
R&D is proposed to be riskier than CAPEX—rests upon the assumption that CAPEX relates solely to investment in property, plant 
and equipment (PP&E). However, capital spending includes cashflows for acquisitions as well—which may be significantly riskier 
than R&D due to uncertainty. A decrease in CAPEX intensity and an increase in R&D intensity may not indicate a substitution 




 To further examine the relationship between vega, gamma and firm size I run OLS 
regressions testing determinants of vega and gamma. Additionally, to examine how severance 
affects these relationships, I run OLS on vega and gamma with severance included. Results from 
the OLS regressions are reported in Table 4.  
In Panel A, vega is the dependent variable and does not have severance included in its 
computation. The results show that Share Price, Ln(Assets), and Ln(Book Value of Equity) have a 
positive and significant relationship with vega. When included together in Model 6, Share Price 
and Ln(Assets) remain key determinants of vega, while there is a negative and significant 
relationship between Ln(Market Value of Equity) and vega. This may be an effect through volatility 
as large market capitalizations lead to reduced share volatility. Interestingly, long-run share 
volatility appears to be negatively, but insignificantly, related to vega. Delta and Percentage of 
Stock- and Option-To-Total Comp. are positive and significant determinants of vega, as expected.  
 Panel B shows the same OLS regressions of firm size on vega with severance. Results 
remain similar except for the relationship between share price and vega which is now insignificant. 
The results in Panel A and B suggest that vega does have a positive and significant relationship 
with firm size either through share price or size of assets, and that severance does not alter this 
relationship, which is consistent with the predictions of the model and equation (8).  
 Next, Panel C and D test the relationship between Gamma and share price as equation (6) 
suggests a negative association due to ESOs; however, when severance is included the negative 
relationship to share prices is mitigated and there should be no effect. Results in Panel C show that 
there is a negative and significant relationship between Gamma (without severance) and share 
price, and other measures of firm size are negatively associated with Gamma as well. When all 
included in Model 6 of Panel C, only Ln(Assets) and Ln(Market Value of Equity) have continued 
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negative and significant relationships with Gamma, while Market-To-Book is also positive and 
significant indicating that a relationship between firm value and gamma may exist.  
 The same tests are run for Gamma with severance and results are reported in Panel D. Panel 
D reports no relationship between share price and measures of firm size and Gamma with 
severance. It is worth noting that in both Panels C and D, adjusted R-squared of the regressions 
are low or negative, indicating these determinants do a poor job of explaining the variation of 
gamma compared to Panels A and B where the adjusted R-squared is relatively high.  
Results in Table 4 have similar implications to Table 3: gamma without severance has a 
negative relationship with share price and a positive relationship with firm value, but when 
severance is included these relationships cease to exist. Vega has a consistently positive and 
significant relationship with firm size regardless of whether severance is included or not which is 
consistent with the arguments of Guay (1999), Core and Guay (2001).  
The results from both Tables 3 and 4 suggest that vega is indeed related to firm size, and 
gamma—especially when severance is included—is not. Given that results from Table 3 suggest 
that gamma is positively related to R&D intensity and results in both Table 3 and 4 show gamma 
has a negative relation to firm size, which is consistent with the model: it seems that gamma’s 
relationship to risky investment is not driven by firm size.  
Vega, on the other hand, does appear to have a strong relationship with firm size which 
may be the driver of the proposed link between vega and risky investment. Next, I examine whether 
gamma or vega is a better measure of risky investment and firm focus as reported in Coles et al. 
(2006). If gamma and vega are placed in the same model, since vega appears to be related to firm 
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size and gamma is a true measure of convexity (i.e. incentives), I should expect to see that gamma 
is a more significant determinant of risky investment or firm focus than vega.  
III.5 Simultaneous Equations on Risk-Taking and Firm Focus 
 
 If gamma is a better measure of risk-taking incentives than vega, then it is appropriate to 
test gamma where vega has been used in the past to see if different results arise. Given that I have 
constructed gamma and vega with severance it is worthwhile to test the effects of severance as 
well. Coles et al. (2006) showed strong evidence that vega is positively related to investment in 
risky projects and improved firm focus, therefore I re-run their simultaneous equation regression 
(3SLS-SSE) models using the same construction of variables found in their paper.  
In running the models, I first estimate my sample in the same tests as their SSEs: results 
remain similar although there are slight differences in size of the estimates which may result from 
different sample periods. Estimates from these ‘calibration’ tests are reported in Model 1 of Table 
5 and 6.  
First, in Table 5, I run a test on investment behavior of CEOs using investment in R&D 
and CAPEX as proxies for risky investment, much like before in Table 2. Having established 
similar results to Coles et al. (2006) in Model 1, I re-run the test and include Gamma (without 
severance) and report the results as Model 2 of Table 5. Estimates indicate that while the 
relationship of vega to R&D and CAPEX is the same as that found under Coles et al. (2006) the 
effect is reduced, and Gamma shows positive, significant and admittedly large effect on both R&D 
and CAPEX. This implies that gamma is a stronger determinant of risky investment than vega.  
In Model 3, I include the effect of severance in the computations for gamma and vega and 
re-run the SSE for R&D and CAPEX. Results indicate that the effect of vega is unchanged, but 
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the effect of gamma is reduced almost entirely. Additionally, gamma shows a negative and 
significant relationship with R&D, which implies a reduction in incentives to invest in risky 
projects. Severance does not seem to affect vega’s measurement of risk-taking incentives, which 
is interesting since it is known that severance does affect incentives in some way. The results from 
Model 3 do, however, indicate that severance reduces risk-taking incentives—which is empirically 
different than what the model might initially suggest. In terms of the model in Section 1, Equation 
(6) suggests that severance can reduce overall gamma when volatility and dividend yield is high, 
and discount rates are low. Noting the sample period of 2008 to 2015—it is entirely consistent 
given interest rate and volatility regimes that severance does reduce risk-taking incentives.  
Next, I test the relationship between vega, gamma and firm focus. Firm focus is a measure 
of CEO investment diversification and thereby firm riskiness. CEO’s with high risk-taking 
incentives may not diversify and increase firm focus, CEOs with limited incentives to take risk 
may diversify the portfolio of the firm to reduce firm cash-flow variability. Therefore if gamma, 
or vega, are true measures of risk-taking incentives, then there should be a positive relationship 
between gamma, vega, and measures of firm focus (Amihud and Lev 1981; Comment and Jarrell 
1995; Coles et al. 2006).  
Using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index (HHI) on segment sales, which has a mean 
(median) of 0.20 (0.23), and the log number of business segments reported in Compustat, which 
has a mean (median) of 0.79 (1.61), I re-run the SSE estimations in the same construction as Coles 
et al. (2006).  
Calibration tests reported in Model 1 of Table 6 show similar results to Coles et al.: a 
positive and significant relationship between sales concentration and vega and a negative and 
significant relationship to the number of segments. In Model 2, when Gamma (without severance) 
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is included in the model, results indicate that vega now has a negative and significant relationship 
with sales concentration and a positive and significant relationship with number of segments. 
Gamma, on the other hand, reports results similar to those found originally in Coles et al. (2006), 
but which are much larger.  
When severance is incorporated in Model 3, vega again shows little change, but, as in Table 
4, the effect of gamma is significantly reduced. With severance, gamma appears to have a negative 
and significant relationship with sales concentration but a positive and significant relationship to 
number of segments. The difference of results between Models 2 and 3 indicates that severance 
may move CEOs towards segment diversification and result in a reduction of firm focus.  
Results of the SSE’s in Table 5 and 6 provide evidence that gamma has a stronger 
relationship to risky investment measured through R&D and CAPEX than vega when included in 
the same model as vega. When severance is included vega shows little change to incentives, 
gamma indicates a complete reduction in the incentive to invest in risky projects. Additionally, 
when gamma is included in the same model as vega, vega becomes associated with reduced firm 
focus and gamma is strongly positively related with firm focus. When the effect of severance is 
included, gamma again shows a reduction in firm focus while vega shows little change.  
Overall the empirical results show that vega has a positive relationship with firm size. 
When gamma is included in simultaneous equations with vega, vega’s role as a determinant of 
risk-taking incentive or firm riskiness through diversification is significantly reduced. Gamma’s 
effects are consistent with what would be expected as a measure of risk taking incentives; Gamma 
is positively related to investment in R&D, and there is some evidence to suggest gamma may be 
a determinant of investment in capital expenditure as well. Gamma is also positively related to 
firm focus—suggesting CEOs with high gamma have reduced risk-aversion and less need to 
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diversify, consistent with gamma being a measure of risk-taking incentives. While initially vega 
appears to be positively related to firm focus—the relationship reverses when gamma is included 
in the same model.  
Lastly, vega does not seem to be affected by the inclusion of severance, while it is known 
that severance affects CEO risk-taking incentives. Gamma shows a marked change in it’s 
relationship to risky investment and firm focus when the effects of severance are included. This 
suggests that severance, however theoretically useful in providing incentives to invest in variance 
increasing projects or reduce CEO risk-aversion, is empirically shown to reduce these incentives 
overall.  
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 Implications of CEO risk-taking incentives based on vega and gamma are different, and 
this is supported by the empirical evidence. Relationships between vega, firm size, share prices, 
and volatility indicate that gamma may be a better estimate of risk-taking incentives than vega. 
Additionally, the model suggests gamma fits the behavioral aspects of CEO risk-taking incentives 
more appropriately, particularly with respect to time to termination, declining utility of wealth, 
and prospecting (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Lastly, gamma is a direct measure of convexity 
of the CEO compensation structure with respect to firm wealth.  
 This essay contributes a flexible model of compensation portfolios which includes 
severance compensation and accounts for the loss of cash and other compensation upon 
termination. To do so I use ‘death tables’ as a novel way to construct estimates of remaining tenure. 
Thereby, I bridge the gap in the literature allowing measurements of CEO risk-taking to be 
computed which also include the incentives of severance.  
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 These extensions to the theory and mechanical analysis of CEO compensation, as well as 
the nicety of CEO ‘death tables’, open a field of research which can be expanded into examining 
the total effects of risk-taking and to finally begin to answer the question as to whether severance 
does or does not increase CEO risk-taking. Preliminary results suggest that it may not always be 
the case, although this is left to further research.  
 With respect to this essay, however, the figures presented depict that under ‘normal’ 
circumstances severance does increase the overall risk-taking incentives of a CEO (e.g. values 
above the magenta line) and suggests that under some circumstances the literature is correct and 
severance helps to induce risk-taking57. Empirically, however, results indicate that when severance 
is included in the measures of risk-taking incentive there is a significant decline in investment in 
risky projects and firm focus. This leads to the conclusion that severance could provide incentives 
to invest in variance increasing projects but under current market and firm specific parameters, it 
may not do so.  
 These results are important for the field and for practitioners alike—CEOs in theory benefit 
from severance agreements as far as risk-taking is concerned, but reality may be far different. 
Additionally, this essay provides practitioners a means of measuring CEO incentives based on 
proposed, or already agreed upon, compensation packages which include the effects of severance. 
Lastly, as an empirical observation to contemporary CEOs, we can say that time in office is a 
declining function, particularly with respect to older CEOs, and that decision and career horizons 
are diminishing rapidly at the time of this writing. This increased pressure to perform is likely to 
be met with increased, and indiscriminate, risk-taking: which is a concerning paradox for CEOs 
                                                           
57  See increased gamma above termination barrier in Figure 3 for increased levels of severance. However, the normality of 
circumstances depends on factors which make the current market, not normal. In cohesion with the results found in Muscarella and 
Zhao (2017), interest rates may affect CEO risk-taking incentives negatively.  
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and the greater market. As CEOs struggle to meet performance standards they may invest in less 
worthwhile projects or invest in ways which improve performance or cut costs at the expense of 
stakeholders, such as employees—and severance will provide a fall back to the CEO, regardless. 
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Figure 1: The Nature of the Payout Structures 
Figure 1: The Nature of Payouts. A graphical representation of payouts. Here the amount of severance, Q, is given at various 
parameters, 2, 4, 8 and 16 million. The other parameters in the depiction are taken from the averages or medians experienced 
by CEOs within the larger sample C = 0.876; g = 1/27; q = 1.08%; Oth. = 1.294; T = 10; rf = 0.25%; STD = 0%, where the 
rf represents the current rate regime and is 0.25%. The red vertical dotted line indicates the termination barrier—proxied by 
the strike of the digital call and put options which is arbitrarily set at 40. The green line represents the strike of the vanilla call-
options again arbitrarily set at 55. The blue vertical dotted line represents the share price issuance for the granted shares, here 




Figure 2: The Nature of the Payout Structures with Realistic Standard Deviation
Figure 2: The Nature of Payout Structures with Realistic Standard Deviation: A graphical representation of payouts. Here the 
amount of severance, Q, is given at various parameters, 2, 4, 8 and 16 million. The other parameters in the depiction are taken 
from the averages or medians experienced by CEOs within the larger sample C= 0.876; g = 1/27; q = 1.08%; Oth. = 1.294; T = 
10; rf = 0.25%; STD = 10%, where the rf represents the current rate regime is 0.25%. The red vertical dotted line indicates the 
termination barrier—proxied by the strike of the digital call and put options which is arbitrarily set at 40. The green line represents 
the strike of the vanilla call-options again arbitrarily set at 55. The blue vertical dotted line represents the share price issuance for 
the granted shares, here give at B = 50. The magenta hashed-line represents a payout portfolio in which the CEO is not compensated 
with a severance contract. 
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Figure 3: Nature of the Gamma Structure
Figure 3: Nature of the Gamma Structure A graphical representation of the gamma of the compensation structure. Here the amount of 
severance, Q, is given at various parameters, 2, 4, 8 and 16 million. The other parameters in the depiction are taken from the averages 
or medians experienced by CEOs within the larger sample C = 0.876; g = 1/27; q = 1.08%; Oth. = 1.294; T = 10; rf = 0.25%; STD = 
10%, where the rf represents the current rate regime and is 0.25%. The red vertical dotted line indicates the termination barrier—proxied 
by the strike of the digital call and put options which is arbitrarily set at 40. The green line represents the strike of the vanilla call-options 
again arbitrarily set at 55. The blue vertical dotted line represents the share price issuance for the granted shares, here give at B = 50. 
The magenta hashed-line represents a payout portfolio in which the CEO is not compensated with a severance contract. 
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Figure 4: Nature of the Vega Structure
Figure 4: Nature of the Vega Structure A graphical representation of the vega of the compensation structure. Here the amount of 
severance, Q, is given at various parameters, 2, 4, 8 and 16 million. The other parameters in the depiction are taken from the averages 
or medians experienced by CEOs within the larger sample C= 0.876; g = 1/27; q = 1.08%; Oth. = 1.294; T = 10; rf = 0.25%; STD = 
10%, where the rf represents the current rate regime and is 0.25%. The red vertical dotted line indicates the termination barrier—proxied 
by the strike of the digital call and put options which is arbitrarily set at 40. The green line represents the strike of the vanilla call-options 
again arbitrarily set at 55. The blue vertical dotted line represents the share price issuance for the granted shares, here give at B = 50. 
The magenta hashed-line represents a payout portfolio in which the CEO is not compensated with a severance contract. 
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Table 1: Univariate Statistics 
   
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
Expected Remaining Tenure 6,295        2.98             2.19              0 1.06          2.58              4.53              14.84            
Expected Total Tenure 6,295        10.52           7.64              0 5.00          8.70              13.89            51.00            
Current Tenure 6,295        7.91             7.28              1.00          3.00          6.00              11.00            53.00            
Continuous Tenure 6,295        5.95             4.27              1.00          3.00          5.00              8.00              22.00            
CEO Age 6,273        55.23           7.25              28.00        50.00        55.00            60.00            76.00            
Total Compensation (severance 
included) (thousands)
6,295        24,890         35,038          0 5,071.79   12,300.52     29,506.57     410,000.00   
Severance to Total Comp 6,295        0.24             0.23              0 0 0.20              0.42              1.00              
Cash to Total Comp 6,295        0.29             0.26              0 0.10          0.20              0.38              1.00              
Stock and Option to Total Comp. 6,295        0.47             0.38              0 0.24          0.55              0.78              1.00              
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
Delta 6,295        542.86 1,043.04       0 58.64        193.31          548.38          7,277.54       
Vega (without severance) 6,295        127.21 210.43 0 11.93        47.39            142.03          1,242.79       
Total Vega (with severance) 6,295        118.76 216.05 0.00 8.94          43.52            135.35          1,460.79       
Gamma ( without severance) 6,295        0.48 2.75 0 0.01          0.07              0.25              106.25          
Total Gamma (with severance) 6,295        0.27 4.93 (253.67)     0.01          0.06              0.22              106.22          
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
Price Per Share 6,295        37.94           46.80            1.00          15.07        28.07            47.44            920.00          
Ln(Assets) 6,295        7.39             1.63              2.03          6.25          7.29              8.45              13.59            
Ln(Market Value of Equity) 6,261        3.82             2.54              0 1.92          3.80              5.55              12.14            
Ln(Book Value of Equity) 6,163        2.35             0.90              0 1.90          2.43              2.93              6.10              
Market-To-Book 6,288        3.11             3.51              0 1.46          2.32              3.69              22.06            
R&D Intensity 6,295        0.03             0.05              0 0 0.01              0.05              0.27              
CAPEX Intensity 6,295        0.25             0.16              0.02          0.13          0.20              0.32              0.80              
HHI 6,295        0.20             0.16              0.03          0.09          0.14              0.23              1.00              
Ln(Number of Segments) 6,295        0.79             0.95              0 0 0 1.61              4.60              
Volatility 6,295        0.41             0.04              0.33          0.38          0.44              0.45              0.45              
Tobin's Q 6,295        84.64           375.51          0 0 0.29              12.60            3,059.31       
Sales Growth 6,283        0 1.07              (8.95)         (0.06)         0.07              0.19              8.44              
Book Leverage 6,270        0.21             0.20              0 0.03          0.18              0.31              3.47              
Return on Assets ( ROA) 6,295        0.05             0.33              (2.20)         0.02          0.06              0.09              24.09            
Stock Return 6,294        0 0.78              (4.77)         (0.27)         0.08              0.35              4.12              
Surplus Cash 6,289        0.06             0.10              (2.45)         0.02          0.06              0.11 0.86              




Table 2: CEO Life Tables 
 
Year Became 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Tenure Year
1999 1.000 1.000
2000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2002 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2003 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2004 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2005 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2006 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2007 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2008 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2009 0.950 1.000 1.000 0.955 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.988 0.987 0.988 1.000 1.000
2010 0.900 0.964 0.919 0.955 0.939 1.000 0.951 0.950 0.924 0.964 0.989 1.000 1.000
2011 0.850 0.821 0.865 0.909 0.898 0.927 0.869 0.913 0.873 0.892 0.943 0.925 1.000
2012 0.800 0.714 0.865 0.864 0.878 0.818 0.820 0.888 0.848 0.867 0.897 0.875 0.976
2013 0.750 0.643 0.838 0.818 0.837 0.764 0.787 0.863 0.810 0.819 0.816 0.863 0.941
2014 0.700 0.607 0.838 0.818 0.776 0.745 0.787 0.825 0.772 0.795 0.805 0.788 0.906
2015 0.650 0.536 0.784 0.773 0.673 0.709 0.738 0.750 0.747 0.771 0.747 0.750 0.847
2016 0.500 0.536 0.676 0.705 0.633 0.655 0.689 0.688 0.671 0.711 0.713 0.688 0.741
Year Became 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Tenure Year
1999 15.600 15.595
2000 14.600 14.595 15.870
2001 13.600 13.595 14.870 14.939
2002 12.600 12.595 13.870 13.939 13.594
2003 11.600 11.595 12.870 12.939 12.594 12.564
2004 10.600 10.595 11.870 11.939 11.594 11.564 11.740
2005 9.600 9.595 10.870 10.939 10.594 10.564 10.740 11.021
2006 8.600 8.595 9.870 9.939 9.594 9.564 9.740 10.021 9.763
2007 7.600 7.595 8.870 8.939 8.594 8.564 8.740 9.021 8.763 9.032
2008 6.600 6.595 7.870 7.939 7.594 7.564 7.740 8.021 7.763 8.032 8.014
2009 5.921 5.595 6.870 7.293 6.594 6.564 6.740 7.116 6.856 7.123 7.014 6.888
2010 5.222 4.783 6.432 6.293 5.992 5.564 6.063 6.377 6.292 6.289 6.090 5.888 6.378
2011 4.500 4.528 5.803 5.583 5.241 4.961 5.588 5.619 5.627 5.758 5.363 5.324 5.378
2012 3.750 4.133 4.803 4.850 4.351 4.556 4.893 4.763 4.780 4.904 4.612 4.600 4.496
2013 2.967 3.536 3.942 4.092 3.539 3.846 4.076 3.887 3.981 4.164 4.018 3.660 3.646
2014 2.143 2.715 2.942 3.092 2.779 2.927 3.076 3.040 3.152 3.275 3.068 2.961 2.768
2015 1.269 2.010 2.110 2.244 2.125 2.052 2.248 2.295 2.242 2.361 2.265 2.084 1.926
Tenure Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
CS Remaining 
Tenure
14.751 13.807 12.880 11.991 11.114 10.416 9.911 9.314 8.837 7.849 7.099 6.389 6.042
Ten Year (cont.) 14 15 16 17
CS Remaining 
Tenure
5.753 3.798 1.091 0.431
TABLE 2: CEO LIFE TABLES
Panel C: Standardized Cross-Cohorot Averages (see Appendix for Standardized formula)
The life tables are computed using standard mortality and life analysis on a cohort basis (using so-called 'crude' estimates). (e.g. see , Life Table and
Mortality Analysis, Chin Long Chiang and other texts) The estimates given in the tables follow the equations in the panel sections. The tables provide some
information such as an immediate decline in the expected tenure over time, while not all estimates are reported for brevity, those values occuring the future are
forecasted using a linear time-series. I adjusted the analysis using 'Expected Life At Birth' calculations (reported in the appendix as Standardized), to curtail
the declining effect of year over year estimation--however the decline was persisitent. It appears that more recent CEOs simply face declining career terms at
a given firm. These findings are consistent with those of Antia, Pantzalis and Park (2010), although results here present slightly higher numbers than their
estimates. Tables are a selected excerpt of CEOs who became CEOs from 1998 to 2010, it does not display all values used in the later regression analysis. 
PANEL A: Survivorship


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Share Price 0.325* 0.396* 0.136 0.162
[1.65] [1.83] [0.68] [0.74]
Ln(Assets) 24.88*** 26.13** 20.46** 25.45*
[2.85] [2.29] [1.98] [1.95]
Ln(Market Value of Equity) -4.651 -11.02*** -4.969 -9.150***
[-1.44] [-3.46] [-1.36] [-2.69]
Ln(Book Value of Equity) 12.71** -1.056 10.52* -0.545
[2.48] [-0.15] [1.84] [-0.07]
Market-to-Book -6.652 -3.370 -6.548 -3.774
[-1.24] [-0.52] [-1.25] [-0.55]
Delta 0.0349*** 0.0367*** 0.0378*** 0.0370*** 0.0377*** 0.0348*** 0.0313*** 0.0318*** 0.0341*** 0.0319*** 0.0326*** 0.0325***
[5.05] [5.16] [5.15] [5.13] [5.22] [4.93] [4.35] [4.33] [4.59] [4.29] [4.38] [4.47]
-48.02 -44.90 -47.30 -44.18 -47.03 -49.27 -49.92 -47.90 -61.19* -46.40 -49.70 -60.65*
[-1.44] [-1.35] [-1.39] [-1.31] [-1.42] [-1.42] [-1.36] [-1.31] [-1.72] [-1.25] [-1.36] [-1.68]
53.79*** 54.45*** 57.26*** 54.23*** 55.59*** 54.34*** 50.42*** 50.36*** 49.97*** 52.19*** 51.35*** 50.14***
[3.63] [3.68] [3.80] [3.64] [3.76] [3.54] [3.09] [3.09] [3.04] [3.17] [3.16] [3.01]
Expected Remaining Tenure -5.267 -4.736 -4.974 -0.592 -4.428 -2.578 -5.813 -5.809 -6.203 -1.021 -5.593 -2.624
[-0.73] [-0.66] [-0.68] [-0.09] [-0.62] [-0.39] [-0.70] [-0.70] [-0.73] [-0.14] [-0.67] [-0.36]
Book Leverage 3.427 -13.48 -2.169 22.60 1.539 -17.94 5.748 -6.715 1.355 25.22 5.906 -13.35
[0.20] [-0.74] [-0.13] [1.08] [0.09] [-0.71] [0.28] [-0.30] [0.07] [1.10] [0.29] [-0.44]
Tobin's Q 0.00301 0.00339 0.00411 0.00329 0.00393 0.00348 -0.00136 -0.00135 0.00370 -0.00140 -0.000882 0.00352
[0.96] [1.10] [1.38] [1.08] [1.31] [1.07] [-0.23] [-0.23] [1.06] [-0.24] [-0.15] [0.96]
Volatility -140.3 -138.8 -157.2 -141.8 -146.3 -196.2 223.8 223.7 119.9 177.6 216.1 45.01
[-1.01] [-1.01] [-1.13] [-1.01] [-1.05] [-1.40] [1.20] [1.20] [0.74] [0.98] [1.16] [0.29]
Constant 270.4*** 92.46 180.7** 186.4*** 296.9*** 29.51 167.7* 14.26 121.2 95.12 180.5** -35.65
[3.85] [1.16] [2.44] [2.65] [4.28] [0.36] [1.85] [0.15] [1.43] [1.15] [2.01] [-0.39]
Observations 6290 6290 6256 6158 6290 6125 6290 6290 6256 6158 6290 6125
Adjusted R-Squared 0.140 0.139 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.148 0.126 0.127 0.140 0.128 0.126 0.147
Table 4: OLS Regressions on Measures of Incentives and Firm Size
Percentage of Stock and Option to-
Total Comp.
Panel A: Vega (not incl. severance) Panel B: Full Comp. Vega (incl. severance)
Percentage of Cash-to-Total Comp.
Table 4: OLS Regressions on Measures of Incentives and Firm Size: OLS estimations of determinants of Vega, without severance in Panel A and with severance in Panel B, and Gamma, without severance in Panel C
and with severance in Panel D. Measures of firm size include the natural log of share price, log assets, log market value of equity, log book value of equity, and market-to-book ratio. Compensation controls includes
percentage of cash-to-total compensation (inclusive of other compensation), the percentage of stock and options to-total compensation, and expected remaining tenure. Controls for risk and valuation include book
leverage (debt divided by total assets), Tobin's Q, and firm volatility computed using rolling 60-month periods of returns. Results in Panel A indicate that share price (model 1), log assets (model 2), and book value of
equity (model 4) are positive and significant determinants of vega. Model 6 shows that when all included share price, log assets, and log market value of equity are all significant determinants of vega--however log
market value of equity is negative, which may point to an effect through volatility as larger market capitalization leads to reduced volatility--and thereby lower vega. Panel B shows similar results except share price
becomes insignificant as a determinant of vega--yet firm size still appears significant. Values reported in square brackets are t-stats, ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Table 4: OLS Regressions on Measu res of Incentives and Firm Size 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Share Price -0.00331*** -0.000831 0.00270 -0.00642
[-3.96] [-1.27] [1.27] [-1.17]
Ln(Assets) -0.521*** -0.295* 1.358 0.723
[-4.71] [-1.91] [1.60] [0.89]
Ln(Market Value of Equity) -0.333*** -0.282*** 0.783 0.969
[-6.23] [-5.17] [1.06] [1.07]
Ln(Book Value of Equity) -0.255*** 0.0207 0.873* 0.0925
[-3.51] [0.19] [1.80] [0.16]
Market-to-Book -0.0250 0.0983*** -0.00224 -0.454
[-1.27] [2.98] [-0.08] [-0.92]
Delta -0.0000394* -0.0000498** -0.0000282 -0.0000406* -0.0000644*** -0.00000774 -0.000152** -0.000171** -0.000217 -0.000130* -0.000131** -0.000162
[-1.69] [-2.13] [-1.28] [-1.85] [-2.78] [-0.35] [-1.99] [-2.03] [-1.57] [-1.77] [-2.06] [-1.51]
0.504** 0.454* 0.353 0.278 0.490* 0.188 -0.937 -0.828 -0.554 -0.985 -0.926 -0.585
[1.98] [1.79] [1.42] [1.36] [1.91] [0.93] [-0.41] [-0.38] [-0.28] [-0.43] [-0.41] [-0.30]
0.297* 0.299* 0.285* 0.323** 0.283* 0.318** 0.772 0.740 0.804 0.811 0.785 0.908
[1.84] [1.85] [1.78] [2.00] [1.75] [1.99] [1.16] [1.10] [1.19] [1.21] [1.18] [1.40]
Expected Remaining Tenure -0.0750 -0.0746* -0.0808* -0.0734* -0.0867* -0.0576 0.0571 0.0366 0.0513 0.0371 0.0659 0.00451
[-1.63] [-1.65] [-1.77] [-1.72] [-1.90] [-1.33] [0.82] [0.57] [0.71] [0.55] [0.88] [0.07]
Book Leverage 0.852*** 1.168*** 0.646** 0.195 0.894*** 0.593** 0.598 -0.161 1.155 1.800 0.569 0.877
[3.06] [4.20] [2.46] [0.91] [3.20] [1.98] [1.15] [-0.30] [1.22] [1.60] [1.12] [0.83]
Tobin's Q -0.0000246 -0.0000244 -0.0000115 -0.0000172 -0.0000315* -0.00000854 -0.00000185 -0.0000157 -0.0000436 -0.0000319 0.00000436 -0.0000392
[-1.43] [-1.49] [-0.67] [-1.10] [-1.82] [-0.53] [-0.07] [-0.47] [-0.82] [-1.04] [0.15] [-0.89]
Volatility -0.328 -0.324 -1.592 0.567 -0.396 -0.273 1.236 1.165 4.037 -1.735 1.260 0.843
[-0.18] [-0.18] [-0.84] [0.38] [-0.21] [-0.18] [0.31] [0.29] [0.80] [-0.93] [0.31] [0.24]
Constant -0.469 3.012*** 1.268 1.505** 0.172 3.044*** -0.820 -10.07* -5.006 -5.163 -0.598 -9.171
[-0.63] [2.73] [1.49] [2.08] [0.24] [3.06] [-0.49] [-1.75] [-1.28] [-1.64] [-0.36] [-1.47]
Observations 6290 6290 6256 6158 6290 6125 6290 6290 6256 6158 6290 6125
Adjusted R-Squared 0.008 0.012 0.022 0.022 0.006 0.041 -0.007 -0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.007 0.015
Percentage of Stock and 
Option to-Total Comp.
Table 4: OLS Regressions on Measures of Incentives and Firm Size (cont.)
Table 4: OLS Regressions on Measures of Incentives and Firm Size (cont.) : OLS estimations of determinants of Vega, without severance in Panel A and with severance in Panel B, and Gamma, without severance in Panel C and with severance in Panel D.
Measures of firm size include the natural log of share price, log assets, log market value of equity, log book value of equity, and market-to-book ratio. Compensation controls includes percentage of cash-to-total compensation (inclusive of other compensation),
the percentage of stock and options to-total compensation, and expected remaining tenure. Controls for risk and valuation include book leverage (debt divided by total assets), Tobin's Q, and firm volatility computed using rolling 60-month periods of returns.
Results in Panel C indicate that gamma not including severance has negative and significant relatonships with share price (model 1), log assets (model 2), log market value of equity (model 3), and log book value of equity (model 4), when taken together (model
6) gamma has negative and significant relationships with log assets and log market value of equity. These results are not unexpected as gamma mathematically declines as share price increases above the strike price of options. Firm value is positively and
significant determinant of gamma. These suggest that CEOs of larger firms have less incentives relative to CEOs of smaller firms--which is consistent as CEOs from smaller firms have higher growth rathes which is consistent with gamma's relationship to firm
value. When severance is taken into account gamma appears to show almost no significance with firm size or value. Values reported in square brackets are t-stats, ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.





Table 5: Simultaneous Equations (3SLS): R&D, Capital Expenditures and Gamma
Dependent Variables of Eq 1.
Regressors of Eq 1. 
Gamma (No. Term) 19.985 *** 58.294 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Full Comp. Gamma -0.185 *** 0.444 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Vega (No. Term) -1.150 *** -7.735 ** 0.371 *** -0.393 ***
(0.009) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000)
Full Comp. Vega 0.325 *** -0.298 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Delta 0.418 *** 2.903 *** -0.024 *** 0.153 *** -0.010 *** 0.178 ***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Termination Payment -0.739 *** 0.502
0.000 0.159
Tenure 0.000 -0.010 ** -0.001 *** -0.006 *** -0.001 *** -0.010 ***
(0.507) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Compensation 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(0.560) (0.083) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Sales) 0.008 0.096 -0.023 *** -0.018 *** -0.023 *** -0.030 ***
(0.453) (0.160) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market-to-Book 0.002 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 * -0.007 ***
(0.560) (0.782) (0.203) (0.361) (0.065) (0.004)
Surplus Cash -0.012 -0.153 * -0.006 -0.020 -0.020 *** -0.113 ***
(0.447) (0.065) (0.176) (0.363) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales Growth 0.003 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 ***
(0.171) (0.205) (0.690) (0.406) (0.944) (0.006)
Stock Returns -0.008 -0.040 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.007 ***
(0.119) (0.162) (0.538) (0.600) (0.346) (0.006)
Book Leverage -0.035 *** -0.174 ** -0.052 *** -0.153 *** -0.032 *** -0.091 ***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2-Digit SIC Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.090 ** 0.206 0.181 *** 0.393 *** 0.198 *** 0.509 ***
(0.035) (0.420) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6247 6247 6247 6247 6247 6247
CAPEXCAPEXR&D CAPEXR&D R&D 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Table 5: Simultaneous Equations (3SLS): R&D, Capital Expenditures and Gamma
Table 5: Simultaneous Equations (3SLS): R&D, Capital Expenditures and Gamma : Simultaneous system estimations for
accounting meansure of investment behavior (R&D and CAPEX), Vega (with and without severance), Delta, and Gamma (with and
without severance) are presented. The reported estimates represent only the values from the first equation in the system. Other
equations in the system match those found in Coles, et al. (2006) and Model 1 is a 'calibration' model which matches their construction
completely--results are similar differences may result from time periods. In Model 2, Gamma (without severance) is added to the
estimation--results seem to indicate that gamma shows stronger investment in R&D and CAPEX than reported under Coles, et al.
(2006) with vega alone, vega appears to have little effect on investment behavior relative to gamma. Model 3 shows estimates where
gamma and vega include the effect of severance compensation. Results seem to indicate that when the incentives of severance are
incorporated into the model gamma indicates a reduction in risky-investment behavior (lower R&D, higher CAPEX), but a dramatically
reduced incentive to invest overall. The scales between models are the same. Vega (with severance) shows little change in incentive to
invest. Model 3 also documents a negative and significant relationship between R&D and severance payments and a positive
relationship between CAPEX and severance, though it is insignificant. P-values based on firm-clustered robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. ***,**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level repsectively. Construction of control variables
can be found in Appendix I of Coles, et al. (2006). 
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Table 6: Simultaneous Equations (3SLS): Firm Focus and Gamma
Dependent Variables of Eq 1.
Regressors of Eq 1. 
Gamma (No. Term) 63.530 *** -98.175 ***
(0.000) (0.001)
Full Comp. Gamma -0.246 * 8.012 ***
(0.094) (0.000)
Vega (No. Term) 1.633 ** -22.818 ** -1.317 *** 3.939 ***
(0.026) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Full Comp. Vega -1.064 *** 1.376 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Delta 0.113 1.521 -0.010 -0.838 *** -0.032 *** -0.431 ***
(0.523) (0.478) (0.378) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Termination Payment 2.006 *** 5.014
(0.001) (0.218)
Tenure -0.002 *** 0.032 *** 0.009 *** 0.035 *** 0.007 *** 0.033 ***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash Compensation 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.003)
ROA -0.015 ** 0.158 ** 0.029 *** -0.029 0.011 * -0.015
(0.036) (0.048) (0.000) (0.447) (0.090) (0.674)
Ln(Sales) -0.056 *** 0.702 *** 0.081 *** -0.036 *** 0.070 *** 0.026
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.222)
Market-to-Book -0.026 *** 0.282 *** 0.011 *** -0.024 * 0.008 ** -0.013
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.085) (0.012) (0.367)
Surplus Cash -0.111 *** 0.119 0.127 *** -0.625 *** 0.044 * -0.684 ***
(0.000) (0.723) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000)
Sales Growth 0.015 *** -0.127 ** -0.010 *** 0.006 -0.003 -0.014
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.672) (0.204) (0.263)
Stock Returns -0.040 *** 0.470 *** 0.024 *** 0.105 *** 0.001 0.157 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.817) (0.000)
Book Leverage 0.060 *** -0.419 -0.060 *** 0.002 -0.021 0.088
(0.008) (0.128) (0.000) (0.978) (0.170) (0.415)
2-Digit SIC Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.862 *** -0.552 -0.355 *** 0.869 *** -0.263 *** 0.456 ***
(0.000) (0.589) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 6247 6247 6247 6247 6247 6247
Ln(Seg)HHI of Segs Ln(Seg) HHI of Segs Ln(Seg) HHI of Segs
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Table 6: Simultaneous Equations (3SLS): Firm Focus and Gamma 
Table 6: Simultaneous Equations (3SLS): Firm Focus and Gamma : Simultaneous system estimations for sales concentration of
segments and number of segments of firms, Vega (with and without severance), Delta, and Gamma (with and without severance). Reported
estimates are for the first equation in the system, estimates of other equations in the system are available upon request. Construction of other 
equations in the system match those found in Coles, et al. (2006) and Model 1 is a 'calibration' model which produces estimates similar to
those found in Coles, et al. (2006). Model 2 has gamma (without severance) included--results show that the effect of vega switches and is
negatively and significantly associated with lower concentration of sales among segments and positively associated with a higher number of
segments (i.e. a reduction in firm focus overall). Gamma (without severance) has a large, positive and significant relationship with
concentration of sales among segments and a large, negative and significant relationship with number of segments (i.e. higher firm focus
overall). Model 3 reports estimates for vega and gamma where severance's incentives are included. Results indicate that with severance
gamma shows a negative and significant relationship with concentration of sales among segments and a positive and significant relationship
with number of segments. Vega's relationship remains unchanged from that of Model 2. This indicates that the incentives provided by
severance may reduce firm focus--although severance is positively and significantly related to sales concentration among segments. P-values 
based on firm-clustered robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***,**, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
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APPENDIX I: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND CONSTRUCTION 
 
APPENDIX I: 
Variable Name Description 
Termination Payment ($ mil)
Obtained from ExecuComp using the TERM_PYMT variable over the sample 2009 to 2015. 
Winsorized to the 1% level.
Change-In-Control Payment ($ mil)
Obtained from ExecuComp using the CHG_CTRL_PYMT variable over the sample 2009 to 2015. 
Winsorizied to the 1% level.
Termination Payment ( Scaled) TERM_PMYT/ AT
Change-In-Control Payment (Scaled) CHG_CTRL_PYMT/AT
Additionaly CEO Compensation Parameters 
As listed in the Variable Description section are obtained as listed under ExecuComp. They are 
winsorized to the 1% level. 
CEO Tenure 
Estimated as the amount of time a CEO has continuously remaiend in office since they took office, this is 
not to be confused with a multiple tenure CEO. This mesure more simply begins at 1 at the beginning of 
each tenure of the CEO. This variable is not winsorized.
CEO Age 
The current age for a given CEO in a given year, used to estimate age differentials in risk-taking behavior. 
This variable is not winsorized.
Delta of the Portfolio
Estimated to be the change in the portfolio value of a CEO given a 1-dollar change in the underlying share 
price of the firm. The value is reported in thousands of dollars of change and is winsorized as a part of its 
original construction. The construction of the variable requires use of the Black-Scholes Merton Option 
pricing model (Black & Scholes (1973); Merton (1973)). 
Vega of the Portfolio 
Estimated to be the change in the portfolio value of a CEO given a 1% change in the underlying share 
volatility of the firm. The value is reported in thousands of dollars of change and is winsorized as a part of 
its original construction. The construction of the variable requires use of the Black-Scholes Merton 
Option pricing model (Black & Scholes (1973); Merton (1973)). 
R&D Intensity XRD/ AT, as done in Daniel, Coles, Naveen (2006)
Capital Expenditure Intensity CAPX/ PPENT, as done in Daniel, Coles, Naveen (2006)
Marekt-to-Book Ratio (AT - Common Equity + PRFF_C *CSHO)/ AT
Financial Leverage (Long-Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities)/ AT
Market Financial Leverage ( Long-Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities)/ ( AT - Common Equity + PRFF_C*CSHO)
Sales Growth Log(Sales t /Sales t-1)
Dividend Yield DIV / PRFF_C
Tax Rate TXT/EBT 
Cash-To-Asset Ratio Cash and Equivalents / AT
Total Asset Turnover Sales / AT
Operating Expense Margin Total Operating Expenses / Sales
Profit Margin Net Income / Sales
ROA Net Income / AT
Ln(Segments) Ln( # Segments Reported under Compustat Segments Database)
APPENDIX 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND CONSTRUCTION
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Variable Name Description 
ToeHold 1 where percentage ownership is greater than 5% and zero otherwise
Hostile 1 where SDC Platinum's Attitude variable indicates that the deal is hostile or unsolicited, 0 otherwise
Tender
1 where SDC Platinum indicates the deal is a tender offer, private tender offer, or debt tender off, 0 
otherwise.
White-Knight 1 where SDC Platnium indicates the deal was taken on by a White-Knight or White Squire, 0 otherwise
Asset-Swap 1 where SDC Platinum indicates the deal was an asset swap, 0 otherwise
Tobin's Q 
(PRFF_C * CSHO) / Total Replacement Value of Assets, Total Replacement Value of Assets as 
reported by COMPUSTAT 
Volatiltiy rolling measure of prior 60-months of daily volatility logged
Tobin's Style Premium (M&A) Deal Value / Total Value of Assets Acquired reported by SDC Platinum 




APPENDIX II: Simultaneous Equations, Correlations and Robustness   
System of Simultaneous Equations Model 
 
  
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡  =      𝛾1,1𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +




=      𝛾1,3𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +
=                                          
=      𝛾1,5𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +
𝛾2,1𝐶ℎ𝑔.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3,1𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4,1𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  +1𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟏+1𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟏+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟏 + 𝑎1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  






                                         +3𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟑+3𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟑+3𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟑 + 𝑎3 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝛾4,4𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  +4𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟒+4𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟒+4𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟒 + 𝑎4 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝛾4,5𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡  +5𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝐁𝟓+5𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝐆𝟓+5𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝐙𝟓 + 𝑎5 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 
 
1𝐶𝑖,𝑡   = 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑂𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝.𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡




𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +                                      +  𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑂𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝.𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑂𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝.𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑂𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝.𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 
1𝐹𝑖,𝑡  = 𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡




𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑛(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 .
 
1𝑋𝑖,𝑡  = 𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖,𝑡




𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡                                 +  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖,𝑡




In Table AII.1: Pairwise Correlations I present in Panels A, B and C, separated for 
legibility; stars indicate that the correlation is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. 
A great deal of these correlations are positive and tend in the direction one would readily assume. 
There appears to be a positive correlation between Capital Expenditure Intensity and R&D 
Intensity, additionally Change-In-Control Payments Scaled is positively correlated with both R&D 
Intensity and Capital Expenditure Intensity and Termination Payment.  Termination Payment itself 
is positively correlated with Capital Expenditure Intensity but not R&D Intensity. The portfolio 
deltas and vegas here appear significantly but negatively and very lowly correlated with 
Termination Payment Scaled and Change-In-Control Payments Scaled but are positively and 
significantly associated with Termination Payment and Change-In-Control Payments when 
presented in millions of dollars. This is perhaps unsurprising as maintaining the comparability 
helps to increase correlation additionally this implies a size effect occurs between the relationship 
of the Delta, Vega and the Termination Payments and Change-In-Control Payments which is 
otherwise removed when scaled by assets. As I note in a later estimation, the loadings of Delta and 
Vega of the Portfolio are much stronger when I use dollar value termination and change in control 
payments than with scaled measurements.  
 
SURE and Mixed-Model Robustness  
As can be seen in Table 1, R&D Intensity—one of my primary measures for managerial 
risk-taking—is highly right-skewed whose mean lies above the median but the first three quartiles 
exhibit natural zero values. This is a result of many firms not reporting R&D expenditure for a 
specific year or at all. Perhaps they do not have R&D expenditure or the data is dirty in its 
collection; in order to correct for missing values, R&D expenditure is set to zero.  
This over-abundance of truncated natural or data specified zeros in the data set causes the 
seemingly odd distribution found here. Although I performed various transformations—not 
limited to the common natural logarithm, in which I employed the 𝑙𝑛(𝑥 + 𝑐) adjustment to correct 
for the zeros, square-root, inverse square-root and inverse transformation—none of these 
transformations performed particularly brilliantly. In the end I chose to use no transformation on 
R&D Expenditure or R&D Intensity, however, I propose in the future for extended investigation 
the use of mixture models. Such a suggestion may be implemented in the same vein as this essay 
via a simultaneous 3-Stage Tobit estimation in which each dependent variable is classed on the 
threshold or let to run as a normal linear estimation (Roncek 1992)) or Box-Cox transformations 
to better address this non-normality in the assay which may cause a violation of the Gauss-Markov 
theorem for Least-Squares estimation and cause the expected central tendency of the residuals to 
not tend towards ‘0’. Although not the focus of this dissertation, I implement these tests here in 
the Appendix II. 
Regardless of this inconvenient reality, the estimations will still produce BLUE of slope 
parameters, yet the intercept estimates will be biased: a significant problem when using indicator 
variables to capture effects. Since the intercept estimations are not my main concern in this essay, 
I move forward noting the apparent limitations and having given suggestions on further robust 
analysis via mixture models.  
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Another interesting pattern in the sample that can be seen in the quartiles is that average Sales 
for these firms is approximately 7-billion USD, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 470-
billion—which relates to Walmart’s revenue net of returns and allowances in 2015. As these 
numbers are highly skewed I do perform a log transformation which is also shown in the 
descriptive statistics. Also firms hold on average 17% of their Total Assets in Cash over the period 
and Total Assets itself is on average 8 billion USD with a maximum of 800 billion. On the whole 
it appears that most firms are profitable despite significant negative values in some datum resulting 
likely from residual fallout from the Great Recession; moreover, the average firm in the sample 
pays an effective tax rate of roughly 23% and 31% on median. Curiously volatility of firm shares 
is clustered with very little variance over-all and the average firm has 24% of its total capital 
funded by interest bearing debt.   
 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SUREs) 
 In order to address the foreseeable criticism that the use of 3SLS simultaneous modeling 
is not parsimonious. I perform a SURE estimation and compare the results to singularly estimated 
OLS models. If there is a difference in the results, it indicates that the OLS models are miss-
specified owing to correlation among the residuals of the component models and that the models 
are in fact related (Zellner (1962), Srivastava & Giles (1987)). This quick econometric robustness 
provides foundation to the use of 3SLS simultaneous estimations as perhaps a more efficient and 
overall parsimonious system for measuring the endogenous effects of severance and change-in-
control payments.  
 As can be seen in Table AII.2: SURE About Simultaneous Estimations the values are 
different in many cases—drastically different in a few. Additionally, the estimated adjusted R2 
helps to conclude that they are different enough that we can tell the system should be estimated 
using regressions that allow the error terms to correlate. It is a natural transition to move from 
SURE estimations into the generalized simultaneous equation world, it is for this reason that I 
implement with a level of surety in their parsimony systems of 3SLS in this essay.  
 
Mixed Model Analysis: Simultaneous TOBITs to treat Natural Zeros 
 As previously mentioned in section III.1 Description of Data there exists a natural 
occurrence of ‘0’s in several variables within the data set. While it appears that in the literature it 
is common to either entirely ignore this issue or more generally transform the data set in such a 
way as to refit the distribution centered around the 0s or to place the 0s within the distribution itself 
so that there does not exist a spike within a tail—this merely creates a spike within the data itself. 
While one could make the argument that such a spike would not alter tendency, which would be 
true if the distribution is assumed normal—a primacy for BLUE estimation under Gauss-Markov 
assumptions of OLS models—it would alter the normality of the distribution itself simply by the 
kurtosis and further still if the transformations do not affix the new transformed central tendency 
around 0, they will ultimately skew the distribution as well.  
Owing to the great repeated frequency of null case reports in R&D expenditure and Capital 
Expenditure, which would cause R&D Intensity and Capital Expenditure Intensity to likewise be 
cast to null, I raise the immediate and reasonable objection that the estimations may not be 
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unbiased and to test for this potential error I am faced with a quandary—controlling for natural 
‘0’s in a system of simultaneous estimation within a 3SLS framework.  
While not easy to execute it is possible to implement a multi-stage simultaneously 
estimated mixed model which allows for the truncated estimation of some equations of the system 
and continuous GLS (LIML within the simultaneous space) estimation where the equations 
regressand is not truncated. This allows me to control and regress intermittently the cases where 
R&D Intensity and Capital Expenditure Intensity are reported as ‘0’ and the entire remaining 
distribution where they are not, effectively capturing and controlling for the bias created in the 
distributions from the natural zeros—due to the simplistic flexibility of TOBIT models, I can more 
easily implement this assay by constructing the mixed model and allowing for R&D Intensity and 
Capital Expenditure Intensity each in their own system to be estimated using a TOBIT style 
regression58.  
Furthermore, I can allow for Termination Payment and Change-In-Control Payments—
which are also likely to be ridden with natural zeros as some firms do not pay severance or change-
in-control to their CEOs and some firms pay them only for certain years—to be estimated in a 
likewise fashion. In this way, I construct the simultaneous systems allowing for the main equation, 
R&D Intensity or Capital Expenditure Intensity, to be estimated with a TOBIT and I do the same 
for Termination Payments and Change-In-Control Payments. For Vega and Delta of the Portfolio 
I allow those to remain estimated in the continuous sense, as they can take on both positive and 
negative values varying with the CEO’s level of sensitivity to either the underlying volatility or 
the share price.  
I present the results of the system estimations as specified in Table AII.3: Mixed Model 
Robustness and Force-Field Hypothesis. The results indicate that even after controlling for natural 
zeros the estimations of the simultaneous equations using 3SLS framework in this essay are 
econometrically robust. There still appears to be a reduction in worth-while investment in R&D 
projects, a proxy for risk-taking, and an increased investment in capital projects, typically seen as 
risk reduction. In order to verify that my conditional result of reduced cash levels for firms which 
compensate CEOs with severance packages ex-ante is robust I also run the estimation on Cash-
To-Assets, however, this main equation in it system is made using a continuous estimation like that 
of Vega and Delta of the Portfolio as previously described, yet the Termination Payment and 
Change-In-Control Payment are still estimated using TOBIT models. The results are reported in 
the third-column of Table AII.3. They indicate that I do indeed continue to find reduced levels of 
cash for firms which compensate CEOs with severance—producing a robust verification of the 
cofounded theories of Harford et al. (2008) and Almazan and Suarez (2003) where a CEO 
compensated with severance reduces cash, spends it on capital projects—which may be self-
serving—and reduces the likelihood of being terminated by her board.  
 
                                                           
58 Implementation of the Mixed Model may be easiest performed in either R or STATA via the use of -cmp- command coded and 
released by Roodman (2009). I follow Roodman’s (2009) paper as a guide for implementing these Mixed Model estimations. Of 
additional interest to future research is the ability to ‘emulate’ various types of recursive simultaneous SUR style estimations such 
as those for biprobits, ivtobits, iterated SUR, Heckman selection models, etc. See Pagan (1979) & Roodman (2009). 
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Barriers to Internal Governance and Heterogeneity in Firm Size 
To investigate how behavior is affecting the CEO with respect to firm size, I stratified the 
firms into quartile groups based using Sales as a proxy for firm size. I chose not to use Total Assets 
because I wanted to capture the effect of size related to a specific firm’s overall performance. For 
example, a firm which has a large amount of assets may simply exist in an industry that requires 
large physical investment but has relatively low sales. Since CEOs are more than likely to be 
compensated on their ability to drive sales than they are on their ability to simply acquire assets—
I found it appropriate to use Sales as my proxy for size.  
Stratifying the sample into the four sub-samples I re-run the SSE on each sub-sample and 
report the most pertinent results: the parameter estimates of the Termination Payment, Change-In-
Control Payments, Delta of the Portfolio, and Vega of the Portfolio—all other controls omitted for 
brevity. I perform the estimation using both R&D Intensity and Capital Expenditure Intensity as a 
measure of CEO risk-taking. The results of these estimations are reported in Table AII.4. 
 
Panel A of Table AII.4 details the first quartile representing the smallest firms in the full-
sample59. There are some interesting effects of note here: severance contracts appear to continue 
to decrease risk-taking behavior via investment in worth-while R&D projects, however, there is a 
positive, yet insignificant, relationship with investment in capital assets. This might suggest that 
small firms will see decreased investment in R&D expenditures where they might otherwise prefer 
such investment given their larger opportunity for growth leading to higher market-adjusted 
returns (Fama & French 1993). Although not reported, this effect could be due to a lack of available 
funds for increased R&D expenditure—whereas some CEOs are compensated in such a way that 
their level of compensation is set based on ‘Peer Groups’ of firms within the industry which may 
not readily reflect the diminutive size of the firm. This might force a result of a negative 
relationship where a more interesting, and complicated, issue of relative size of the firm and CEO 
total compensation arise (Bizjak, Lemmon, Nguyen 2011; Gong, Li, Shin 2010; Black, Dikolli, & 
Hofmann 2011).  
Another interesting result from this panel is that there seems to be new relationship that 
forms between the Vega of the Portfolio and the severance payments. In both the R&D Intensity 
and Capital Expenditure Intensity regressions the vega of the portfolio is now positively related to 
the severance contract—which is largely the opposite of all prior estimations and the premise 
behind the use of severance compensation contracts—they reduce the CEOs sensitivity to volatility 
of the firm, at the very least they should hedge her downside risk and provide appropriate 
protections reducing the overall sensitivity.  
Although the Vega of the Portfolio correctly estimates the effects on risky investment, the 
indirect effect is puzzling. Effectively, while Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) documented the 
effect of setting the vega and delta of the CEOs compensation portfolio relative to the risk-taking 
behavior of increasing investment, they did not document the indirect effect of the severance 
contract upon the vega or when size of the firm is taken into consideration. For small firms it 
                                                           




appears that severance contracts ultimately increase the relative sensitivity of the CEO to the firm’s 
volatility—which would explain why CEOs of small firms shy away from R&D expenditure.  
Panel B describes the effect of the second quartile of size of the firms (25% - Median). It 
appears that the indirect effects of severance and change-in-control payments on vega have 
reverted to their normal relationship in that severance helps to reduce the sensitivity of the CEO 
to the firm’s volatility. However, for this lower-mid tier group of firms, severance contracts seem 
to increase intensities for both R&D intensity and capital expenditure intensity—leading to a 
conclusion of increased investment overall and expansion activities. It is not immediately clear 
how such a result factors into the traditional frame-work given both results indicate increased 
investment, but perhaps severance contracts, for these mid-level firms, are a useful means of 
inducing risk-taking behavior in managers. Indeed, it is likely the case in the mid-tier firms that 
severance levels are optimal and boards have greater monitoring capabilities owing to the size of 
the firm. Stronger boards help to reduce the power of a force-field, particularly where the CEO 
cannot erect one when monitoring costs are low, consistent with the prior analysis in sub-section 
V.6.   
 
Panel C estimates the effects of upper-mid tier group firms (Median – 75%), and shows a 
stable severance and change-in-control relationship with the determination of vega as was seen in 
prior estimations. But in this estimation we see that the main results of the prior estimations appear 
to take hold and severance loads negatively on R&D Intensity and positively on Capital 
Expenditure Intensity indicating a net overall shift away from risky investment in worth-while 
R&D programs to less risky investments in capital assets. Given the skewness implicit in the size 
distributions from the sample—it is not surprising that my main result should fall within this 
quartile group and confirms the prior hypotheses.   
Panel D estimates the large group firm effect; these firms are unique in that their size is so 
large, severance could end up having no effect. Indeed, I find that for large firms both the direct 
and indirect of severance on R&D Intensity are insignificant, and that only the effect of Change-
In-Control Payments is negatively associated with risk-taking. This result is consistent since large 
firms are relatively guarded from M&A activity and such a compensation scheme has low efficacy 
due to the reduced likelihood of being the target in an acquisition: resulting in CEOs interpreting 
the payout as equally unlikely to occur further reducing the effect of the incentive. Lastly, it could 
be the case that the size of the firm helps to stabilize the overall volatility such that severance’s 
effect is largely negligible, as can be seen with the insignificant results shown for Termination 
Payments here in Panel D. Even still for large firms, we see that severance does increase capital 
expenditure which suggests that CEOs are induced to invest—though it remains to be seen whether 
those investments are self-serving since there is little evidence that cash is depleted in large firms—
at least sufficiently enough that a severance agreement would constitute a burden. If it is true that 
CEOs erect barrier to governance in the previously examined ways, then CEOs of large firms 
should be increasing the capital expenditure in MSI projects which allows them to protect 
themselves and increase the cost of termination enough.   
There appears to be a significant and differing discrete size effect relating to severance and 
change-in-control payments on risk-taking. For small firms, severance could reduce risk and 
simultaneously make the CEO more sensitive firms to the underlying volatility; which may 
ultimately result in CEOs finding ways of hedging this sensitivity elsewhere, for example, via 
104 
 
reduced investment in risky-projects, for example. For medium size firms, severance results in an 
increase in risk-taking or the overall result of a total net reduction of investment in worth-while 
R&D projects but increased expenditure on capital assets, and reduced cash balances. And finally, 
large firms show little net benefit as a result of severance and this effect is largely significant and 
continuing monotonically from small firms to large firms. This effect is in of the barrier to 
governance as firms with higher severance, which correlates with size, are likely to see higher 
levels of reduced cash-to-asset ratios and ultimately a lower likelihood of terminating the CEO as 
they deride assets into capital expenditures and acquisitions making it more and more difficult to 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Log Sales Sale (mil $)
Financial 
Leverage 





Cash To Assets 
Ratio
Market to Book Ratio 1
Log Sales 0.0840* 1
Sale (mil $) 0.0356 0.4914* 1
Financial Leverage -0.0063 -0.014 -0.0009 1
Dividend Yield -0.0885* 0.0208 -0.0158 0.0062 1
Tax Rate 0.0383 0.1159* 0.0267 -0.0097 0.0182 1
CEO Continuous Tenure 0.0131 0.1145* 0.0313 0.033 -0.0287 0.009 1
Sales Growth -0.0074 0.008 0.0327 -0.0004 0.0166 0.0019 -0.0203 1
Cash To Assets Ratio -0.0382 -0.3886* -0.1028* -0.0216 0.0554* -0.1191* -0.0239 -0.008 1
CEO Age -0.0054 0.1039* 0.0749* 0.0083 0.0072 0.0241 0.4109* 0.0258 -0.0790*
Volatility -0.0222 -0.0649* -0.0198 -0.006 -0.0418 0.0096 -0.0419 -0.0084 0.0467
EBITDA 0.0538* 0.4644* 0.8292* 0.0005 -0.0059 0.0202 0.0389 0.037 -0.0651*
Operating Cash Flow 0.0482 0.4430* 0.8054* -0.0011 -0.0054 0.0189 0.0452 0.0343 -0.047
Tobin's Q 0.0378 0.0094 -0.0058 0.001 -0.001 0.0164 0.0221 -0.0011 -0.0321
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0564* 0.1301* 0.0288 -0.6748* 0.036 0.0503 -0.0062 0.0039 -0.02
Profit Margin 0.0101 0.0739* 0.0094 -0.0502 0.0101 0.0174 -0.0159 0.001 -0.0873*
Total Asset Turnover 0.0497 0.2128* 0.1347* -0.0163 -0.0305 0.0624* -0.0359 0.0081 -0.1490*
Operating Expense Margin -0.0103 -0.0712* -0.0091 0.0505 -0.0108 -0.0166 0.0171 -0.001 0.0860*
Total Assets (mil $) 0.0294 0.4007* 0.6967* 0.0048 -0.0121 0.0053 0.0671* 0.0123 -0.0676*














EBITDA 0.0650* -0.0271 1
Operating Cash Flow 0.0600* -0.027 0.9851* 1
Tobin's Q 0.026 -0.0157 -0.0072 -0.0069 1
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.0165 0.0059 0.045 0.041 0.0013 1
Profit Margin -0.0444 0.0104 0.012 0.0113 0.0013 0.1257* 1
Total Asset Turnover 0.0094 0.0026 -0.0585* -0.0644* 0.0194 0.0129 0.0364 1
Operating Expense Margin 0.045 -0.0111 -0.0126 -0.0118 -0.0011 -0.1255* -0.9926* -0.0324 1
Total Assets (mil $) 0.0695* -0.0237 0.8319* 0.8145* -0.0066 0.0202 0.009 -0.0773* -0.009
Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix with Sidak corrected errors for pairwise matches. Correlations are bolded and stared where significant at the 99% confidence level. Remaining correlation pairs 
are disclosed in Panel A and Panel B for the total of the variables represented
TABLE AII.1 : CORRELATION MATRIX  PANEL B
TABLE AII.1 : CORRELATION MATRIX  PANEL C
Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix with Sidak corrected errors for pairwise matches. Correlations are bolded and stared where significant at the 99% confidence level. Remaining correlation pairs 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Type of Primary Regression in 3SLS 
Mixed Model for Equation Specifying 
Regressand of Interest
Regressand of Interest 
Termination Payments (mil $) -0.00042 *** 0.00034 *** -0.00694 ***
Change of Control Payments (mil $) 0.00027 *** -0.00013 -0.00049
Delta of The Portfolio ($ 000) 0.00000 ** 0.00001 *** 0.00001 ***
Vega of The Portfolio ($ 000) 0.00008 *** -0.00002 0.00001
Salary 0.00000 -0.00001 ** -0.00001 **
Bonus 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Stock Awards 0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** 0.00000 **
Option Awards 0.00000 ** 0.00000 0.00000 ***
Non-Equity Incentive 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 ***
Other Compensation 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Market to Book Ratio 0.00058 -0.00328 * 0.00027
Log Sales -0.01058 *** -0.01533 *** -0.03481 ***
Financial Levearge 0.00290 *** -0.07238 *** -0.00150 *
Sales Growth 0.00000 -0.00002 -0.00002
Dividend Yield -0.00120 *** -0.00156 *** 0.00248 ***
Tax Rate -0.02027 *** 0.00647 -0.00791 **
CEO Continuous Tenure 0.00029 -0.00166 *** 0.00079 *
Cash-To-Assets 0.20251 *** 0.20237 ***
CEO Age -0.00056 *** -0.00206 *** -0.00094 ***
Constant 0.07327 *** 0.45749 *** 0.64382 ***
Observations
TABLE AII.3: Mixed Model Robustness and Force-Field Hypothesis. Three independently performed 
estimations using a mixed-model simultaneous 3SLS estimation with the parameter construction which follows the 
original 3SLS analysis performed in Tables 3 & 4. Parameter estimates for the first--main--equation in each 
system are reported here, all other equations in the system are omitted for brevity. The first estimation uses a 
TOBIT model to estimate R&D Intensity where the system is specified truncated for natural 0s in the equations 
for R&D Intensity, Termination Payment, and Change-In-Control. The second system also uses a TOBIT model 
to estimate Capital Expenditure Intensity where the system is specified truncated for natural 0s in the equations 
for Capital Expenditure Intensity, Termination Payment, and Change-In-Control. The final and third estimation 
uses a GLS (LIML in the simultaneous space) model to estimate Cash-To-Asset ratio dependent upon TOBIT 
style estimations for Termination Payment and Change-In-Control to control for natural 0s. The intent of these 
robustness regressions are to control for naturally occuring 0s in the data-sets which create spikes and non-
normal distributions with extreme excess kurtosis focused around 0. Using mixed models with truncated models 
where natural 0s are known to occur, I am able to separate the estimation procedure to account for this bias and 
more accurately estimate the model. It warrants noting that the estimations are consistent with prior analysis 
providing robust support for the Force-Field hypothesis. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 
indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
PANEL A: Mixed Model Simultaneous Estimation 










Termination Payments -0.05179 *** -37.88540 25.11943 *** 0.82532 ***
Change of Control Payments 0.07142 *** -151.12219 *** -10.98965 ** 0.88441 ***
Delta of The Portfolio 0.00001 0.08812 *** -0.00008 -0.00020 ***
Vega of The Portfolio 0.00082 *** 5.83672 *** 0.00195 *** -0.00167 **
Termination Payments 0.01530 -52.59231 17.25514 *** 0.81463 ***
Change of Control Payments 0.04761 *** -202.36661 *** 6.96540 0.86641 ***
Delta of The Portfolio 0.00033 *** 0.08854 *** -0.00013 ** -0.00016 ***
Vega of The Portfolio -0.00064 *** 5.80481 *** 0.00170 ** -0.00016
Obs 1630
Variables 
Termination Payments 0.02024 *** 347.00647 *** -47.79241 *** 0.68310 ***
Change of Control Payments -0.03172 *** -875.53360 *** 123.20675 *** 1.00070 ***
Delta of The Portfolio -0.00003 *** 0.14320 *** 0.00025 *** -0.00038 ***
Vega of The Portfolio 0.00028 *** 6.38033 *** -0.00076 *** 0.00181 ***
Termination Payments 0.02396 * 298.47264 *** -40.47104 *** 0.67609 ***
Change of Control Payments 0.05870 *** -870.69184 *** 119.16431 *** 0.99212 ***
Delta of The Portfolio 0.00010 *** 0.14778 *** 0.00022 *** -0.00036 ***





Delta of the 
Portfolio






Delta of the 
Portfolio






TABLE AII.4:Size Effects of Severance, Change-In-Control, Delta and Vega on Risk-Taking. Panels A and B. Separating
the full sample into quartiles based on size I rerun the 3SLS estimations across the four sub-sample size groups. Panel A: 1st
Quartile of Size (Small), contains the parameter estimates for the smallest size of firms. Only Termination Payments, Change-In-
Control Payments, Delta and Vega of the Portfolio are enumerated for brevity. Panel B: 2nd Quartile of Size (25% - 50%)
indicates the lower middle group of firms by size. Observations within the size groups are indicated below each panel. * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level
Table AII.4: Size Effect of Severance, Change-In-Control, Delta and Vega on 
Risk-Taking
PANEL A: 1st Quartile of Size (Small)
R&D Intensity
Delta of the 
Portfolio








Delta of the 
Portfolio










Termination Payments -0.01209 *** 258.48098 *** -34.12792 *** 0.43126 ***
Change of Control Payments -0.00403 -1358.42279 *** 214.58953 *** 0.92438 ***
Delta of The Portfolio -0.00001 *** 0.13815 *** 0.00008 *** -0.00021 ***
Vega of The Portfolio 0.00012 *** 5.78789 *** -0.00010 0.00101 ***
Termination Payments 0.07095 *** 234.81874 *** -46.68772 *** 0.45296 ***
Change of Control Payments -0.07513 *** -1251.70462 *** 210.73646 *** 0.96452 ***
Delta of The Portfolio 0.00003 *** 0.14462 *** 0.00007 *** -0.00018 ***
Vega of The Portfolio -0.00012 *** 5.80184 *** -0.00026 0.00094 ***
Obs 1652
Variables 
Termination Payments -0.00309 -615.29005 *** 24.68907 0.31934 ***
Change of Control Payments -0.02188 *** 646.39655 *** 199.68591 *** 0.74593 ***
Delta of The Portfolio -0.00001 *** 0.15624 *** -0.00005 *** 0.00002 ***
Vega of The Portfolio 0.00010 *** 3.66245 *** 0.00004 0.00024 ***
Termination Payments 0.11534 *** -584.36491 *** 17.54061 0.35732 ***
Change of Control Payments -0.14883 *** 659.71395 *** 158.20114 *** 0.79690 ***
Delta of The Portfolio 0.00001 *** 0.16133 *** -0.00006 *** 0.00003 ***
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PANEL C: 3rd Quartile of Size (50% - 75%)
PANEL D: 4th Quartile of Size (Large)
R&D Intensity
Delta of the 
Portfolio




TABLE AII.4:Size Effects of Severance, Change-In-Control, Delta and Vega on Risk-Taking. Panels C and D.  Separating 
the full sample into quartiles based on size I rerun the 3SLS estimations across the four sub-sample size groups. Panel C: 3rd
Quartile of Size (50%-75%), contains the parameter estimates for the upper middle quartile group of firm size. Only Termination
Payments, Change-In-Control Payments, Delta and Vega of the Portfolio are enumerated for brevity. Panel D: 4th Quartile of Size
(Large) indicates the grup of the largest firms by size. Observations within the size groups are indicated below each panel. *
indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates signifiance at the 5% level, *** indicates signifiance at the 1% level





APPENDIX III: CEO DEATH TABLES ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Year Became 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Tenure Year
1999 16.600 15.595
2000 16.600 15.595 15.870
2001 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939
2002 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939 13.594
2003 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939 13.594 12.564
2004 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939 13.594 12.564 11.740
2005 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939 13.594 12.564 11.740 11.021
2006 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939 13.594 12.564 11.740 11.021 9.763
2007 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939 13.594 12.564 11.740 11.021 9.763 9.032
2008 16.600 15.595 15.870 14.939 13.594 12.564 11.740 11.021 9.763 9.032 8.014
2009 16.921 15.595 15.870 15.293 13.594 12.564 11.740 11.116 9.856 9.123 8.014 6.888
2010 17.222 15.783 16.432 15.293 13.992 12.564 12.063 11.377 10.292 9.289 8.090 6.888 6.378
2011 17.500 16.528 16.803 15.583 14.241 12.961 12.588 11.619 10.627 9.758 8.363 7.324 6.378
2012 17.750 17.133 16.803 15.850 14.351 13.556 12.893 11.763 10.780 9.904 8.612 7.600 6.496
2013 17.967 17.536 16.942 16.092 14.539 13.846 13.076 11.887 10.981 10.164 9.018 7.660 6.646
2014 18.143 17.715 16.942 16.092 14.779 13.927 13.076 12.040 11.152 10.275 9.068 7.961 6.768
2015 18.269 18.010 17.110 16.244 15.125 14.052 13.248 12.295 11.242 10.361 9.265 8.084 6.926
Year Became 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Tenure Year
1999 14.761 14.463
2000 13.761 13.463 21.442
2001 12.761 12.463 20.442 21.879
2002 11.761 11.463 19.442 20.879 15.470
2003 10.761 10.463 18.442 19.879 14.470 15.002
2004 9.761 9.463 17.442 18.879 13.470 14.002 16.507
2005 8.761 8.463 16.442 17.879 12.470 13.002 15.507 16.416
2006 7.761 7.463 15.442 16.879 11.470 12.002 14.507 15.416 14.422
2007 6.761 6.463 14.442 15.879 10.470 11.002 13.507 14.416 13.422 15.894
2008 5.761 5.463 13.442 14.879 9.470 10.002 12.507 13.416 12.422 14.894 13.468
2009 5.082 4.463 12.442 14.233 8.470 9.002 11.507 12.511 11.515 13.985 12.468 10.952
2010 4.384 3.652 12.004 13.233 7.867 8.002 10.830 11.772 10.951 13.151 11.543 9.952 13.092
2011 3.661 3.397 11.374 12.523 7.117 7.399 10.355 11.014 10.286 12.620 10.816 9.389 12.092
2012 2.911 3.001 10.374 11.790 6.227 6.994 9.660 10.158 9.440 11.766 10.065 8.665 11.209
2013 2.128 2.404 9.513 11.032 5.415 6.284 8.843 9.281 8.640 11.026 9.471 7.724 10.359
2014 1.304 1.583 8.513 10.032 4.655 5.366 7.843 8.435 7.811 10.137 8.521 7.025 9.482
2015 0.431 0.878 7.682 9.184 4.001 4.490 7.015 7.689 10.242 9.223 7.719 6.148 8.639
Average Tenure Expectancy 
Standarized Remaining Tenure
𝐸 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝐶𝐸𝑂 = 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑥+ 𝑒𝑥
𝑆𝑑.𝑒𝑥 =   e r  C O Be   e C O −Δe  , −1
  e r  C O Be   e C O =   1−𝑀 +0.5( 1−𝑀 )𝑀𝑖
𝑖−1
  1 
𝑖








Year Became 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Tenure Year
1999 15.761 14.463
2000 15.761 14.463 21.442
2001 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879
2002 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879 15.470
2003 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879 15.470 15.002
2004 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879 15.470 15.002 16.507
2005 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879 15.470 15.002 16.507 16.416
2006 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879 15.470 15.002 16.507 16.416 14.422
2007 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879 15.470 15.002 16.507 16.416 14.422 15.894
2008 15.761 14.463 21.442 21.879 15.470 15.002 16.507 16.416 14.422 15.894 13.468
2009 16.082 14.463 21.442 22.233 15.470 15.002 16.507 16.511 14.515 15.985 13.468 10.952
2010 16.384 14.652 22.004 22.233 15.867 15.002 16.830 16.772 14.951 16.151 13.543 10.952 13.092
2011 16.661 15.397 22.374 22.523 16.117 15.399 17.355 17.014 15.286 16.620 13.816 11.389 13.092
2012 16.911 16.001 22.374 22.790 16.227 15.994 17.660 17.158 15.440 16.766 14.065 11.665 13.209
2013 17.128 16.404 22.513 23.032 16.415 16.284 17.843 17.281 15.640 17.026 14.471 11.724 13.359
2014 17.304 16.583 22.513 23.032 16.655 16.366 17.843 17.435 15.811 17.137 14.521 12.025 13.482
2015 17.431 16.878 22.682 23.184 17.001 16.490 18.015 17.689 19.242 17.223 14.719 12.148 13.639
Standardized Average Tenure Expectancy 
𝑆𝑑.𝐸 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝐶𝐸𝑂 = 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑥+𝑆𝑑. 𝑒𝑥
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APPENDIX IV: VALUATION OF DIGITAL AND DYNAMIC BARRIER 
OPTIONS AND SELECTED FIRST AND SECOND ORDER GREEKS 
DERIVATIONS 
 
In order to motivate the construction of the digital barrier, I need to borrow the frame-work of Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973, 1976) and most importantly to follow closely the seminal work of 
Rubinstein and Reiner (1991, 1995) in developing these simple, yet, elegant models. These models are well 
known to the realm of quantitative and option pricing in finance, and perhaps are used most extensively by 
exotic option’s trading desks and individuals and actuaries of the insurance industry who may find them 
useful for quantifying risk. I do not extend the literature here in these summarizations and derivations, but 
only provide a simplified and pertinent to the topic of these papers explanation in order to motivate the 
arguments contained within. The scholarship for these derivations can, in large part, be attributed to 
Rubinstein and Reiner and in the case of some more complicated barrier-style options, Merton for his initial 
derivations. In short, this appendix is meant to serve as an immediate primer for individuals operating in 
corporate financial research who do not regularly use options or exotic options in their work and may be 
unfamiliar with their pricing methods.  
 
Pricing of Digital, or Binary, Options   
 Digital options, also called Binary options, are so called because their payout takes on either 0 or 1 
in value. Although their name may suggest a likeness with computing, their use is actually one of the very 
first options ever constructed, the pure gamble, that a value will be below or above a stated amount. If the 
gamble should finish ‘in the money’ then the payout is 1 dollar, or however many multiples of 1 dollar in 
the number of contracts purchased. If the contract or gamble should finish ‘out of the money’ or is a ‘bad 
bet’ then the gambler would face 0 earnings, and the house (the underwriter or call or put writer in this 
case) of the option would keep the premium paid for the bet. Naturally such bets have an attractive payout 
ratio relative to the cost, as to all options: and can be easily interpreted in reality as an incremental bet on 
each square in the game of roulette. 
In a financial setting digital options are most often used to trade, or more functionally gamble, upon 
whether or not a stock’s price, or other asset—such as forex pairs—will exist above a certain price or below 
a certain price on or before expiration, and the payout for being correct is 1 dollar or you lose your entire 
investment in the bet. Owing to the fact that digital calls and puts take on their value of 1 or 0 depending 
on where the price is in relation to the strike and the payout does not continue to increase in value once the 
option is ‘in the money’: there is no need to determine the risk-adjusted probability difference of the price 
ending ‘in the money’ for a given share price and strike. For digital options there is simply the need to 
determine the present value risk-adjusted probability that the option will execute ‘in the money’ which is 
given simply by:  
𝑽𝑸𝑪 = 𝑸𝒆
−𝒓𝝉𝜱(𝒅𝟐) (𝐴𝐼𝑉. 1) 
for a standard digital call option, where Q is value of the payout (1 dollar in the prior discussion), and for a 
standard digital put option it is: 
𝑽𝑸𝑷 = 𝑸𝒆
−𝒓𝝉𝜱(−𝒅𝟐) (𝐴𝐼𝑉. 2) 
 These pricing kernels are much simpler than the previous pricing kernels of the of the vanilla call 
and put options. Coincidentally their derivatives can be easily solved as well. Here I provide the simplified 




Delta of Digital Call and Put Option  
 Taking equation AIV.17 and partially differentiating with respect to the share price we have: 
𝜕𝑉𝑄𝑠
𝜕𝑆𝑡




) (𝐴𝐼𝑉. 3) 





With respect to the digital put option, the computations are nearly identical with the exception of a negative, 
𝜕𝑉𝑄𝑃
𝜕𝑆𝑡








Gamma of Digital Call and Put Option  
 Taking equation AIV.4 and AIV.5 and differentiating a second time with respect to 𝑆𝑡 we obtain the 


























for simplification define a constant 𝐴 =
𝑄𝑒−𝑟𝜏
𝜎√𝜏































































Again, let A be a constant here defined as 𝐴 = −
𝑄𝑒−𝑟𝜏
𝜎√𝜏




















2 ]  
































Vega of Digital Call and Put Option  








































































using the partial of 𝑑2, we can now solve the vega of the digital call option: 
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Rho of Digital Call and Put Option  
The rho of the digital call and put options indicates how the options value changes with respect to 






























similarly, for a digital put: 
𝝆𝑸𝑷 = 𝝉𝑸𝒆
−𝒓𝝉𝝓(−𝒅𝟐)
√𝝉
𝝈
(𝐴𝐼𝑉. 12) 
 
